What exactly is the Bromine Science and Environmental Forum (BSEF)?
The name suggests an academic body or an environmentalist
organisation. Or could this ‘forum’ be some sort of coalition bringing
together scientists, environmentalists and other stakeholders? In
reality, BSEF has only four members: the world’s major producers of
bromine flame retardants, based in the US, Israel and Japan¹. When
the commercial interests of these four companies were threatened by
plans to ban some of their products from the EU market, they turned to
public relations giant Burson-Marsteller for assistance.
Well-experienced in running front groups, Burson-Marsteller helped to
set up the Bromine Science and Environmental Forum and the PR firm has
ever since run BSEF’s EU operations from its office on Av. de
Cortenbergh 118 in Brussels. Until recently, the corporate nature of
BSEF and the key role of Burson-Marsteller in its operations was
routinely kept vague or simply hidden. To add to the impression of a
house of mirrors, Burson-Marsteller’s Brussels office also runs
several other bromine industry outfits fighting EU bans, such as the
Alliance for Consumer Fire Safety in Europe (ACFSE) and the European
Brominated Flame Retardant Industry Panel (EBFRIP), which consists of
three of the four BSEF corporations².

Industry front?

Established in 1997, BSEF in the first many years managed to operate
relatively unchallenged, but the group has run into heavy criticism.
The California-based Environmental Working Group, for instance, in a
July 2003 report called the BSEF “a lobbying front dedicated to
casting doubt on the mounting evidence against brominated
chemicals³“. In a recent Open Letter calling the EU Commission to
introduce binding rules on lobbying, BSEF was described as an
“industry front group run from the Brussels offices of a global PR
firm, on behalf of chemical industry clients⁴”. This sparked a swift
reaction from BSEF, which just a few days later published a statement
on a widely read EU-focused news site. In the statement BSEF presented
itself as “dedicated to further the scientific and regulatory
understanding of brominated chemicals including flame retardants” and
argued that they have no secrets and “have staff and employ
consultants like many other bodies in Europe”. The statement explained
that “the fact that we share office space with our outside EU
consultant makes perfect sense in terms of cost and operational
efficiencies and has never been concealed (it is on the name plaque at
the entrance of the building⁵).” The name plaque in the lobby of the
grey office building on Cortenbergh 118 in the Brussels EU quarter
indeed shows the BSEF logo next to that of their “outside EU
consultant”, Burson-Marsteller. Also Dead Sea Bromine Group (now
renamed ICL Industrial Products) and the Great Lakes Chemical
Corporation receive mail at Cortenbergh 118.

On December 10th, BSEF chairman Dr Raymond Dawson (of the Albemarle
Corporation, based in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, US) sent Corporate
Europe Observatory a slightly amended version of the statement. “We
represent the interests of our members and employ consultants like
many other bodies in Europe”, writes Mr. Dawson, who flies into
Brussels once in a while to assist Burson-Marsteller in BSEF lobbying
activities⁶. The words “have staff” were omitted and for a good
reason. Mr. Dawson in his letter no longer referred to
Burson-Marsteller as BSEF’s “outside EU consultant”, but simply “EU
consultant”. But also this slightly adapted description does not do
justice to the nature of the relationship. Without Burson-Marsteller
there would be no BSEF.

BSEF employs no staff of its own in Brussels. Everyone working for
BSEF from the Cortenbergh 118 offices is a Burson-Marsteller
consultant, from Program Director Lawrie McLaren to Angela Albers of
the secretariat⁷. In fact, as Corporate Europe Observatory’s Erik
Wesselius was told when he met with Raymond Dawson and Lawrie McLaren
at Cortenbergh 118 in mid-January, the whole BSEF budget goes through
Burson-Marsteller⁸.

Online transparency?

Selective transparency and pulling up smokescreens are routine
practice for BSEF. Dawson wrote in his December 10 letter that “There
is absolutely no secret about what interests BSEF represents, who its
members are, or where our offices are located. All this information is
readily available on our website, www.bsef.com.” Dawson fails to
acknowledge that the BSEF website recently has gone through a major
overhaul which added a lot of new information. Improved transparency
is always to be appreciated, but in this case it seems to be only
aimed at limiting PR damage to the BSEF after it was publicly
challenged over its highly selective openness.

The four BSEF member corporations, which could previously only be
found by clicking a button, are now prominently mentioned on the BSEF
home page. The link with Burson-Marsteller was previously not
mentioned at all, but after the overhaul curious visitors can discover
the connection. A new “contact” category lists two staff people as
working for Burson-Marsteller, including Lawrie McLaren who was
previously presented only as BSEF Program Director (he used to be the
only BSEF representative figuring on the website⁹).

