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Al Qaida- The SWISH Report

tim — Sat, 13 Sep 2008 16:14:33 +0000

An eighth report from the South Waziristan Institute of Strategic Hermeneutics to the al-Qaida Strategic Planning Cell (SPC) on the progress of the campaign

Thank you for inviting us to deliver another report on the progress of your movement. You will recall that our work for your planning cell commenced with an initial assessment in July 2004, a follow-up in January 2005 and further reports in February 2006 and September 2006 and (in light of political developments in the United States) December 2006.

The next analysis was presented in November 2007; but the pace of events in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan – in the context of the evolving United States presidential-election campaign – led to the request for the next report only three months later, in February 2008. This last document clearly signalled to you that this might be the final occasion when our services might be required.

We are then particularly pleased that – even though our February 2008 assessment was somewhat blunt in terms of your movement’s overall prospect – you have invited us to deliver one more report. We understand that on this occasion you require a brief updating of our analysis on your main theatres of operation, together with an analysis of the impact of the possible outcomes of the US residential election in November 2008.

Pakistan and Afghanistan

In our last briefing we made three judgments about Pakistan. First. that the country’s then general-president Pervez Musharraf had been much weakened by the result of the country’s just-held parliamentary election, and that we were not convinced he would survive. Second, that it was doubtful that a stable parliamentary coalition would emerge. Third, that there would be we increased United States military activity within western Pakistan. In all three respects our analysis was accurate: Pervez Musharraf has gone, the domestic governing coalition is in disarray, and the US military is now conducting special-forces operations across the border with Afghanistan.

The assumption of the presidency by Asif Ali Zardari is also an indication that the feudal pattern of Pakistani politics is thriving; though civil-society elements and the legal profession may cause problems for the government. It is likely that President Zardari will be supportive of increased US military action, but this may cause deep unease in sections of the Pakistani military, as well as increasing the more general anti-American mood.

While our predictions seven months ago for Pakistan were reassuringly accurate, we must confess we were less effective in our analysis concerning Afghanistan. There, we were doubtful that the revitalised Taliban would extend their activities to major assaults on coalition forces – in the face of overwhelming firepower we instead expected to see an intense concentration on roadside bombs and martyr attacks. While these have indeed been increased, we also note the effective move towards the targeting of supply-routes, and a willingness, on occasions, to conduct substantial military operations. These have included a successful assault on the main prison in Kandahar and lethal attacks on US and French units.

One outcome of these developments is that the US military now puts a much greater emphasis on the war in Afghanistan and is looking to increase its own military deployments while seeking to persuade its Nato partners to be more supportive.

Iraq

In our February 2008 report, we anticipated that the George W Bush administration, along with neo-conservative commentators, would develop an overall narrative centred on a “probability of victory” in Iraq which would downgrade the significance of the war in that country during the latter months of the presidential campaign. This has indeed been what has happened, with the framers of the narrative placing a great emphasis on Iraq’s increased security. It is interesting in this context, however, that the United States military leadership is deeply reluctant to withdraw combat-troops to a level much below that of the pre-surge (that is, pre-February 2007) deployments. In spite of the pressing need for troops in Afghanistan, it now looks as though just one of the fifteen remaining US combat-brigades will be withdrawn in the September 2008 – March 2009 period.

We strongly suspect that many of the more astute military analysts in US Central Command (Centcom) and the Pentagon believe that security in Iraq is far more problematic than their political masters would like their citizens to believe. This is partly due to the hard line now being taken by the Nouri al-Maliki government, especially towards the integration of Sunni militias into the security forces, but also relates to strains in Shi’a / Kurdish relations and the growing influence of Iran.

The al-Maliki government claims to want a total United States military withdrawal by 2010 or 2011, but oil geopolitics makes this nonsensical – the US is in Iraq for the long term. While your associates in Iraq have had major reversals, we suspect these are short-term. We stand by our assessment of seven months ago:

“Although circumstances will not always be as favourable as 2006-07, rest assured that your paramilitary combat-training zone in Iraq will remain viable and of great use to you for the foreseeable future.”

In this context, we note recent reports that some of your paramilitary associates from Iraq are now active in Somalia.

The American election campaign

In our last report to you it had become clear that John McCain was likely to be the Republican candidate and that Barack Obama might defeat Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination. Our overall view was that:

“What is best for you is that the United States remains resolute in its support for Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt; fully addicted to oil and therefore determined to remain dominant in the Persian Gulf; and prepared to continue to pursue its war against you with the utmost vigour. In other words, eight more years for George W Bush would have been ideal. Sadly for your movement, that cannot be.”

As a whole, we considered McCain to be a far better prospect from your perspective; though we had some concerns that such rightwing incumbents can, on occasions, opt successfully for radical change.

Today, with the Obama/McCain contest fully underway, we indeed believe that a McCain presidency is – by a considerable margin – the more favourable to your movement; not least because the Republican ticket is now supplemented by a vice-presidential nominee who is a Christian fundamentalist as well as a climate-change sceptic from an oil-rich state.

It remains the case that if elected, Barack Obama could be very limited in his security options. His speech to the leading American pro-Israel organisation Aipac in June 2008 was markedly hardline; he supports military reinforcements for Afghanistan; and he has implied that he would be willing to order more direct US military action in Pakistan. Even so, part of the reason for taking such positions relates simply to the realities of electoral politics. What he says now and what he would do in office may be very different, especially if the Democrats have convincing majorities in both houses of Congress.

In any case, whatever his actual policies, we most certainly would expect under an Obama presidency a marked change in style towards a more listening, cooperative and multilaterally-engaged America. That must be of deep concern to you. A more “acceptable” America in global terms is the last thing you want.

In one sense, however, we can reassure you about the outcome; for our associates in our Washington office believe that John McCain will win by a relatively small margin, although Congress is likely to remain Democrat-controlled. Their assessment is based on a prediction that while polls may well give Obama a small margin even up to election-day, a small but significant portion of those voting will be sufficiently influenced by residual prejudice to opt for McCain in the privacy of the polling booth. Their point is that even if only one in fifty voters behaves in this manner, that should help ensure a victory for McCain.

We acknowledge that this is very tentative, and that American politics are currently volatile and unpredictable; and that, after all, our assessment in November 2007 was made in the context of a likely Rudy Giuliani / Hillary Clinton contest!

Your concern must still be with the prospect of an Obama victory, and a key question is whether you should engineer a major attack against US interests shortly before the election. We would advise against this. Whether or not you have the resources to mount a major attack (and we understand why you will not take us into your confidence), the result could be unpredictable.

In the immediate wake of a 9/11-scale attack within the continental United States, Obama’s advisers would know that this would benefit their opponent strongly. They might well then take the risk of going on the offensive against McCain, pointing to the folly of George W Bush’s policies and the manner in which they have made the United States unsafe. It would be a risky strategy but these would be desperate times for the Obama campaign and it might just come off. The risk to you is too great and for this reason alone we do not advocate such an attack.

Instead, we stand by our recommendation in February 2008 that you seek, in the weeks before the election, to make it known that you favour Barack Obama and believe he would be a president with whom you could do business. This would be combined with strong statements to the effect that you believe a John McCain presidency would be a disaster for the United States and that he would be a leader unto darkness and death. Such a strategy, we believe, would go a long way to ensure he was elected, this being the outcome you should most earnestly desire.

Wana

South Waziristan

10 September 2008

Political epitaph

tim — Fri, 22 Aug 2008 18:45:25 +0000

Which genius dreamed up the idea of sending Gordon Brown off to Afghanistan to meet puppet president Hamid Karzai and to mimic Tony Blair’s previous media stunt of posing in brilliant white shirt surrounded by British soldiers?

President Karzai could only have been the answer to the question of what international leader’s grip on his job is more tenuous than our Prime Minister’s.

Commentators used to joke that his writ only ran as far as the outskirts of Kabul. This overstates his real influence.

The Afghan president continues to be guarded by US contractors because he distrusts his own armed forces and he is utterly dependent on NATO military power, which remains incapable of suppressing resistance to the occupation of Afghanistan.

Mr Brown’s lavish praise of British troops, likening them to Olympic heroes on a daily rather than a four-yearly basis, is unlikely to have endeared him to them, knowing, as they do, that he is responsible for placing them in the dangerous and unwinnable situation that faces them.

