al-Qaida | ukwatch.net

Transatlantic bomb plot- jury fails to convict

tim — Sun, 14 Sep 2008 22:20:19 +0000

The conclusion of the trial of those accused of plotting to blow up transatlantic airlines in 2006 has created a major crisis for the Labour government and the security services. It has revealed the gaping disconnect between public opinion and official propaganda on the “war on terror.” So great is the damage that within days of the verdict the Crown Prosecution Service announced its intention to demand a retrial.

On August 10, 2006, British security services dramatically announced they had foiled an imminent attack on a number of transatlantic planes flying out of London. Described as the most significant terror plot since 9/11, the early hours saw a series of raids in southern England and the detention of some 24 young men, predominantly British citizens of Pakistani origin, including a Muslim charity worker and an employee at Heathrow airport.

London’s Heathrow airport—the world’s largest in terms of international passenger traffic—was shut down, thousands of flights were cancelled and an indefinite ban was imposed on hand luggage.

Police and government officials reported that the men had intended to use liquid chemicals, disguised as drinks, to cause a series of explosions on up to 17 aircraft in midflight.

Deputy Commissioner Paul Stephenson of the Metropolitan Police said the intention was to “cause untold death and destruction and, quite frankly, to commit mass murder.” Then Home Secretary John Reid said that the scale of the plot was potentially larger than 9/11 and that the loss of life “would have been on an unprecedented scale.”

In the United States, President George W. Bush told a press conference that the plot was a “historical reminder that this nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation.” Michael Chertoff, as homeland security secretary, said the plan was “suggestive of an Al Qaeda plot,” was “well advanced” and “really quite close to the execution phase.”

Some two years later—after a five-month trial costing £10 million—on September 8, a jury was unable to agree that such a plot ever existed, and failed to convict the eight men on trial on the prosecution’s central charge of plotting to explode transatlantic aircraft.

The court had heard that “martyrdom videos” recorded by six of the defendants had been found in which they threatened death and destruction, and that evidence gathered by undercover officers and through surveillance techniques proved that the men had established a bomb factory in an east London flat.

The prosecution said that evidence also established that the bomb plot had been hatched in Pakistan and that when defendant Abdulla Ahmed Ali was arrested, he had a “blueprint” for the plot in a pocket diary. A computer memory stick containing details of flights and airport security arrangements had also been uncovered.

The eight denied such a plan. Ali said that the videos were intended to form part of a documentary highlighting Western attacks on Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. Ali, Assad Ali Sarwar and Tanvir Hussian pled guilty to conspiracy to cause explosions, but said these were only ever intended as a publicity stunt to draw attention to the video and were never intended to cause harm.

The jury rejected this claim and convicted the three of conspiracy to murder. But it was deadlocked on the central charge of conspiring to explode airliners.

The four other men—Waheed Zaman, Umar Islam, Arafat Waheed Khan and Ibrahim Savant—had admitted conspiring to cause a public nuisance. But the jury was unable to reach verdicts on them in relation to charges of conspiracy to murder.

Even more damaging from the standpoint of the prosecution’s case, Mohammed Gulzar—who was described as the plot’s ringleader but who always denied any involvement—was acquitted of all charges. He cannot be retried, but the Home Office has said that Gulzar, who is from Birmingham, will be subject to control orders curtailing his movements.

Furious response to the verdict

The verdict has brought a furious response from the government, security services and the media.

The trial judge, Mr. Justice Calvert-Smith, has been singled out for criticism. He had led a slipshod trial, it was alleged, in which he had pandered to the juror’s every whim—allowing them a holiday, and even time off for a family emergency.

Given the need to maintain juror continuity in such a lengthy case, the judge (in this instance, a former director of public prosecutions) was in fact required to set a holiday period at the start of the hearing and to make certain arrangements for other exigencies. After the jury had deliberated for 11 days without reaching agreement on the central charge, the judge had directed that he would accept a majority verdict of 11-1 or 10-2, which it subsequently failed to achieve.