The overhaul of the website also brought a change in tone and a move
to a more conciliatory discourse. Glossing over the essential role of
Burson-Marsteller, the website describes the rationale for
establishing the BSEF as follows: “producers of bromine were concerned
to investigate the real scientific basis on key issues, believing in
some cases that concerns were valid and action needed to be taken and
in some cases that allegations were overblown for political
reasons¹⁰.” In reality, BSEF has consistently fought against bans
and restrictive regulation on bromine flame retardants, while only
accepting the need for phase-out in cases when the lobbying battle was
lost.

A few weeks after Corporate Europe Observatory received the letter
from BSEF Chairman Ray Dawson, another letter came in, this time from
Jeremy Galbraith, CEO of Burson-Marsteller Brussels. Galbraith wrote
that “references to Burson-Marsteller and our clients contain many
factual errors¹¹”. Corporate Europe Observatory replied on January
5th, asking Mr. Galbraith to send a full list of the alleged factual
errors, but we have not received such a list yet¹².

A lobby group with a green and scientific sounding name where all
staff members are actually employed by a PR firm, while the bills are
paid by four chemicals producers? This might have been simply
peculiar, if there wasn’t so much at stake for human health and the
environment in Europe and the rest of the world.

Bromines under fire

Bromine flame retardants (BFRs) are chemical compounds used in many
products, ranging from electronics or computer casings to textiles and
furniture, in order to reduce the risks of fire. The re are several
types of brominated flame retardants on the market, but the debate on
potential risks has centred around the so-called polybrominated
diphenyl ethers or PBDEs. These substances are used in three technical
mixtures: penta, octa and deca. Evidence is growing that PBDEs pose a
serious risk to human health and the environment and they are often
compared to toxins like DDT and PCBs, both banned in most parts of the
world in the 1970s. Sweden took the lead in investigating the effects
of these flame retardants, after toxics in the breast milk of Swedish
women were discovered in the 1990’s. According to scientific studies,
PBDEs interfere with the body’s hormone system and foetus development,
resulting in unusual types of cancer, disturbance of brain development
and reduced resistance to disease¹³. Toxic flame retardants can be
replaced by the use of low flammability materials and fire protection
systems.

The BSEF member corporations are responsible for 85% of the total
global production of bromines and the organisation has over the last
seven years worked to prevent regulatory bans and restrictions that
were on the way. On the question why BSEF established itself in
Brussels, Chairman Ray Dawson responded that “chemicals policy
world-wide is led by the EU¹⁴.” As EU environment and health
regulations create momentum for similar legislation elsewhere around
the world, BSEF concentrated on Brussels first. Since then it has also
started lobbying campaigns in the US, including on the state level in
California and Hawaii. Peter OŽToole of BSEF/Burson-Marsteller US
explained the rationale for establishing the BSEF in Washington D.C.
offices (c/o Burson-Marsteller): “Clearly, a lot of the hot and heavy
action is happening in Europe. Now it seems California is picking up
on it¹⁵.”

Lies of omission?

One example of the BSEF’s very selective approach to transparency is
the groups’ February 2003 press release celebrating the Dutch
government’s decision to end a ban on BDBPT, another bromine flame
retardant. The press release praises bromine flame retardants across
the board and presents the BSEF as a group dedicated to higher fire
safety standards¹⁶. The press releases nowhere mentions that BSEF
represents the producers of BDBPT, nor is Burson-Marsteller mentioned.
Contact persons are Lawrie McLaren and a Dutch Burson-Marsteller
consultant. All press releases issued by the BSEF in 2004 (as posted
on the BSEF website) fail to disclose the 100% corporate nature of the
Bromine Science and Environmental Forum.

What is a front group?

With the BSEF, the bromine industry and Burson-Marsteller uses what
PRWatch defines as the third party technique. This technique has been
defined by one PR executive as “putting your words in someone else’s
mouth.” PR firms often employ the third party technique by using
scientists as seemingly independent, authoritative experts to back up
a corporate position. Well-known examples of this are the army of
phoney but nevertheless often influential ‘scientists’ that have been
paid by corporate interests to deny the reality of climate change or
the harmful effects of smoking on human health. Corporate sponsored
groups created by PR firms to appear as “independent” third parties is
another tactic commonly used in the US. The BSEF comes out of this
dubious tradition. In words of Amanda Little of Burson-Marsteller
Sidney, “For the media and the public, the corporation will be one of
the least credible sources of information, on its own product,
environmental and safety risks. Both these audiences will turn to
other experts … to get an objective viewpoint¹⁷“.