British troops were originally dispatched to Afghanistan in what was said to be a cross between a peacekeeping and a nation-rebuilding mission.

It has turned out to be an all-out war, especially since they were redeployed, at Pentagon insistence, to Helmand province, where resistance is fierce and where casualty levels have inexorably risen.

Despite this reality, the Prime Minister claims that “substantial progress” is being made against the Taliban and the proof for this is that the Afghan resistance is having to adopt tactics “more of a guerilla nature than head-on confrontation with our forces.”

How very unsporting. Wouldn’t it be so much better if the Afghans formed up into massed ranks to charge tanks and heavy machineguns or to present a clear target to the occupiers’ aerial power rather than using roadside bombs and suicide attacks.

The government’s advisers should have known that such guerilla tactics would be favoured in a long-lasting war of attrition, but new Labour put subservience to the White House before any concern for British troops, to say nothing of the Afghan civilian population, who are the real sufferers in this US imperial aggression.

Still, it’s an ill wind that blows no-one any good and the arms traffickers of BAE Systems aren’t doing too badly at all, thank you very much.

Our government’s slavish determination to support every Made in Washington war has meant a bonanza for the company’s private shareholders, with the latest contract to supply ammunition to our armed forces over the next 15 years weighing in at £3 billion.

That should guarantee plenty of bonuses and dividends for senior civil servants and new Labour ministers who jump on board after being deservedly turfed out at the next general election.

Armed Forces Minister Bob Ainsworth is delighted that this programme will ensure “a modernised, sustainable munitions industry which will support British jobs.”

What a pity that such concern for industry and jobs has never extended to the rest of Britain’s manufacturing sector, which new Labour has allowed to disintegrate without lifting a finger.

And it is this obsession with war and private profits that will be new Labour’s political epitaph.

Laughable rhetoric

tim — Tue, 19 Aug 2008 17:40:18 +0000

When an occupying military power knows that it has the backing of the most powerful global information outlets, it can indulge itself in the most laughable rhetoric.

And this was underlined in the wake of the killing of an Afghan woman and two children by rockets fired by British forces in Helmand province.

Although these civilian casualties were caused by troops who came from thousands of miles away to occupy the country, an International Security Assistance Force spokesman had the temerity to say: “The enemies of Afghanistan have yet again shown a complete disregard for the lives of the innocent who they claim to fight for.”

That is precisely what the Afghans who oppose imperialist occupation would say and with far greater reason.

Yet the pro-occupation international media continues to relay propaganda about Taliban forces launching attacks from among civilians, even though they would know that this would result in bloody responses from the occupying forces against their own families.

The allegation beggars belief, as does puppet governor Gulab Mangal’s comment that “support for the Taliban in Helmand is reducing.”

Resistance to occupation in the entire south and east of Afghanistan has escalated in recent years and the steady increase in British military casualties illustrates this.

The British troops sent to Afghanistan have been lied to over their role.

They are in an unwinnable conflict and are kept there as tokens of new Labour’s subservience to the White House.

They should be brought home immediately, leaving the Afghan people to work out their future without outside interference.

US stooge

Outgoing Pakistani military dictator Pervez Musharraf has always been a loyal toady of US imperialism and his resignation will suit Washington as much as it does the general himself.

Gen Musharraf’s expectation is that his stepping down will short-circuit the growing public clamour for his impeachment, while the US will hope for no in-depth investigation of the dirty alliance it foisted on him.

That means that the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in setting up the Taliban in the early 1990s will not be investigated.
Nor will the activities of the ISI during his time as Pakistani military commander.

It will also mean that Washington’s support for the general, especially since 2001 when he executed a political back-flip to join the White House “war on terror,” will not be subject to inquiry.

Gen Musharraf has all along been susceptible to US power, which is why he dropped the Taliban and was passive in the face of US bombing raids on Pakistani tribal areas abutting the border with Afghanistan.

Despite this influence and its constant rhetoric about democracy, freedom and the rule of law, the Bush administration was unbothered by the general’s political dictatorship and his assaults on the judiciary.

Washington’s readiness to see him stand down only came about when it could see the scale of opposition building up against him and the dictatorship.

Development of democracy in Pakistan will depend on the level to which political forces are able to resist US tutelage and assert popular sovereignty.

Investigation into Pakistan torture allegation

Ellie Keen — Thu, 17 Jul 2008 22:01:17 +0000

An official complaint alleging that British intelligence officers colluded in the torture of a British medical student who was detained in Pakistan after the July 2005 suicide attacks in London has been lodged with the tribunal that conducts investigations into MI5 and MI6.

Labour backbencher John McDonnell has complained to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) that the student, his constituent, was picked up by a Pakistani intelligence agency and tortured for two months in a building opposite the British deputy high commission in Karachi.

The student told McDonnell on his release that he was questioned by British intelligence officers, who he believes were from the Security Service, MI5, after he had been tortured. McDonnell believes that British officials “outsourced” his mistreatment to the Pakistani agency, and wants the IPT to examine the matter.

Earlier this year four British nationals claimed they were mistreated after being detained by Pakistani intelligence agents, and that they were then questioned by British intelligence officers in between or after torture sessions.

One has since been convicted of terrorism offences after being returned to the UK, a second is awaiting trial, and a third absconded while subjected to a control order.

Yesterday the Guardian reported that three other Britons – including McDonnell’s constituent – have also alleged they were mistreated after being detained in Pakistan, and were eventually released without charge.

MI5 asked the Home Office to issue a statement which said: “The Security and Intelligence Agencies do not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture or inhumane or degrading treatment. For reasons both ethical and legal, their policy is not to carry out any action which they know would result in torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.”

It is unclear how many Britons have been held in Pakistan for questioning during counterterrorism investigations in recent years.

Earlier this year the Foreign Office responded to a parliamentary question from Andrew Tyrie, Tory MP and chairman of the all-party parliamentary group on extraordinary rendition, by saying there were six such cases since 2000. But the Guardian is aware that there have been at least 11, and there are unconfirmed reports that there may have been more.

Some of the detainees received no assistance from British consular officials. The Foreign Office maintains that it had no duty to represent them while they were in Pakistan as they have dual nationality. The men’s lawyers said this claim is undermined by the strenuous efforts that British diplomats make on behalf of the 200-plus dual nationals forced into marriage in Pakistan each year.

When Tyrie asked about MI5’s ability to visit and question detainees to whom consular officials claim to have been denied access, Kim Howells, the Foreign Office minister, replied: “Priority was given to the welfare of the detainees.”

A number of the detainees themselves deny this, saying that the British intelligence officers who interviewed them appeared to ignore their complaints that they were being tortured.

US/NATO casualties climb in Afghanistan

tim — Tue, 15 Jul 2008 16:38:46 +0000

The US/NATO occupation force in Afghanistan on Sunday suffered the largest number of casualties in a 24-hour period in more than three years. Nine American troops lost their lives and as many as 15 were wounded in a day-long battle with insurgents who attacked a US base in the eastern province of Kunar. Another soldier, also believed to be an American, was killed in a roadside bombing in the volatile Sangin district of Helmand province.

Sunday’s attack was one of the most effective insurgent operations in the six-and-a-half year war. The US military and Afghan government forces had only established a base in Wanat, a village near the Pakistani border, three days earlier. A sizeable force of guerillas converged on the base in the middle of the night. According to an Associated Press report, they evacuated the civilian community and took up firing positions in buildings surrounding the facility. At approximately 4.30 a.m., the insurgents launched an assault.

Fighting lasted throughout the day, with the anti-occupation fighters repeatedly engaging the base with mortars, machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades. According to some reports, militants managed to get inside the US compound. Multiple US air strikes had to be called in to drive off the attackers.

A spokesman for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) told journalists: “We defended the base. There are still some operations on-going. The insurgents were repulsed and there is no fighting now, but they might pop up again.” NATO sources claim that dozens of insurgents were killed.

Wanat is near the district of Deh Bala, in the adjacent province of Nangahar, where US fighters bombed a wedding party on July 7. As many as 27 men, women and children were slaughtered. The assault on the American base may well have been a revenge attack.

The attack, however, is part of a trend over recent weeks of set piece battles against the occupation forces. In late June, a large force of guerillas seized a number of villages in the Arghandab Valley to the northwest of Kandahar. Scores were killed during the US/Afghan government operation to take back control of the district.

