The Extraordinary Achievements of the Anti-War Movement

Justice Not Vengeance Anti-War Briefing 112

BRITAIN NEARLY DISCONNECTED FROM THE WAR

The goal of the British anti-war movement in early 2003 was to stop the British government participating in the invasion of Iraq, hoping that this could delay or derail the US drive to war. We nearly succeeded.

The mass media and the party political system have never and will never acknowledge how close we came. The history books are and will remain silent on this topic, but it is vital for the anti-war movement to remember that it managed to exert such pressure on the British Government that a week before the war, it seriously considered withdrawing from the invasion of Iraq.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION

Throughout the crisis the US public was very concerned at the prospect of political isolation – polls in the US in June and Aug. 2002 found that while more than half of Americans would approve of military action against Iraq if the US won some allied support, that number shrank to a minority if the United States had to go it alone. (Christian Science Monitor, 17 July 2002; ‘Poll: Most Americans Back War Against Iraq’, Reuters, 12 Aug. 2002)

In March 2003, ‘research from the National Journal showed the importance of the UK in the Bush administration’s domestic political calculation: 77 per cent of people said “we absolutely need” to have British support in the event of war in Iraq.’ (FT, 14 Mar. 2003, p. 2) In other words, the US anti-war movement, while not strong enough to prevent the war, was strong enough to force Washington to seek international support – particularly from Britain.

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFUSES

The problem was that the British anti-war movement was so powerful that Tony Blair was forced to spend months seeking a UN Security Council Resolution which he could present as in some way “authorising” the invasion.

In Feb. 2003, a BBC poll found 40 per cent of people would support a war only if there was UN authorization and only 9 per cent would support it without authorization – which is what happened (45 per cent opposed the war whether or not the Security Council approved; BBC press release, 12 Feb 2003, http://tinyurl.com/ynu6rw)

Permanent members of the Security Council threatened to veto any US/UK war resolution, so Tony Blair moved to a fall-back position. He would regard the war as “UN-authorized” if a substantial majority in the Security Council – if 9 out of 15 members – voted in favour of a war resolution.

However, despite enormous pressure, the smaller “middle six” undecided countries – Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan – refused to support the US/UK Resolution, robbing Tony Blair of his majority and his crucial propaganda device. This was in large part because of the protests from the anti-war movements in these countries.

‘In varying degrees,’ it was reported at the time, ‘all six need money, trade and good will… Other than Pakistan, however, none has a direct stake in the outcome of the Iraq crisis. All have said they disapprove equally of what they see of the U.S. rush to war and the French willingness to allow open- ended U.N. weapons inspections. And each is dependent for its survival on public and political opinion that is overwhelmingly against a vote for war in Iraq.’ (Washington Post, 14 March 2003, p. A22)

The US anti-war movement forced Bush to keep Britain on board. The British anti-war movement forced Blair to spend months pleading with small countries at the UN. The global anti-war movement then denied Blair and Bush the political cover they needed at the UN.

THE TURKISH MIRACLE

What worried the British Government even more as it approached the 18 March war vote in the House of Commons was the fact that in Turkey, a country much more dependant financially, militarily and politically on the US than Britain, a similar Parliamentary vote had been lost.

On 1 March 2003, while the biggest demonstration in years was taking place outside Parliament, and MPs were being phoned by their constituents in the debating chamber, a resolution to allow the US to use Turkish territory and airspace to invade Iraq was lost by four votes. (BBC News Online, 1 March 2003, http://tinyurl.com/3yxs9e) The Financial Times suggested that the sheer scale of the grassroots opposition to war ‘may have been the deciding factor’. (6 June 2003, p. 19)

The vote meant that the British contribution became militarily significant, much to everyone’s surprise. Edward Luttwak, senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, pointed out that originally, with a light, fast invasion force, Britain would have made up a third of the entire force. Then, for various reasons, the US deployment was enlarged, and ‘the British role became smaller and smaller.’

When Turkey refused access to US ground forces, all the US northern invasion force units were ‘stuck on the wrong side of the Suez Canal’, and British forces in Kuwait, in the south, once more became ‘indispensable’: ‘Sandwiched together, with units under each other’s command, Yanks and Brits are more closely integrated than they have been since the Second World War – and that is why a last- minute withdrawal by Mr Blair has become simply unthinkable.’ (Sunday Telegraph, 16 March 2003, p. 6)

THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE: DISCONNECTION

It may have been unthinkable for Luttwak, but, the Sunday Telegraph and Sunday Mirror both reported that it wasn’t unthinkable in Whitehall. ‘By Tuesday [12 March], there were serious worries in the White House that Mr Blair, its staunchest ally, might not survive the political crisis at home. Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, tried to explain the problems to Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, in a telephone call which had meant to be devoted to the fine detail of the war plan.

‘As we reveal today, Mr Hoon’s department [the Ministry of Defence] was frantically preparing contingency plans to “disconnect” British troops entirely from the military invasion of Iraq, demoting their role to subsequent phases of the campaign and peacekeeping.

‘Mr Rumsfeld – who had always believed that the “UN route” was the road to perdition – was already deeply exasperated by Mr Blair’s insistence that a second resolution was necessary, and the delays that the horse-trading at the UN was causing. Mr Rumsfeld confided to one friend, “I am learning to hate the British.”

‘However, he decided to give them a way out. Later that day, at a press conference in Washington, Mr Rumsfeld suggested that US troops could go to war without the British if necessary. One Cabinet Minister said, in tones of desperation: “It is just Rumsfeld being Rumsfeld.” The British media was encouraged to believe that the US Defence Secretary had been speaking hypothetically.

‘The trouble was that he hadn’t been doing any such thing. As a senior Number 10 official said: “Rumsfeld was telling the truth.” ... In a second call on his secure telephone, Mr Hoon told Mr Rumsfeld in blunt terms that his remarks were causing pandaemonium. “Wobbly Tuesday” was the lowest point of the crisis for Mr Blair.’ (Sunday Telegraph, 16 Mar., p. 18; see also Sunday Mirror, 16 March 2003, p. 6)

DELAY AND DISCONNECTION

The global anti-war movements, and the British anti-war movement in particular, brought the war leaders to point where George Bush offered Tony Blair the option of withdrawal: ‘I told Tony, I said “rather than lose your government, withdraw from the coalition” – because I felt it was important for him to be the Prime Minister at this point in our relationship.’ (Observer, 23 Apr. 2006 ) Blair himself recently confirmed this offer – made days before the 18 March vote. (Times, 17 Nov. 2007 )

‘One confidant explained: “Having taken it so far, backing out seemed to him a rather pathetic thing to do.”’ (Independent, 31 Oct. 2007 )

The delays created by the global antiwar movements nearly derailed the drive to war. It is possible that even a few days’ more delay could have given the UN weapons inspectors the time they needed to institute a final and decisive phase of inspections that would have made war politically impossible. (See Milan Rai’s Regime Unchanged, Pluto 2003) We know that the British Government was forced to desperately draw up contingency plans only days before war.

These are significant achievements for popular movements with very limited resources. Governments prize the appearance of overwhelming strength and confidence. We now know that this war was avoidable and that the war leaders were not an irresistable force.

Our movement shook the Government to its core. Next time we will win.