PRWatch defines front groups and industry-funded organisations as “an
organisation that purports to represent one agenda while in reality it
serves some other party or interest whose sponsorship is hidden or
rarely mentioned¹⁸.” Even when it is disclosed that the funding
comes from industry, as the BSEF generally (but far from
systematically) does, there are many other forms of deception. As
PRWatch notes, “this sort of manipulation doesn’t necessarily entail
outright lies of commission, but it typically entails lies of omission
that disguise the identity of the message’s sponsor… Using lies of
omission rather than commission enables the people who participate in
front groups to rationalise that they aren’t really doing anything
wrong.

The bromine corporations lobby as BSEF, as individual companies and
under the official industry umbrella the European Brominated Flame
Retardant Industry Panel (EBFRIP) – which is also run by
Burson-Marsteller¹⁹! As if this is not enough, there is also the
Alliance for Consumer Fire Safety in Europe (ACFSE), which also has
its secretariat address at 118 Avenue Cortenbergh. The public face of
ACFSE is British fire-fighter Robert Graham, whose campaign for
bromine flame retardants included putting furniture on fire in front
of the European Parliament building in Strasbourg. On ACFSE’s
stationery the address does show the link with the PR agency (“c/o
Burson-Marsteller”), but the connection with the bromine industry is
concealed²⁰. The ACFSE website (just recently taken offline)
presented horror stories of consumer products combusting. The site
solicited membership from fire-fighters, scientists, consumers
organisations, etc. Contact persons in ACFSE press releases were
Burson-Marsteller consultants. The PR firm also uses the website www.
firesafety.org as an additional voice in defence of brominated flame
retardants (BFRs).

Dark record

BSEF claims to be “dedicated to further the scientific and regulatory
understanding of brominated chemicals including flame retardants”. The
history of the bromine producers behind the BSEF however does not make
it easy to believe this noble mission. As documented by the US-based
Political Ecology Group in their 1997 report The Bromide Barons, the
US companies involved in the BSEF have a track record of blocking,
delaying and weakening a US ban against methyl bromide, a hazardous
but highly profitable chemical²¹. BSEF member Albemarle Corporation
(which owns the Ethyl Corporation) also has a particularly dark
history of attempting to delay the phase-out of lead gasoline in the
US.

The BSEF has two sets of closely related activities. In the BSEF’s own
words these are to “commission science on BFRs and bromine and to
educate decision-makers on the results of this science, and to
represent the bromine industry on issues of environment and human
health²²”. In reality, however, this seems to boil down to
subcontracting ‘science’ that fit BSEF purposes and to lobby
parliamentarians, government officials and regulators against
restrictions on the use of the bromine flame retardants.

Parliament upsets BSEF

In 2001, the BSEF lobbied to influence the European Parliament’s
decision-making on two directives which could lead to bans or
restrictions on bromine flame retardants²³. In the run-up to the
vote, BSEF (or more likely Burson-Marsteller) produced several glossy
newsletters titled “Bromine is best”. The issue that was released on
the eve of the vote, included a detailed overview of the amendments
that the BSEF wanted MEPs to support and which not²⁴. All amendments
from the two UK conservative MEPs Goodwill and Bowis got the BSEF’s
thumbs-up (“maintains fire safety”), whereas most other amendments
were rejected as “unjustified discrimination”, etc. “BFRs are not
dangerous substances”, the newsletter claimed. It however also
acknowledged that penta-BDE & PBB, are of concern for environment and
health and that the industry was phasing out PBB on a voluntary basis
and would comply with a ban on penta-BDE.

Still it came as a bad surprise for the BSEF when the European
Parliament in September 2001 voted to ban not only penta-BDE, but also
octa-BDE and deca-BDE. An EU risk assessment had already concluded
Penta-BDE to be a risk to the environment and the Parliament made the
ban on the two latter dependent on the outcome of ongoing assessment
procedures. Robert Campbell of BSEF member company Great Lakes
Chemical Corporation called the Parliament’s decision a “dangerous
precedent²⁵”.

According to an industry newswire, Campbell “disagreed with Europe’s
characterisation of these chemicals as hazardous²⁶.” “The potential
risks of these chemicals need to be compared to the substantial risk
of harm caused by people being burned,” Campbell said²⁷. Even the
penta-BDE ban angered Campbell, who stated that “Great Lakes could
have conducted additional studies to refute that conclusion but
decided not to do so because the European market for this chemical is
so small that it did not warrant the investment²⁸.”

After this set-back, the BSEF concentrated its lobby strategy on the
risk assessments of the two other bromine flame retardants and
particularly decabrominated diphenyl ether (deca-BDE). The European
Parliament wanted to include not only penta-BDE and octa-BDE, but also
deca-BDE in the general ban, as it was to be banned in the directive
on electrical and electronic equipment, but was unable to move the
Council of Ministers to support this in the conciliation negotiations.
Restrictive action on deca-BDE was postponed until the Community risk
assessment report was completed. Deca-BDEs account for 91% of the
total volume of PBDEs used in Europe in 2001. This explains why the
bromine corporations prioritised preventing a ban on this product.