Anti-occupation fighters also attempted several offensive operations in Sangin last week, crossing the Helmand River to attack NATO and Afghan Army personnel. US retaliatory air strikes on Sunday reportedly resulted in the deaths of at least 40 guerillas, as well as the destruction of several improvised bridges and dozens of small boats.

Also on Sunday, a suicide bomber detonated an explosion at a crowded bazaar in the town of Deh Rawood in Uruzgan province, killing five Afghan police and as many as 19 civilians, including a number of young children. The suicide attack came in the wake of a massive blast that struck the Indian embassy in Kabul, killing 41 people and injuring over 140.

Most US and NATO casualties continue to be the result of remotely-detonated roadside bombs. A total of 20 occupation personnel have already lost their lives in July, including a 42-year-old American junior officer who appears to have committed suicide on July 4.

Among the recent casualties was a Hungarian explosives expert who was killed by a bomb on Saturday in the northern province of Baghlan. The 32-year-old had only arrived in Afghanistan several weeks ago—to replace a Hungarian explosives expert who was killed trying to defuse a bomb on June 10.

A roadside bomb in Paktika province took the lives of two US National Guardsmen from Guam last Thursday. More than 15 percent of all American troops serving in Afghanistan are part-time civilian soldiers.

Nine UK troops were wounded near Sangin on Wednesday when a British helicopter gunship, which had been called in to rescue them from an ambush, mistakenly fired on their position. Three of the men suffered serious injuries. One had to be flown back to Britain for specialised medical treatment. He is said to be in a stable condition.

An Australian special forces soldier was killed and three others wounded by a roadside bomb in Uruzgan province on Tuesday. This was the fifth Australian fatality in the past nine months. The same day, an American soldier was killed in a bombing near Bagram airport.

The insurgency is based among the fiercely independent Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Some guerilla groups are loyal to the fundamentalist Taliban movement that was overthrown by the US invasion in 2001. Others follow Pashtun Islamist warlords such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Huqqani—both of whom received huge amounts of money and arms from the CIA to conduct a guerilla war against the Soviet force occupying Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Fighting has been taking place inside Pakistan over the past several weeks. The Pakistani government, responding to pressure from Washington to curb the movement of guerillas into Afghanistan, has ordered its security forces to crack down on various militant groups operating in the tribal provinces along the Afghan border. The focus of the operations has been the area surrounding Peshawar—the largest city on the road through to the Khyber Pass in Afghanistan.

Insurgents retaliated over the weekend, ambushing a convoy of Pakistani Frontier Corps—the paramilitary force responsible for security in the tribal regions—on Saturday near the border city of Hangu, to the south west of Peshawar. According to Pakistani media sources, eight troops were killed and eight others who were captured were executed by firing squad. Local Taliban groups claimed they had captured and were still holding a further 29 soldiers and police.

The attack coincided with an unannounced visit to Pakistan by US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen. He met with President Pervez Musharraf, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and the head of the armed forces, General Ashfaq Kiyani.

The purpose of Mullen’s trip was to deliver a blunt message to the Pakistani establishment to step up operations in the border regions against Pashtun militants. The Bush administration and NATO countries have repeatedly accused Islamabad of not doing enough to stop insurgent activity and thereby facilitating the rise in attacks on their troops in Afghanistan. Mullen repeated the claim on Saturday, telling a press conference that the “border is more porous than it was a year ago. It’s very important that action be taken to respond to that.”

The Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai has gone further and accused the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and sections of its military of assisting the Taliban insurgency. An Afghan government spokesman blamed the ISI for last week’s bombing of the Indian embassy. Other Afghan figures have implied it was involved in the assassination attempt on Karzai in June.

Yesterday, Karzai repeated the accusations, declaring: “The murder, killing, destruction, dishonouring and insecurity in Afghanistan is carried out by the intelligence administration of Pakistan, its military intelligence institutions…. We have told the government of Pakistan and the world and from now on it will be pronounced by every member of the Afghan nation.”

The implicit threat facing Musharraf and Gilani is that the US military will step up its own operations inside Pakistan’s tribal regions unless the situation is brought under control. Just days before Mullen’s visit, nine Pakistani troops and several civilians were wounded when a border outpost was bombed in South Waziristan on Thursday. Local tribesmen told the Associated Press that the bombing was a US air strike. The Pakistani government, anxious not to further inflame the mass resentment and hostility over its collaboration with the US, stated that casualties were inflicted by mortars fired from Afghanistan and that the attacker had “yet to be determined”.

The escalating war in Afghanistan is fuelling calls for the deployment of additional US troops to the war zone. Significantly, Barack Obama, the Democratic Party presidential candidate, who has supported US military action against insurgent bases inside Pakistan, was among them. He called in an op-ed in yesterday’s New York Times for the dispatch of an additional two combat brigades, or more than 10,000 troops. “We need more troops, more helicopters, better intelligence gathering and more non-military assistance to accomplish the mission there,” he wrote.

Afghanistan: state of siege

tim — Mon, 14 Jul 2008 16:22:54 +0000

On 7 July 2008 a suicide-bomber detonated a large car-bomb at the gates of the Indian embassy in Kabul, killing fifty-four people and injuring more than 140. The embassy stands in one of the most secure parts of Afghanistan’s capital, yet this did not protect it from what security forces described as the worst bombing [1] in the city since the termination of the Taliban regime in November 2001. Taliban sources denied that the movement was responsible, while Afghan sources implied [2] (albeit without supporting evidence) a Pakistani intelligence connection. The high death-toll is in part attributable to the fact that many people were queuing at the embassy at the time; this may be a factor too in the Taliban reaction, for it has been a regular practice of the group to deny responsibility for attacks where large numbers of civilians are killed.

Whoever was responsible, the Indian embassy attack came at a time of escalating violence in Afghanistan marked by a number of high-profile paramilitary actions. These include an assassination attempt against President Hamid Karzai at a military parade on 27 April 2008), and the dramatic raid on Sarpoza prison in Kandahar which freed dozens of Taliban prisoners and which was followed by the seizure of several villages close to the city (see “Afghanistan in an amorphous war [2]”, 19 June 2008). A day after the embassy attack, a bomb was found [3] on a bus carrying Indian workers in the province of Nimroz (where many Indian projects, including the strategic Zarang-Delaram highway project, are centred).

The seriousness of the situation in Afghanistan has led to the United States navy’s redeployment [4] of a carrier battle-group led by the aircraft-carrier USS Abraham Lincoln from the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea; this will enable [5] US strike aircraft to provide further airpower in Afghanistan.

The problem with this response is the danger it carries of continuing the pattern of inflicting civilian deaths in misdirected air-strikes, which in turn provokes affected communities to turn against the coalition forces. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC [6]) estimates that in the period of 2-7 July 2008 alone, paramilitary violence and coalition military action together killed at least 250 civilians, and that deaths caused by US air power being a particular source of tension on the ground (see ICRC, “Civilians in the line of fire [7]”, 9 July 2008).

The question of deaths as a result of missile-strikes [8] is a source of great controversy. In two recent incidents, for example, there is dispute over the identity of the dead Afghans. Local Afghan officials claimed that the fifteen people who died in a US missile attack in Kunar province on 4 July [9] were civilians, while American spokespersons insisted that only militants were killed; Afghan officials were equally adamant that the at least twenty-seven victims of a missile attack on 6 July [10] included nineteen women and children, reportedly members of a group of around eighty or so people in a wedding party who were taking a rest while walking to the groom’s house.

Whatever the true circumstances of these and other cases [11], the killing of civilians by coalition forces is deeply unsettling and has added to the anti-western mood in many parts of the country already hard-pressed [12] by problems such as growing food insecurity. The pattern of civilian deaths also comes at a time when coalition sources are beginning to admit to the seriousness of the strategic predicament they face in Afghanistan.

A chain of influence

Each year since the Taliban regime was ended, foreign troop numbers in the country have risen; the single greatest increase has been since early 2007, with 20,000 additional troops arriving to take the overall total to around 66,000 (see the editorial, “Afghan Escalation [13]”, Washington Post, 6 July 2008). Despite this, the intensity of Taliban activity has also increased. Much of it is seasonal, with less fighting during the severe winter months, but even here there has been a change. In recent years, suicide-attacks in cities such as Kabul and Kandahar have increased overall, but they have also continued through the winter months.