Silencing critics?

The BSEF has a remarkably aggressive strategy towards critics exposing
the impacts of toxic bromine products. In a May 2003 letter on behalf
of the BSEF, the law firm Harbottle & Lewis urged newspapers and
television broadcasters not to cover the warnings against BFRs issued
by WWF and other environmental groups. The letter advised the media to
consult Lawrie McLaren on issues related to BFRs and ended with the
following blunt notification: “We should state for the record that our
clients will be monitoring future press and media coverage on the
issue of BFRs, and will not hesitate to pursue all remedies available
to them should there be any incorrect or inaccurate statements in
relation to BFRs that adversely affect our clients’ businesses²⁹.”

BSEF’s lobby coup

The final decision whether or not to ban deca-BDE was to be based on
the results of a ten-year long EU risk assessment study initiated by
the European Commission in 1994. But long before the study was
concluded the bromine industry kicked off an intensive lobbying
campaign to influence the results. The conclusion of the study was to
be finalised in May 2004 and in the months before industry built up
strong pressure on the regulators, who had clearly indicated that they
were considering to recommend banning the chemical.

It was also in this crucial phase of decision-making that the BSEF, in
the words of Axel Singhofen, assistant to the Greens in the European
Parliament and a witness to the decision-making process on the PBDEs,
managed to “land a real coup by making the Commission say that the
directive on the restriction of certain hazardous substances in
electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS) did not cover deca-BDE,
contrary to what the Commission always intended to do³⁰”.

Although it was entirely clear that the ban of PBDEs in the RoHS
directive did include deca-BDE, Lawrie McLaren convinced the
Commission director in charge to issue a statement exempting deca-BDE.
In a letter dated 25 February 2004, D. Grant Lawrence of DG
Environment assured Lawrie McLaren that Deca-BDE “is currently covered
by the exemptions” and that this would remain the case unless the risk
assessment concluded restriction is necessary³¹. The remarkable
letter, starting with a amicable “Dear Lawrie”, must have been
celebrated as a major victory at Cortenbergh 118 as well as in the
headquarters of BSEF member corporations.

The BSEF wasted no time. On March 3, it released a statement saying
that “The European Commission’s Environment Directorate-General has
now been able to clarify to BSEF in writing that Deca-BDE is exempted
from the RoHS Directive’s restrictions”. Stretching the truth quite a
bit, the statement claimed that “This is the formal view of the
European Commission as a whole including its Legal Services³².”

However, their triumph did not last long. A week later a cross-party
protest letter from six MEPs³³ forced then Environment Commissioner
Margot Wallström to override her director and to reconfirm the ban.
The letter to Wallström made clear that the legislative intent of the
majority of the European Parliament had been to include Deca-BDE in
the ban, as the Commissioner herself had acknowledged in a plenary
debate at the Parliament in April 2002. Wallström’s response letter
left no space for doubt: “It is clear from the text agreed by the
co-legislators that Deca-BDE is at present banned and this ban will be
subject to a review in the light of the risk assessment³⁴.”

Luring the regulators?

After an angry initial reaction³⁵, the BSEF re-focused on the risk
assessment procedure which could get the European Commission to review
the status of Deca-BDE before the directive comes into force.

Documents obtained by Corporate Europe Observatory reveal some rather
blunt BSEF lobbying tactics towards the European Chemicals Bureau
(ECB), which plays a key role in EU risk assessments³⁶. Aiming to
influence the outcome of an important December 2003 meeting of EU
regulators deciding on the future of Deca-BDE, then BSEF Chairman
David Sanders sent a fax to Dr. Vollmer, Head of Unit at the ECB.
Following up on a meeting they held on 14 November, Sanders reminded
Vollmer that “we rely on the ECB as the chair of the meeting to ensure
that the Member State representatives do not, for example, invoke the
precautionary principle³⁷.” A remarkable request, as the
precautionary principle has since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty been
enshrined as the very basis of European Union environmental policy.

The anxiously expected assessment report, finalised in May 2004,
concluded that there is insufficient risk proven to impose a general
restriction on deca-BDEs. The report however also states that
continued monitoring the environmental effects of the substance is
necessary. According to Axel Singhofen, the controversial decision was
influenced by the BSEF’s voluntary commitment to develop, in
collaboration with regulators, a programme of emissions reductions and
independent environmental monitoring³⁸. The programme however only
covers emissions from the production of deca-BDE, which accounts for a
minority of the total emissions to the environment. This means that
the overwhelming majority of emissions which occur in the waste phase
will simply continue.

Now that an EU-wide ban has become unlikely, the Swedish government
has announced that it will move ahead with a national ban on deca-BDE.
Environment Minister Lena Sommestad commented that: “We know that
deca-BDE is a persistent substance that spreads in the environment.
The best thing to do would be an EU-wide ban. But as things are moving
this slowly we must now push the issue ourselves³⁹.”

Industry reacted swiftly on the Swedish moves which they claimed are
“not justified by science and which appears to be a clear case of
political prejudice as it deliberately disregards a European
scientific assessment⁴⁰.” The European Bromine Flame Retardant
Industry Panel (EBFRIP) asked the European Commission to act and
prevent the Swedish ban.

Sound Science?

The BSEF also uses more subtle, but problematic, ways to influence the
debate about BFRs. Its sponsors scientific studies, which tend to
conclude that the disputed bromine compounds are in fact good for the
environment. In his letter to CEO, BSEF Chairman Raymond Dawson boasts
that “the BSEF has commissioned more than 100 studies from independent
scientists and scientific institutes⁴¹.” How many of these studies,
one is tempted to ask, have resulted in conclusions that did not fit
the commercial interests of the producers of the chemicals in
question? When the results of these studies get published in academic
and scientific magazines, often the link with the bromine corporations
that sponsored the study is not clearly disclosed. An example is the
article on the “Comparison of the Recyclability of Flame-Retarded
Plastics”, published in the Journal of Environment, Science and
Technology, February 2003. Although the article acknowledges the
involvement of the Bromine Science and Environmental Forum in the
study, it doesn’t clarify that the sole members of the BSEF are the
world’s four largest bromine producers.

The BSEF clearly uses ‘science’ as a political tool. The group has
systematically attempted to discredit other scientific reports with
conclusions that did not fit their agenda. An example is the so-called
Viberg study, which raised serious concerns about the developmental
neurotoxicological effects of deca-BDE on mice brains⁴².

Another example: when scientists discovered three forms of PBDEs in
the arctic regions of Canada, BSEF issued a statement downplaying the
importance of the study. In a statement mirroring decades of industry
denial of the dangers other toxic chemicals, the BSEF stated that “In
this type of forbidding environment, some algae naturally produce some
brominated compound types⁴³.”

In correspondence with the European Commission obtained by Corporate
Europe Observatory, the bromine industry does not appear driven by the
pursuit of scientific truth about the environment and health impacts
of PBDEs⁴⁴.

The correspondence shows how representatives of BSEF, EBFRIP and the
individual corporations – acting collectively or on their own – acting
collectively or on their own – have exerted pressure to avoid EU-bans,
particularly on deca-BDE, their main endangered money-maker.
Environmental NGOs calling for a precautionary ban were discredited
and their positions caricaturised, in particular WWF. “It is clear
that WWFŽs agenda is to ban any chemical found in the environment no
matter the minimal degree of risk⁴⁵,”

The potential of disclosure rules

When Burson-Marsteller’s front group constructions are exposed, the
company’s standard response is to pretend that nothing is wrong. BSEF,
Alliance for Consumer Fire Safety and the European Brominated Flame
Retardant Industry Panel are all run by Burson-Marsteller. According
to Dawson and McLaren this is a quite normal construction for chemical
sector organisations⁴⁶. While this may be the reality that has
developed in Brussels over the past decade, the real question is of
course whether these practices are desirable or even acceptable from a
democratic point of view.

According to sources in the European Parliament, MEPs being approached
by Lawrie McLaren or other BSEF lobbyists are very unlikely to know
that the group and its activities are de facto run by
Burson-Marsteller. The European Parliament’s code of conduct requires
PR consultants to disclose their client⁴⁷, but in this case the
problem is the opposite. McLaren pretends to represent an interest
group which in reality only exists because four corporations based in
the US, Israel and Japan pay him and others at Burson-Marsteller to
fight EU restrictions on their products. Parliamentarians (and the
general public) have the right to know the full truth about the BSEF.

The BSEF-Burson-Marsteller pantomime underlines that EU rules on
lobbying are absurdly weak and totally insufficient to address the
problematic aspects of lobbying at the EU level. Without a radical
improvement of the registration and reporting obligations for
lobbyists at the European institutions, there can be no effective
democratic scrutiny of corporate influence over EU policy-making.
Important lessons can be learned from the lobbying disclosure
legislation in place in the United States and Canada, which obliges
firms and organisations (with a lobbying budget over a certain
threshold) to submit regular reports on which issues they are lobbying
on, for which clients and with what budget. Interestingly, in his
letter to Corporate Europe Observatory, Jeremy Galbraith, CEO of
Burson-Marsteller Brussels, wrote “For the record, we have no
objection to registration of lobbyists as currently occurs in
Washington⁴⁸”.