For the US forces, the biggest surprise has been the growth in Taliban activity in the eastern part of the country. This region, close to the Pakistan border, has been garrisoned by US forces operating independently of Nato, and there have been frequent claims of progress over the past two years. The US forces and spokespersons have made pointed references to the contrast between their “success” and the difficulties experienced by British troops in Helmand province and the Canadians [14] in Kandahar.

Now, though, the US claims are sounding less assured. The newly-appointed US military commander for eastern Afghanistan, Major-General Jeffrey J Schloesser, has highlighted [15] the increased sophistication of the methods used by the insurgents as a factor in the rising violence. This has led to a near-doubling of the number [16] of US troops killed in the country in the first six months of 2008 compared with the similar period in 2007. What has become particularly noticeable has been the more widespread use of roadside bombs, with tactics developed in Iraq being deployed in Afghanistan (see Peter Spiegel & Julian E Barnes, “Afghan Attacks Rise, U.S. Says [17]”, Los Angeles Times, 25 June 2008).

The escalation of violence in Afghanistan has two other elements. The first is a loss of support for the war in a number of Nato member-states that have committed troops. A Pew Global Attitudes Project [17]survey conducted in a number of Nato countries in April 2008 (even before the violence intensified in the following two months) found majority support for the withdrawal of Nato forces – ranging from 54% to 72% in countries including France, Germany, Spain, Poland and Turkey (see Jim Lobe, “Afghanistan Moves Back Into the Limelight [18]”, Inter Press Service, 3 July 2008).

The second element is the steady rise in power of Taliban and al-Qaida paramilitaries in western Pakistan. The Pakistan-based Taliban militias now have considerable influence [21] in many of the border districts of Pakistan, including parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies [22], and North Waziristan and South Waziristan.

This influence in turn has two effects. The first is that Taliban groups fighting in Afghanistan have safe havens across the border [23]; but if US forces mount raids into western Pakistan this simply stirs up more anti-American feelings across the country.

The second effect, and just as significant from a US perspective, is that the Taliban control has allowed al-Qaida to regenerate. An informed assessment is that there are as many as two thousand paramilitaries established in training camps in western Pakistan, up from several hundred three years ago (see Mark Mazzetti & David Rohde, “Amid Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan [24]”, New York Times, 30 June 2008). The issue has been complicated by differences of opinion within the United States over the need for US forces, whether CIA, special forces or regular military, to operate within Pakistan. This remains unresolved but has become even more complicated by the uncertainties of politics within Pakistan itself (see Gary Thomas, “Instability, Uncertainty, Fuel Pakistan, Afghan Attacks [25]”, Voice of America, 8 July 2008).

A “winning fight”

Pervez Musharraf remains president, though his diminishing [26] influence means that his markedly pro-American outlook carries less weight. The coalition government remains in some disarray [27] over the president and other issues, but its overall mood – reflecting an even stronger popular feeling – is unwillingness [28] to allow greater US military involvement in the border districts. The bottom line, which is keenly recognised within the higher echelons of the Pakistani civil service, is that the population as a whole will simply not accept more US involvement. It has become a political non-starter.

The consequences for the US military are thoroughly negative. The senior Nato commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, states:

“The porous border has allowed insurgent militant groups a greater freedom of movement across that border, as well as a greater freedom to resupply, to allow leadership to sustain stronger sanctuaries and to provide fighters across that border” (see Eric Schmitt, “Pakistan is said to be attracting insurgents [29]”, International Herald Tribune, 10 July 2008).

American military and intelligence sources are reporting a marked increase in the involvement of foreign fighters with Taliban militias in western Pakistan. These include young men from Chechnya, Uzbekistan and the Gulf states; since March 2008 the numbers have increased (according to an unnamed Pentagon official) “from a trickle to a steady stream”. This is part of a trend in which Pakistan and Afghanistan are now the focus of attention for paramilitaries intent on fighting western forces.

The International Herald Tribune report on this phenomenon is worth quoting at length:

“The American officials say the influx (of foreign fighters), which could be in the dozens but also could be higher, shows a further strengthening of the position of the forces of Al Qaeda in the tribal areas, increasingly seen as an important base of support for the Taliban, whose forces in Afghanistan have become more aggressive in their campaign against American-led troops.

...American intelligence officials say that some jihadist Web sites have been encouraging foreign militants to go to Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is considered a ‘winning fight’, compared with the insurgency in Iraq, which has suffered sharp setbacks recently.

Four senior military officials said that Al Qaeda was strengthening its increasingly close operational ties in the tribal areas with the Taliban and other various militant groups – financing, training recruits and facilitating attacks into Afghanistan, though not necessarily conducting attacks themselves.”

A decisive year

The accumulating result of these trends is a deteriorating security situation across much of southern and eastern Afghanistan, made worse by the Taliban/al-Qaida revival [30] across the border. A forceful United States government might have insisted on taking the war to Pakistan, even against the overwhelming opinion against this within that country. But the George W Bush administration is nearing the end of its term and is, in any case, far more preoccupied with Iran (see “Iraq task, Iran risk [30]”, 3 July 2008).

In April 2008 a number of analysts were suggesting that 2008 would be a decisive year for the seven-year war: either the Taliban would succumb to the overwhelming weaponry available to Nato and US forces, or the movement would increase its power. At the midpoint of the year, the latter view looks more accurate – so much so that Afghanistan might even exceed Iraq as an issue at the heart of the American presidential campaign.

Links:

[1] http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080709/ap_on_re_as/afghan_explosion
[2] http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=5328140
[3] http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=454096&sid=NAT
[4] http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/07/08/carrier.moves/
[5] http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=56054
[6] http://www.icrc.org/eng/afghanistan
[7] http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/afghanistan-news-090708%21…
[8] http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=2008-07-09_D91QAEAO0&show_articl…
[9] http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jkKFU8CvHoLV5ont_58iLTVBWLVQD91O9R500
[10] http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008036533_afghan07.ht…
[11] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7498041.stm
[12] http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=79162
[13] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/05/AR200807…
[14] http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=8d56ddc9-9f6d-4f99…
[15] http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-fg-usafghan25-2008jun2…
[16] http://icasualties.org/oef/
[17] http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/25/world/fg-usafghan25
[18] http://ipsnorthamerica.net/news.php?idnews=1567
[19] http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/paulrogers.htm
[20] http://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745641966
[21] http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080709/wl_sthasia_afp/afghanistanattacksin…
[22] http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=3893
[23] http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/afghan_pak_border_map.htm
[24] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/washington/30tribal.html
[25] http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-07-08-voa51.cfm
[26] http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=172441
[27] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c93103c0-4dce-11dd-820e-000077b07658.html
[28] http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hkOyy6iVkNxhRAX9Mio7wSQxbnYQD91QM9R00
[29] http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/10/asia/10terror.php
[30] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/world/asia/10terror.html?em&ex=1215748…

Homeland Insecurity

tim — Mon, 07 Jul 2008 11:33:51 +0000

In another bizarre twist to Washington’s often illegal, irrational ‘war on terror,’ peaceful, lawful human rights campaigners are now apparently being refused entry to the US — without any right of appeal.

Noordin Mengal, a British citizen and Baluch human rights defender, was detained and deported by US immigration when he arrived at Newark Liberty International Airport from Dubai last week.

Mengal is the grandson of the veteran Baluch national leaders Sardar Attaullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri. He is a representative to the United Nations Human Rights Council on behalf of Interfaith International and is a member of the lawful, non-violent Baluchistan National Party (BNP).

Baluchistan was invaded and annexed by Pakistan in 1948. It has been under military occupation ever since.

Washington’s ally in the so-called war on terror, the Pakistani President and long-time dictator Pervez Musharraf, has been waging a savage war against the people of Baluchistan,

This has included indiscriminately bombing civilian areas using US-supplied fighter aircraft and attack helicopters.

Unlike Musharraf, some of whose army and intelligence services are protecting the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, the BNP is peaceful, democratic and secular. Its members ought to be supported, not harassed, by the US.

But the ignorant, simple-minded Bush regime doesn’t like human rights defenders who challenge its foreign allies and stooges. In particular, it is fearful of campaigners who expose US complicity with dictators and with the perpetration of crimes against humanity. Presumably, this is why Mengal was stopped and sent back? There is no other explanation, since all his papers were in order and all his humanitarian campaigning is non-violent and constitutional.