While the US Lobbying Disclosure Act is light-years ahead of the EU in
terms of providing basic transparency, it fails to prevent deceptive
lobbying practices. Its potential positive effects on US politics are
dramatically undermined by the disastrous impact of massive corporate
campaign finance donations, but the US disclosure rules also suffer
from major loopholes. Public Citizen is one of the civil society
groups campaigning for tighter transparency and ethics rules in the
US⁴⁹. The group points out that the current rules are not
effectively implemented and it recommends to create an “independent
and central ethics office for monitoring, disclosing and enforcing
lobbying and ethics laws and regulations.” In order to make the
information accessible, Public Citizen envisages “a fully searchable,
downloadable web-based lobbying disclosure database”, which would
allow anyone to search on laws and specific issues lobbied on. Public
Citizen also stresses the need for stricter rules to prevent
‘revolving doors’ and for expanding disclosure obligations to often
fake “grassroots” lobbying campaigns conducted by corporations and PR
firms. These reports, Public Citizen stresses “should require
information from paid lobbyists or their employers about their
identity, clients, expenditures, and policy foci.”

While this type of regulation would probably still not be sufficient
to weed out deceptive lobbying and PR tactics in Brussels, such
transparency would help undermine the effectiveness of such practices.
It would enable parliamentarians to know who is lobbying them (and
their colleagues!), help the media to increase their scrutiny of
corporate lobbying campaigns and also provide civil society with a
potent tool for counter-campaigning.

Burson-Marsteller’s bad habits

The BSEF and the other bromine groupings operating from Av. de
Cortenbergh 118 fit in a long tradition of Burson-Marsteller front
groups. In the US, Burson-Marsteller has since the 1980’s assisted
industry with establishing tailor-made groupings to promote corporate
agendas while claiming to represent the public interest⁵⁰. In 1993,
for instance, it helped for Philip Morris by launching a fake
grassroots coalition called the National Smokers Alliance, “defending
smokers rights” (with Burson-Marsteller consultants in top positions
of the ‘alliance⁵¹’). In 1995 the firm set up the Foundation for
Clean Air Progress, a front for an industry campaign to pressure the
US Environmental Protection Agency not to adopt tougher air pollution
controls.

Burson-Marsteller introduced these tactics in Europe more than a
decade ago. In 1994, for instance, the company was heavily involved in
setting up the European Science and Environment Forum (ESEF). This
group, with a name remarkably similar to that of the BSEF, calls
itself “an independent, non-profit-making alliance of scientists whose
aim is to ensure that scientific debates are properly aired, and that
decisions which are taken, and action that is proposed, are founded on
sound scientific principles⁵².” However, according to PRWatch, its
real mission was to disparage the science upon which environment and
health regulations are based. A turf war between Burson-Marsteller and
competing PR giant APCO undermined the ESEF’s momentum.

Setting up ‘front groups’ seems to be a standard ingredient of the
package of services that Burson-Marsteller offers its corporate
clients. In September 2004, the UK newspaper the Observer revealed
that Burson-Marsteller was behind the Coalition to Prevent Deep-Vein
Thrombosis (DVT – better known as economy class syndrome⁵³).
Covertly funded by pharmaceuticals giant Aventis, this fake pressure
group launched an alarmist campaign designed to boost the sales of
Lovenox. As usual the PR firm denied there was anything wrong or
unethical about running fake NGOs. David Earnshaw, managing director
of Burson-Marsteller in Brussels and in charge of the thrombosis
campaign, simply denied there was any covert strategy.

A similar case was uncovered in early 2004, again by UK newspaper the
Observer and again exposing Burson-Marsteller’s Brussels office in a
deeply problematic role⁵⁴. In this case the PR giant had invited
celebrity women to join “European Women for HPV Testing”, seemingly an
independent grassroots initiative to pressure regulators to introduce
new screening tests claimed to help predict cervical cancer. The
campaign was covertly funded by Digene Corporation, the producer of
the tests, that wanted to increase sales of the product. When the
story broke, the women enrolled to support the campaign were outraged
never to have been informed about the Digene link. Burson-Marsteller
CEO Jeremy Galbraith admitted that his firm had established the group
in 2001 as a front for its lobbying campaign, but insisted it was done
to raise awareness of the links between the HPV and cervical cancer.
After the Observer article was published, the website of “European
Women for HPV Testing” was changed so it now discloses the
unrestricted grant from Digene Corporation.

¹ The four member corporations are the Dead Sea Bromine Group
(recently renamed ICL Industrial Products), the Great Lakes Chemical
Corporation, the Albemarle Corporation, and the Tosoh Corporation.

² Notes from meeting with Dawson and McLaren, 19 January 2005 (Erik
Wesselius, Corporate Europe Observatory).

³ Tainted Catch, Environmental Working Group, July 2003.

⁴ The Open Letter (dated 25 October 2004), now signed by over 260
groups, called upon the new European Commission to introduce far
stricter rules on corporate lobbying, stop ‘revolving doors’ and end
the privileged power of corporate groupings. The letter illustrated
the need for improved and enforceable ethics and transparency rules
with the example of the BSEF. The letter also mentioned that the BSEF
is lobbying against tighter health and environment regulations
concerning toxic bromines.

⁵ BSEF statement following Open Letter to Barroso, 28 October 2004.

⁶ Letter from BSEF Chairman Ray Dawson to Corporate Europe
Observatory, 10 December 2004.

⁷ Lawrie McLaren’s business card says: Managing Director,
Burson-Marsteller. At BSEF he is “Program Director”.

⁸ Notes from meeting with Dawson and McLaren, 19 January 2005 (Erik
Wesselius, Corporate Europe Observatory).

⁹ Before the overhaul of the website, the contact page contained
only the BSEF secretariat address and Mr Lawrie McLaren was introduced
as BSEF program director.

¹⁰ BSEF home page, visited in January 2005.

¹¹ Letter from Burson-Marsteller CEO Jeremy Galbraith to Corporate
Europe Observatory, 21 December 2004.

¹² In his letter to Corporate Europe Observatory, Mr. Galbraith
pointed that he is the CEO of Burson- Marsteller Brussels, whereas
David Earnshaw is managing director. This will be corrected in the
next edition of the Lobby Planet. See our answer to Mr. Galbraith, 5
January 2005.

¹³ Factsheets on brominated flame retardants, Swedish Society for
Nature Conservation, 2003.

¹⁴ Notes from meeting with Dawson and McLaren, 19 January 2005
(Erik Wesselius, Corporate Europe Observatory).

¹⁵ California is U.S. gateway for European enviro laws, Associated
Press, 24 July 2003.

¹⁶ Third party technique, Sourcewatch WIKI, visited in January
2005.

¹⁷ Industry-funded organizations, Sourcewatch WIKI, visited in
January 2005.

¹⁸ Nederlandse regering heft productieverbod brandvertrager op,
BSEF press release, Brussels, 28 February 2003.

¹⁹ EBFRIP members are the European branches of three of the four
BSEF member corporations: Albemarle S.A., Eurobrom BV (representing
Dead Sea Bromine Group) and Great Lakes Chemical (Europe) Ltd. Source:
EBFRIP website, January 2005.

²⁰ See for instance ACFSE’s submission to the European Commission’s
consultation on the revision of the RoHS directive, 2 July 2004.

²¹ Methyl bromide is a by-product of the largest volume brominated
flame retardant (BFR) in production today: tetrabromobisphenol-A
(TBBPA). TBBPA is widely used in electrical and electronic equipment
like computers. See: Bromide Baron Rap Sheet #2, Political Ecology
Group, 31 March 1997 and TBBPA Tetrabromobisphenol-A Fact Sheet,
edition 2004, BSEF.

²² BSEF home page, visited in January 2005.

²³ The directives on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
(WEEE) and Reduction of the use of Hazardous Substances (RoHS).

²⁴ Bromine is best…, a newsletter from the Brominated Flame
Retardant Industry, Number 6, 14 May 2001.

²⁵ “Industry Urged to Oppose Parliament Vote To Ban Substances
Before Analysis Finished”, Chemical Regulation Reporter, Volume 25
Number 37, 17 September 2001.

²⁶ About penta-BDE Campbell “said he is not pleased that the
chemicals have been found in the environment, but no one has been able
to prove that the low levels detected are having any adverse effects”.
Ibid.

²⁷ “No Plans Now From EPA to Regulate Flame Retardants Banned by EU
Parliament”, Chemical Regulation Reporter, Volume 25 Number 37, 17
September 2001.

²⁸ Great Lakes only stopped producing penta-BDE by the end of 2004,
after the substance had also been banned in California, Maine and
Hawaii. See for example: Flame Retardants to be Extinguished, Marla
Cone, Los Angeles Times, 4 November 2003.

²⁹ BSEF threat letter to media, 6 May 2003.

³⁰ E-mail from Axel Singhofen, Adviser on Health and Environment
Policy Greens/EFA in the European Parliament, 13 December 2004. In
2003, the EU adopted two different directives that concerned BFRs: one
directive, known as RoHS banned all PBDEs as well as PBBs in
electrical and electronic equipment [Directive 2002/95/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on the
restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical
and electronic equipment], the other banned the use of two types of
PBDEs (Penta-BDEs and Octa-BDEs) across the board [Directive
2003/11/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 February
2003 amending for the 24th time Council Directive 76/769/EEC relating
to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous
substances and preparations (pentabromodiphenyl ether,
octabromodiphenyl ether].