Mengal has never been arrested in the past and has never been convicted or charged by any government. He has never been accused of any offence and has no charges pending against him. Does the US government care? Apparently not. It seems to ignore the US constitution when it suits it to do so.

After being held in custody in appalling conditions for over 26 hours by the Department of Homeland Security, Mengal was refused entry to the US and deported. No reasons given. No right of appeal. This is Bush-style democracy (sic) in action.

Apart from humiliating and inconveniencing Mengal, does this matter to the rest of us? Yes. It is further evidence of the corrosion of the rule of law and human rights by a US administration that is making major blunders in its bid to protect the country from terrorist attack.

Mengal’s mistreatment by the US authorities is worth telling in some detail because it highlights the lawless abuses and shamelful ignorance that often characterises President Bush’s foreign and domestic policies.

On his arrival at Newark at 6.30pm on 23 June, Mengal was detained and interrogated by officers of the Customs and Border Protection Enforcement section of the Department of Homeland Security. Mengal was questioned about the situation in Baluchistan and his human rights activities. Although he cooperated fully and gave a truthful account, he was subsequently told that he would not be granted entry to the United States and was, in effect, deported.

Under the US visa waiver programme, however, law-abiding British nationals are exempted from formal visa procedures and can freely visit the US for a maximum stay of up to three months on each entry.

Mengal asked an officer if he could call an official at the British embassy. The official confirmed his right to do so, but told him it would only be possible just prior to his departure. In the end, this assurance was voided. Moreover, Mengal was denied access to a telephone to contact his family and no one from the US government informed Mengal’s family of what was happening to him.

According to Mengal, at the wholly unreasonable hour of 2am the next morning he was re-interrogated. At one point he was asked if he would like to phone someone within the US, as he was not allowed to call internationally. But then he was told it was too late in the night and he would have to wait until later in the morning. But this offer to later phone a US contact never materialised.

A transcript of his interrogation was supposed to be given to him but wasn’t. It was eventually sent to him after he left the US, but it was doctored to falsely allege that he had declined offers to contact a lawyer and the British embassy.

A little later Mengal was informed that he would be given a place to rest, but was made to sit on a chair for nearly 10 hours, during which time he was repeatedly told that he would soon be taken to another facility.

At approximately 6am on 24 June he was belatedly given a thermoplastic blanket (disposable emergency sheet made of yellow polythene with a cellulose matting insulation) to keep warm.

At around 11 am, officers moved Mengal to another facility. The authorities shackled him like a common criminal, locking his handcuffs to a heavy chain looped around his waist, and led him through the airport lounge to an armoured detention vehicle.

Mengal was driven to the Elizabeth detention facility in New Jersey, where he was placed in a cell with a solid steel door. He estimates he was there for over five hours.

On questioning the detention officer regarding his status, Mengal was told that he was not a criminal, nor an offender. Mengal asked the officer if a British citizen had ever been detained at this facility. The officer replied: “Never.”

In the evening of 24 June, Mengal was once again restrained with fetters and manacles and transported back to the airport. He asked officers of the Department of the Homeland Security if he had the right to call a lawyer. He was told he was not now entitled to one and could only have done so on the day of his arrival. On the day of his arrival, however, he was not informed of any of his rights, nor was he allowed to contact anyone.

At 8pm, Mengal was interrogated again by officials from US Immigration and Customs enforcement. They disparaged and dismissed his human rights work. He was made to feel like an enemy of the US.

Shortly before he was put on a Qatar Airways flight at about 9pm, Mengal was told he was being sent back to Dubai and that if he returned to the US, even having attained a visa, there was still a possibility he would be denied entry.

With typical US government double-speak, Mengal was informed that he was not being deported, but rather was regarded as “inadmissible.” At no point was he ever told why he was refused admission to the US. Even now, he doesn’t know why.

Throughout his detention, Mengal was denied the right to contact an official from the British embassy. Isn’t this a violation of the Vienna Convention? Are not detained foreign nationals supposed to have the right to contact their diplomatic representatives?

It seems like the Department of Homeland Security can’t tell the difference between a terrorist and an anti-terrorist, democratic, secular, peaceful Baluch human rights defender. In which case, the war on terror is bound to fail. The US government’s clumsy, ignorant victimisation of another innocent person — Mengal isn’t the first and he won’t be the last — helps explain why so many people hate America. This is a nation that professes a love of liberty yet often acts like a tin-pot tyranny.

Iraq task, Iran risk

tim — Mon, 07 Jul 2008 11:27:43 +0000

The architects of the “war on terror” in the George W Bush administration will soon be leaving office. But the four months until the United States presidential election on 4 November 2008 could be momentous. In Iraq and Iran, what happens in the next four months – or does not happen – will shape events in the next four years and even beyond (see “Washington’s choice: subdue Iran, secure Iraq”, 12 June 2008).

The current level of conflict in Iraq is lower than for most of the period since the start of the war in March-April 2003, but it continues at a substantial level. The United States military’s losses have also been on a declining trend [1], but it still lost twenty-nine people in June 2008, an increase from nineteen in May. But this is far from the only index [2] of the fragility of the current security environment, as two recent incidents and one longer-term factor show.

The first incident is a US military raid on 27 June 2008 on the town of Janaja in southern Iraq that killed a civilian reported to be a relative of Iraq’s prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. The operation involved sixty US soldiers as well as Apache helicopter-gunships; did not include Iraqi units; and was apparently conducted without the knowledge of the provincial authorities, even though Karbala province was supposed to have been under Iraqi control. The response [3] of the Iraqis was, not surprisingly, sharp (see Hannah Allam & Sahar Issa, “U.S. Raid Angers Iraq [4]”, Miami Herald, 28 June 2008).

The second is a suicide-bombing attack in Anbar province on 28 June that killed twenty-three people including three US marines, which an al-Qaida insurgent group said that it had perpetrated (see Alissa J Rubin, “Group Claims Responsibility for Iraq Attack [5]”, New York Times, 29 June 2008). The attack was targeted [6] against local Sunni leaders who were supporters of the anti-al-Qaida “awakening movement”, and the militant responsible had been a member of the movement. It was, in short, an “inside job”.

The trend is the construction right across Baghdad of a network of walls designed to separate armed factions and communities. These have contributed to the decrease in violence, but have also produced a prison-like environment that is resented by many citizens (see Hamza Hendawi, “Iraqis Say Walls Protect But Feel Like Prison [7]”, Associated Press, 28 June 2008).

The Iraq outlook

Beyond the immediate security environment, two large developments are a signal of Washington’s current strategic thinking in relation to Iraq. The first is the opening up of Iraqi oil reserves to thirty-five companies in a bidding competition to increase oil production. At the outset the process involves six oilfields, though five short-term contracts are also being offered to American and European companies (see Sudarsan Raghavan & Steven Mufson, “Iraq Opens Oil Fields to Global Bidding [8]”, Washington Post, 1 July 2008).

The opening of the Iraqi oil industry to private companies represents a major departure from the nationalised industry of the Saddam Hussein era. Such a process was an early aim of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA [9]) established in the wake of the US invasion as the key instrument of US political control in the post-Saddam flux. Many believed and more hoped that a partially functioning Iraqi government has been able to take an independent line on this issue, though it now appears that the process of privatisation has been closely overseen by a group of American advisers. This group itself, moreover, was led by a team from the US state department, thus giving the George W Bush administration a direct role in the process (see Andrew E Kramer, “U.S. helped Iraqis on oil contracts [10]”, International Herald Tribune, 1 July 2008).

This series of columns has consistently argued that the primary purpose of the termination of the Saddam Hussein regime was less to gain control of Iraq’s oil reserves, even if they were around four times the size of US domestic reserves; rather, it was the location of Iraq in a region containing nearly two-thirds of all of the world’s oil that was more significant (see, for example, “Iraq’s danger signals [10]”, 13 December 2007). Nonetheless, the manner in which Iraq’s oil is coming under external control does begin to give some credence to those who claim a more direct connection between Iraq’s oil and the decision to go to war.

The plan to expand Iraqi oil production carries a real concern for its designers: that the pipelines and processing plants will be vulnerable to the kind of insurgent activity that inflicted such enormous economic damage in 2004-05. This fear may be connected with the second large development – the plan to maintain US military forces at current levels for at least until mid-2009. The last of the five additional combat-brigades that formed the year-long US “surge” is now departing the country, but plans are already underway to bring 30,000 fresh troops into the country early in 2009 (see Lolita C Baldor, “U.S. To Send 30,000 Troops To Iraq [11]”, Associated Press, 28 June 2008). These will replace existing contingents in a routine fashion, but what is less remarked is their effect on overall US deployment; namely, that that 142,000 troops will remain in Iraq, a number actually 7,000 more than were present before the surge began in February 2007.

It is always possible that violence will decrease to the extent that further withdrawals can take place, but the Pentagon is not currently planning for this. Its calculation is most likely based on a real fear that many of the insurgents are lying low and will return to the conflict in the coming months. If this proves correct, then a likely target will be Iraq’s oil installations just as foreign companies are moving in. This too will become clear by November 2008.

The Iran prospect

The Pentagon’s current preparation for a major long-term military presence in Iraq is accompanied by a sharpening of rhetoric over the putative threat posed by Iran’s nuclear plans. Most of this is at present emanating from some Israeli commentators and some of the Washington-based think-tanks and policy groups that identify themselves with what they imagine Israel’s national interest to be.

Most analysts are aware of the capacity of the Iranians to respond to any military attack by the United States or Israel in numerous ways, by (for example) escalating tension in Iraq or engineering a massive spike in crude oil prices. This often leads them as a result to discount the risk of an attack on Iran. Against this, some circles in Washington argue that Iran’s capacity to react has been much overplayed; in this view, Iran is actually far weaker than is commonly appreciated (see Seymour M Hersh, “Preparing the Battlefield [12]”, New Yorker, 7 July 2008). The conclusion is that now may be a good time to demonstrate resolve by targeting Tehran’s nuclear facilities, however limited they might currently be (see Gareth Porter, “‘Weak’ Iran ripe to be attacked [13]”, Asia Times, 1 July 2008).

What has always to be remembered in weighing the effect of these nuances is that there is a bottom-line for Israel: namely, there must never be another country in the region that has nuclear weapons – deterrence must work only one way if Israel is to be secure. In addition, a strong thread within hardline Israeli political thinking in the present political conjuncture (though opinion on the matter is not uniform) is that a Barack Obama presidency would be bad news. He may have sounded hardline over Iran in his speech [14] to Aipac on 4 June 2008, but Obama is seen as a highly intelligent politician with a worrying streak of independence in him (see “Iran and the American election [14]”, 5 June 2008).

It is troubling, then – a matter of concern to those in Israel and Washington who seek to resolve the Iran issue by force – that Obama is ahead of John McCain in the opinion polls. Perhaps, in such uncertain and unpredictable circumstances, now is the time to pre-empt Iranian nuclear developments – whatever the costs – rather than wait for an Obama victory and the nightmare prospect of talking to the enemy?

These, then, are the four months that will determine the future of the region and much of the world – not least the long-term security of the state of Israel – for years ahead. Iran and Iraq at the heart of present concern, though the security deterioration in other areas deserves to be noted: Afghanistan and Pakistan (see Julian E Barnes & Peter Spiegel, “Afghanistan Attacks Rise, U.S. Says [15]”, Los Angeles Times, 25 June 2008), and parts of north Africa (see Michael Moss, “Algerian militants win new lease on life as Al Qaeda affiliate [16]”, International Herald Tribune, 1 July 2008). Whether the incoming White House tenant faces the ashes of a new landscape of war or merely the fallout of the old one, the world is in for a long and bumpy ride.

Links:

[1] http://icasualties.org/oif/
[2] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/01/AR200807…
[3] http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080629/ts_nm/iraq_raid_dc_1
[4] http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/586350.html
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/world/middleeast/29iraq.html?ref=middl…
[6] http://www.metimes.com/Politics/2008/06/28/qaeda_claims_iraq_suicide_bom…
[7] http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080627/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_inside_the_walls…
[8] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/07/01/ST20080701…
[9] http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/cpa/
[10] http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/30/business/contracts.php
[11] http://www.wtopnews.com/?nid=116&sid=1430221
[12] http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh/?yrail
[13] http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JG02Ak04.html
[14] http://my.barackobama.com/page/community/post/HQblog/gG5CKp
[15] http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/25/world/fg-usafghan25
[16] http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/01/africa/01algeria.php

Chaos in Afghanistan

Ellie Keen — Fri, 27 Jun 2008 22:50:00 +0000

Bad and Getting Worse

Can anyone state exactly why foreign troops are fighting in Afghanistan? What is the collective aim, the specific mission, the ultimate objective, of the 60,000 soldiers there? I ask this because as I write the total of US deaths in Afghanistan “and region” is over 450, and news has come in of the killing of more British and American soldiers. And I wonder what all of them have died for.

There are three separate foreign military organizations in Afghanistan, and they conduct operations entirely differently. The International Security and Assistance Force, the NATO countries’ military contingents, and the independent US forces have no single overall headquarters ; they have entirely unrelated Rules of Engagement (a preposterous and almost unbelievable situation) ; and do not have a combined mission statement. If a young captain at any military college in the world were told to produce a planning paper for direction of military operations in a foreign country and came up with such a harebrained cockamamie muddle he would be laughed at and sent packing.

***

The situation in Afghanistan is bad and getting worse, but before sketching the history of foreign military failure in that harsh and barbaric country it should be noted that its eastern neighbor, Pakistan, remains host to the largest number of refugees existing in any one country in our horrible world. There is no other nation that has accepted so many displaced people for so long – or has received less international gratitude for its generosity to foreign exiles. There has been attentive care, of course, from the saintly UN High Commission for Refugees whose staff around the world rarely receive the recognition they deserve. But Pakistan has not received any acknowledgment, either, for its hosting of millions of Afghans, some of whom are intent on wrecking the country that has given them haven.

There remain in Pakistan over 1.5 million Afghans who have the status of refugees. (Plus some 400,000 who have been absorbed into Pakistan society, legally or otherwise.) They cannot return to their own country, no matter how much they may want to, because it is still in a state of chaos, thanks to inept foreigners, evil fanatics, terminally corrupt politicians, and ruthless tribal thugs who are allowed by the government and occupation forces to rule their fiefdoms with no regard for laws of God or man.

***

The US Government Accountability Office made it clear last week that there should be no more funding of training for the Afghan army because there is no “coordinated, detailed plan” for its future – after five years of foreign military occupation of the country. Remember the chaotic scenes in Kabul in April when President Karzai fled for his life and Afghan soldiers ran equally swiftly from the scene of a shooting at a military parade? That black comedy summed up the pathetic non-effectiveness of the new Afghan army. And the situation in Afghanistan would be uproariously funny, because of the amateur and clumsy dabbling by so many western nations, were it not that the majority of its citizens are in a state of even deeper poverty, fear and despondency than applied when the weird, fanatical, illiterate and psychotic Taliban were in power.

***

After Britain’s three Afghan Wars in the 19th and 20th Centuries, the Soviet Union, in a fit of Kremlin madness (for it transpired that it was a gigantic mistake), decided they would succeed where the British had failed, and in 1979 they invaded a country which had been doing quite well until a coup had deposed leadership that actually tried to look forward socially and improve the lives of ordinary Afghans. In the course of the Fourth Afghan War the country was destroyed, and brutal mujahideen “freedom fighters” prospered as a result of vast American subsidies. Their viciousness was promoted by tiny-minded gung-ho knuckle-dragging foreigners whose egos were matched only by the size of their moneybags.

When the USSR retreated from Afghanistan it was expected that western powers would rally round and help the country in its time of greatest need. Reconstruction, good governance and establishment of rule of law were obvious imperatives. Not a bit of it. There is no oil in Afghanistan. It doesn’t produce vast quantities of anything marketable, apart from heroin, so was not a desirable plot to be cultivated. There was no encouragement of democracy ; no notion of supporting the few forward-thinking Afghan leaders who wanted to bring at least a modicum of social improvement and equality to a benighted country that was in a state of anarchy. So the moronic Taliban came to power and thrust Afghanistan even further back towards the Dark Ages.