³¹ Letter from D. Grant Lawrence (DG Environment, director
Governance, Communication & Civil Protection) to Lawrie McLaren
(BSEF), 25 February 2004.

³² European Commission clarifies that Deca-BDE is exempt from EU
restrictions, BSEF statement, 3 March 2004.

³³ Letter sent to Margot Wallström, signed by MEPs Karl-Heinz
Florenz, Bernd Lange, Chris Davies, Jonas Sjöstedt, Alexander de Roo
and Johannes Blokland, 10 March 2004.

³⁴ Letter from Margot Wallström to MEPs Karl-Heinz Florenz, Bernd
Lange, Chris Davies, Jonas Sjöstedt, Alexander de Roo and Johannes
Blokland, 29 March 2004.

³⁵ BSEF Requests Clarification of Deca-BDE Status in the RoHS
Directive, 22 March 2004.

³⁶ The European Chemicals Bureau is part of the DG Joint Research
Centre. Risk assessments are undertaken according to a list of
priority chemicals identified by the ECB.

³⁷ Fax sent by BSEF Chairman David Sanders to Dr. Vollmer, Head of
Unit at the ECB (Institute for Health and Consumer Protection Unit:
Toxicology and Chemical Substances), 27 November 2003. A copy of this
fax is on file with Corporate Europe Observatory.

³⁸ Voluntary commitment by BSEF and the British Plastics Federation
on deca-BDE in the plastics sector. Managing Emissions of Persistent
Chemicals by Proactive Commitment to Good Practice: A Code of Good
Practice for the Use of the Flame Retardant Decabromodiphenylether
(Deca-BDE) in the Plastics sector, BSEF and British Plastics
Federation, May 2004.

³⁹ “Swedes lead way with chemical ban”, Roger Falk, European Voice,
Vol. 10 N.17, 13 May 2004.

⁴⁰ “Swedish political decision to commission a proposal to ban
Deca-BDE contradicts EU science results”, EBFRIP press release, 11th
May 2004.

⁴¹ Letter from BSEF Chairman Ray Dawson to Corporate Europe
Observatory, 10 December 2004.

⁴² Viberg H., Fredriksson A., Jakobsson E., Örn U. and Eriksson P.
(2003). Neurobehavioural derangements in adult mice receiving
decabrominated diphenyl ether (PBDE 209) during a defined period of
neonatal brain development. Toxicological Sciences, 76(1): 112–120
(2003).

⁴³ “Detection of Newer Chemicals in Arctic Points to Global
Presence, Researcher Says”, Chemical Regulation Reporter, Volume 27
Number 35, 8 September 2003.

⁴⁴ Documents obtained by CEO show a range of meetings and a large
amount of correspondence between representatives of the BSEF, EBFRIP,
CEOs of Albemarle, Dead Sea Bromine Group and Great Lakes Chemical and
then Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström and other high-level
officials at the Commission with a say on the regulatory process on
bromine flame retardants. CEO was refused access to a range of these
documents.

⁴⁵ BSEF Comments on “WWF’S COMMENTS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
ASSESSMENT OF DECAPBDE (COM013_env_WWF3.doc)”, BSEF, 27 November 2003.
A copy of this document is on file with Corporate Europe Observatory.

⁴⁶ Notes from meeting with Dawson and McLaren, 19 January 2005
(Erik Wesselius, Corporate Europe Observatory).

⁴⁷ “In the context of their relations with Parliament, the persons
whose names appear in the register provided for in Rule 9(2) shall:”
“state the interest or interests they represent in contacts with
Members of Parliament, their staff or officials of Parliament”.
Source: Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (16th edition – July 2004), ANNEX IX, Provisions governing the application of Rule
9(2) – Lobbying in Parliament, Article 3 (Code of conduct).

⁴⁸ Letter from Burson-Marsteller CEO Jeremy Galbraith to Corporate
Europe Observatory, 21 December 2004.

⁴⁹ Conduct and Disclosure of Lobbying Activities: Compendium of
Potential Reform Proposals, Public Citizen, 20 July 2004.

⁵⁰ See for instance page 34 in Global Spin – the Corporate Assault
on Environmentalism, Sharon Beder, Green Books, 1997.

⁵¹ For an overview, see ibid.

⁵² European Science and Environment Forum, Sourcewatch WIKI,
visited in January 2005.

⁵³ Drug firm plays up long flights fear, Antony Barnett, The
Observer, 26 September 2004.

⁵⁴ Revealed: how stars were hijacked to boost health company’s
profits. Antony Barnett, The Observer, 25 January 2004.