But because the Saudi Arabian suicide plane-destroyers on 9/11 in America were guided by a murderous Saudi Arabian lunatic who lived in Afghanistan, the place became a priority. Not for development, of course, for that was the last thing in the tiny minds of George Bush and his demented crew : their priority was vengeance. US air attacks destroyed countless villages and an unknown number of Afghans. An assault on the area in which bin Laden was supposed to be hiding was ludicrously unsuccessful, and the whole story of that bizarre and militarily unprofessional fiasco has yet to be fully told. (I give some details in my next book, but am restricted by having many years ago signed the Official Secrets Act which, as retailed in the wonderful BBC TV series ‘Yes Minister,’ is “Not there to protect Secrets. It is to protect Officials.” There are, however, a couple of interesting tales.)

The Afghan brutes who are dignified by the word ‘warlord’ by the western media – for there is something swashbuckling in the word that appeals to hacks and headline writers – but who are only grubby gangsters – had a wonderful time, courtesy of the CIA and MI6. They murdered hundreds of their closest enemies and laughed all the way to their Swiss banks, while bin Laden disappeared. Elsewhere, the drug thugs have had an even more vindictive and lucrative time. The Fifth Afghan War has been good for some – especially the dozens of corrupt members of the present government in Kabul who have prospered mightily. (Their names are well known by western nations involved in Afghanistan – I had detailed descriptions of names, places and bank accounts during my last visit to Kabul.)

But last week the ineffectual President Karzai of Afghanistan said that Afghan troops would cross the border into Pakistan to pursue and kill anyone who had been fighting against Afghan or “coalition” forces. This would be a very serious statement were it not for the fact that the US Government Accountability Office has observed that “only two of 105 Afghan army units are considered [operationally] capable,” with a third of them able to perform “only with routine international support” – for which read massive US bombing strikes such as killed Major Akbar of the Pakistan army and ten of his Frontier Corps soldiers on 11 June.

Afghanistan is a disaster area. The lives of hundreds of foreign soldiers have been sacrificed by their governments. The army of Pakistan has suffered thousands of dead and wounded. For what? The collective wisdom of the condescending west has produced nothing other than chaos, death, corruption, hatred and booming heroin exports.

Is there any optimism that the next five years of the Fifth Afghan War will be any better than the last if present policies apply? It is time for a common sense approach to Afghanistan by all the clever foreigners who think they know how the country should be governed. Does anyone think that will happen?

Brian Cloughley’s website is www.briancloughley.com

This is an expanded version of ‘The Fifth Afghan War’ that appeared in two newspapers in Pakistan, The Nation and The News, on June 25.

Afghanistan in an Amorphous War

Ellie Keen — Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:53:14 +0000

An incident causing major loss of life in Iraq, and an enduring pattern of low-level violence in north Africa, have created concern that the cautious sense of progress in the campaign against al-Qaida in recent months may prove more apparent than real. Even these serious events, however, are overshadowed by evidence of a Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. At the same time, all these theatres of the global "war on terror" share underlying affinities that United States strategy in this war is tending to reinforce.

The Iraqi incident was a car-bomb attack on a crowded Baghdad market on 17 June 2008 which killed sixty-three people and wounded seventy-eight. This, the most destructive explosion in the city since 6 March, was all the more painful for coming at a time when a certain optimism about Iraq's security and wider prospects was achieving traction (see "Iraq starts to fix itself", Economist, 12 June 2008). A further aspect of this was the declining number of victims, both American (in May 2008, nineteen soldiers died, the lowest monthly total than in any month since the war began in March 2003) and Iraqi (civilian casualties were also at a relatively low level in May – although still in the hundreds).

These signs of improvements had done much to support the view – expressed most vocally on the American right, but shared by others too – that the war in Iraq was, or was becoming, winnable. Those sympathetic to John McCain in the presidential campaign suggest that he should make this theme (and his broader support for the war and the US's military "surge" strategy) a centrepiece of his contest with Barack Obama (see Charles Krauthammer, "McCain must make case for Iraq", Newsday, 19 Jun 2008). The implication here is that Iraq is and will remain what it has been – the pivot of the entire "war on terror", where the now-expected destruction of what is termed "al-Qaida in Iraq" is a sign of decisive progress in the war as a whole.

The Afghan landscape

The progress that has been made in increasing security for many Iraqi citizens – partly through the social division of much of the population by repeated bouts of fighting and expulsion, partly through the deals made with elements of the Sunni community against al-Qaida forces, partly though the exhaustions of war – is given as justification of this optimistic view. This approach, however, tends to ignore other, more uncomfortable pointers to the al-Qaida movement's condition – including the attack on 2 June on the Danish embassy in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad; and a series of bombings on 4-8 June in Algeria that killed a number of people (the precise total is in dispute). The most important of these trends is the upsurge in violence in Afghanistan. In May 2008, the deaths among coalition troops in that country exceeded those in Iraq for the first time; June has also been marked by numerous hits against British troops, which took the total killed in the war to 106.

There had earlier been a widespread anticipation that the summer months would see a renewed Taliban offensive in southern Afghanistan, although there was also some caution about the prospect of major attacks (see "Al-Qaida's afterlife", 29 May 2008). The fact that overwhelming firepower is available to Nato forces has made it all the more likely that Taliban and other militias would opt to diversify and "miniaturise" its tactics, including the use of roadside- and suicide-bombs.

The war in Afghanistan has been attracting less media attention in the United States than that in Iraq, and the evolving reportage of the presidential campaign may accentuate the contrast (see Jim Malone, "Iraq: The Defining Difference Between McCain, Obama", VOA, 13 June 2008). But inside the Pentagon it was becoming clear that the security problem there was rapidly developing, in part because many districts in western Pakistan had become safe havens for Taliban, al-Qaida and other militias.

The US response to this increased threat has been threefold:

increase troop levels in Afghanistan and seek to take overall responsibility for the counterinsurgency war, at least in the southern and southeastern parts of the country
pressurise Pakistan to limit militia operations in its own western districts

make a determined effort to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

An announcement by Britain's ministry of defence series of incidents in which British troops were killed led the country's Britain's ministry of defence to announce a further increase of 230 in troop numbers, taking the total to around 8,030 by spring 2009 – though this was linked to a claim that the Taliban were in retreat rather than making gains. This bullish assessment contrasted with a more cautious measure of the condition of security in Afghanistan from the senior US army commander in the country, General Dan K McNeill, at the end of his sixteen-month posting on 3 June (see Ann Scott Tyson, "A Sober Assessment of Afghanistan", Washington Post, 15 June 2008).

McNeill emphasised that the last three years had seen a gradual resurgence of Taliban activity. At the same time, the number of troops operating under Nato's International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) had risen over a three-year period to 53,000 from forty countries. But this was not enough, McNeill contended: a much larger troop deployment would be required if the Taliban militias were to be defeated.

The Taliban vision

Three major developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan that took place within days of McNeill's departure from the country both underpinned his judgment and gave an indication of the likely course of events in summer 2008.

The first was the killing on 10 June of eleven members of Pakistan's official Frontier Corps as a result of a US air-strike. Some reports say that the Pakistani troops were actually aiding a Taliban group under attack by US and Afghan troops close to the border. This has not been confirmed, but it would not be entirely surprising, given local sympathies for fellow-Pushtun Pakistani paramilitaries in some parts of the Pakistani army (see Anna Mulrine, "Pakistan's Border Badlands Are a Challenge for the Next President", US News & World Report, 13 June 2008.

More important, though, is the reaction within Pakistan to this event. The loss of life has intensified a deep-seated public antipathy to the United States and its conduct of its "war on terror". The killing of the Frontier Corps soldiers will make it difficult for a Pakistani government of any persuasion to work with Washington. Moreover, the incident comes at a time when the Pentagon's closest ally in Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf – still the country's president, though weakened after the elections of February 2008 – is facing severe political challenges to his authority, and may even be obliged to resign in the next few weeks (see Syed Saleem Shahzad, "US strike hits Pakistan's raw nerve", Asia Times, 12 June 2008).

The second development was the extraordinary break-out from Sarpoza prison in Kandahar, in an operation planned and executed by Taliban elements. In a coordinated assault where the explosion of a bomb hidden in a road-tanker was followed by a direct paramilitary invasion of the city's main prison, several hundred Taliban prisoners were released. The incident is all the more serious because (as is perhaps not fully appreciated in the western media) Kandahar is one of the main centres of coalition military resources in Afghanistan, host (for example) to its second-largest air base.

The third development compounded the Taliban attack on the jail. This was the deployment of at least 500 paramilitaries to overrun a number of villages close to Kandahar. At the same time, the combination of the jail attack and the subsequent offensive is unlikely to mark the start of a Taliban operation to take control of Kandahar, since Nato with all its firepower will not allow that to happen. What is more probable is that this operation is a show of strength, and the prelude to a Nato counter-offensive which the Taliban forces will respond to by melting away until the next opportunity is chosen.

The two actions show is that the Taliban militias do not have to limit their operations to small-scale guerrilla attacks; the level of their support means that they are well beyond that and can engage in large-scale offensives too, at a time of their own choosing.

More generally, the Taliban strategists will see this as one part of the early stage of a decades-long war; they do not have to win in the conventional military sense, they merely have to outlast those foreign forces seen as the occupiers, especially in the face of divisions within Nato (see Anna Mulrine, "A Struggling Coalition of the Willing and the Not-So-Willing", US News & World Report, 16 June 2008).

The global horizon

These recent developments in Afghanistan confirm that the focus of the US "war on terror" may really be shifting eastwards. At the very moment when neo-conservative elements in Washington speak of winning the Iraq war, that very war is becoming less relevant in the context of the larger picture. The US insistence on maintaining a very large military presence there indicates that the Iraq war is far from reaching its endgame, but in one sense it has already served its purpose (see Tom Englehardt, "The Greatest Story Never Told: Finally, the US Mega-Bases in Iraq Make the News", TomDispatch.com, 15 June 2008).

More than five years of fighting in Iraq have given the wider al-Qaida / jihadist movement a new generation of paramilitaries trained against well-armed and equipped US soldiers and marines. Many of the tactics honed in Iraq are now being applied in Afghanistan, not least in the form of roadside bombs and the tactical nous employed to avoid Nato's air power (see Caroline Gammell & Tom Coghlan, "The increasing sophistication of Afghanistan's roadside bombs", Daily Telegraph, 18 June 2008). All this, combined with the persistent uncertainties in Iraq, and the significant and under-reported currents in north Africa, means that the "war on terror" has moved on.

Whether they are right or wrong, those who claim that Iraq is or is becoming a success fail to realise that the country's importance in the global arena of conflict is diminishing. This has been the recurrent story of the George W Bush administration's "war on terror". It is a further reason to argue that, in the absence of fundamental changes of approach, the world is still in the early stages of a decades-long confrontation.

Nato's lost cause

Ellie Keen — Wed, 11 Jun 2008 15:44:13 +0000

In the latest clashes on the Pakistan-Afghan border, Nato troops have killed 11 Pakistani soldiers and injured many more, creating a serious crisis in the country and angering the Pakistan military high command, already split on the question.

US failure in Afghanistan is now evident and Nato desperation only too visible. Spreading the war to Pakistan would be a disaster for all sides. The Bush-Cheney era is drawing to a close, but it is unlikely that their replacements, despite the debacle in Iraq, will settle the American giant back to a digestive sleep.

The temporary cleavage that opened up between some EU states and Washington on Iraq was resolved after the occupation. They could all unite in Afghanistan and fight the good fight. This view has been strongly supported by every US presidential candidate in the run up to the 2008 elections, with Senator Barack Obama pressuring the White House to violate Pakistani sovereignty whenever necessary. He must be pleased.

That the “good war” has now turned bad is no longer disputed by a number of serious analysts in the US, even though there is no agreed prescription for dealing with the problems. Not least of which for some is the future of Nato, stranded far away from the Atlantic in a mountainous country, the majority of whose people, after offering a small window of opportunity to the occupiers, realised it was a mistake and became increasingly hostile.

The “neo-Taliban” control at least 20 districts in the Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan provinces where Nato troops replaced US soldiers. It is hardly a secret that many officials in these zones are closet supporters of the guerrilla fighters. As western intelligence agencies active in the country are fully aware, the situation is out of control. The model envisaged for the occupation was Panama. The then US secretary of State, Colin Powell, explained that: “The strategy has to be to take charge of the whole country by military force, police or other means”. His knowledge of Afghanistan was limited.

Panama, populated by 3.5 million people, could not have been more different to Afghanistan, which has a population approaching 30 million and is geographically quite dissimilar. To even attempt a military occupation of the entire country would require a minimum of 200,000 troops.

A total of 8000 US troops were dispatched to seal the victory. The 4000 “peacekeepers” sent by other countries never left Kabul. The Germans concentrated on creating a police force that could run a police state and the Italians, without any sense of irony, were busy “training an Afghan judiciary” to deal with the drugs mafia. The British were in Helmand amidst the poppy fields. As for the new satellite states involved – Czechs, Slovenes, Poles, Estonians, Slovakians and Romanians – it was useful training for the future.

Five years later, in September 2006, an attempted bombing of the US embassy came close to hitting its target. A CIA assessment that same month painted a sombre picture, depicting Karzai and his regime as hopelessly corrupt and incapable of defending Afghanistan against the Taliban. Ronald E Neumann, the US Ambassador in Kabul supported this view and told an interviewer that the US faced “stark choices“ and defeat could only be avoided through
“multiple billions” over “multiple years”.

The repression, striking blindly, leaves people with no option but to back those trying to resist, especially in a part of the world where the culture of revenge is strong. When a whole community feels threatened it reinforces solidarity, regardless of the character or weakness of those who fight back.

Many Afghans who detest the Taliban are so angered by the failures of Nato and the behaviour of its troops that they are hostile to the occupation. Nato itself has stopped pretending that its occupation has anything to do with the needs of the Afghan people and acknowledge it as an open-ended American military thrust into the Middle East and Central Asia. As the Economist summarises, “Defeat would be a body blow not only to the Afghans, but” – and more importantly, of course – to the Nato alliance”. As ever, geopolitics prevail over Afghan interests in the calculus of the big powers.

The basing agreement signed by Washington with its appointee in Kabul in May 2005 gives the Pentagon the right to maintain a massive military presence in Afghanistan in perpetuity. That Washington is not seeking permanent bases in this fraught and inhospitable terrain simply for the sake of “democratisation and good governance” was made clear by Nato’s secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Brookings Institution in February this year: the opportunity to site military facilities, and potentially nuclear missiles, in a country that borders China, Iran and Central Asia was too good to miss.

More strategically, Afghanistan has become a central theatre for uniting, and extending, the west’s power-political grip on the world order. On the one hand, it is argued, it provides an opportunity for the US to shrug off its failures in imposing its will in Iraq and persuading its allies to play a broader role there. In contrast, as one report (pdf) suggests, America and its allies “have greater unity of purpose in Afghanistan. The ultimate outcome of Nato’s effort to stabilise Afghanistan and US leadership of that effort may well affect the cohesiveness of the alliance and Washington’s ability to shape Nato’s future.”

There are at least two routes out of the Khyber impasse. The first and the worst would be to Balkanise the country. This appears to be the dominant pattern of imperial hegemony at the moment, but whereas the Kurds in Iraq and the Kosovans and others in the former Yugoslavia were willing client-nationalists, the likelihood of Tajiks or Hazaris playing this role effectively is more remote in Afghanistan.

The second alternative would require a withdrawal of all US/Nato forces, either preceded or followed by a regional pact to guarantee Afghan stability for the next ten years. Pakistan, Iran, India and Russia could guarantee and support a functioning national government, pledged to preserving the ethnic and religious diversity of Afghanistan and creating a space in which all its citizens can breathe, think and eat every day. It would need a serious social and economic plan to rebuild the country and provide the basic necessities for its people.

Nato’s failure cannot be simply blamed on the Pakistani government. It is a traditional colonial ploy to blame “outsiders” for internal problems. If anything, the war in Afghanistan has created a critical situation in two Pakistani frontier provinces and the use of the Pakistan army by Centcom has resulted in suicide terrorism in Lahore with the federal intelligence agency and a naval training college targeted by supporters of the Afghan insurgents.

The Pashtun majority in Afghanistan has always had close links to its fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan. The present border was an imposition by the British empire, but it has always remained porous. It is virtually impossible to build a Texan fence or an Israeli wall across the mountainous and largely unmarked 2500km border that separates the two countries. The solution is political, not military. And it should be sought in the region not in Washington or Brussels.