The jury itself has also been denounced as lax and incompetent. Typical of this approach was Max Hastings in the Daily Mail, who complained that the jurors’ conclusions could only lead people to assume “either that those responsible for protecting us do not know what they are doing; or that some jury members are stunningly indifferent to the activities of allegedly would-be mass-murderers.”

Amidst suggestions that the verdict proved it was necessary that lengthy, “complex” trials should not be heard by jurors, Frances Gibb in the Times cautioned that “jurors must ensure that they do not fuel the opinion that, in long trials at least, their time is up.”

In reality, the jury demonstrated a high degree of concern for points of law. They rejected the three main defendants’ claim that they were only seeking minor explosions for propaganda purposes, but were not satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt”—the burden of proof at trial—that they had specifically intended to explode bombs on transatlantic flights.

The jury’s diligence was such that Justice Calvert-Smith praised their conduct at the end of the trial. Excusing them from any further juror service for their lifetimes, he described them as a “unique bunch of 12 people” and said they could “Depart this court with the full-hearted thanks of the community for your service to it, which is far beyond the duty for most jurors, and my personal thanks.”

A political conspiracy

The Crown Prosecution Service’s announcement that it intends to seek a retrial of the seven demonstrates only contempt for due process. Having failed to secure the conviction it required, the CPS intends to keep going until it succeeds.

On the face of it, this determination seems perverse. Why the concern with proving the specific charge of intention to explode transatlantic aircraft? After all, the three have been found guilty of conspiracy to murder, which carries a life sentence.

Moreover, it is abundantly clear that the jury could not reasonably convict on the central charge. Within days of the initial raids and arrests, it was already apparent that there were gaping holes in the assertions by US and British authorities that they had stopped an imminent terror attack. Reports stated that no bombs had actually been assembled; that none of those detained had purchased airline tickets and some did not even have passports.

In short, nothing presented during the trial proved that aircraft had been targeted.

But an enormous political investment has been made in this case.

As the World Socialist Web Site explained in “The politics of the latest terror scare,” the alleged plot was seized on not because of supposed security considerations but “for transparently political purposes of a deeply reactionary character. It has, rather, to do with the machinations of the clique of political gangsters—Dick Cheney, Karl Rove, among others—who run the US government.”

The context of the terror plot, the WSWS stated, was the ever-bloodier quagmire faced by the US-led occupation in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the politically explosive failure of the US-backed Israeli assault on Lebanon. With Bush’s approval ratings plummeting, Republicans feared a wipeout in the upcoming November elections.

“The answer of the Cheney-Rove conspirators is to engineer a new wave of panic and hysteria in an attempt to once again stampede voters behind Bush’s ‘war on terrorism.’ They did the same in 2004, when in the run-up to the election the government suddenly announced a plot to attack major financial institutions in New York, Washington and Newark, New Jersey—a plot that came to nothing.”

This is now so clearly a matter of record that Simon Jenkins in the Guardian notes, “It has been an open secret in police circles that Operation Overt, the most complex in counter-terror history, was sabotaged by the American vice president, Dick Cheney, desperate for a headline boost to the Republicans’ 2006 mid-term elections.”

He cites the recent book “The Way of the World” by Ron Suskind, the Wall Street Journal’s former senior national affairs writer. This sets out how, after Prime Minister Tony Blair had informed Bush in July 2006 of the British intelligence services’ two-year-long investigation, Operation Overt, into alleged Muslim extremists, “Cheney then privately dispatched the CIA’s operations director, Jose Rodriguez, to Islamabad to secure the arrest of one of the British suspects, Rashid Rauf, believed to be a possible link with al-Qaida,” Jenkins writes.

The capture of Rauf (who subsequently and inexplicably escaped detention) created panic in London, as “the police had desperately to round up as many suspects as they could find overnight,” and “all for the mid-term elections.”

So rushed were the arrests that Blair had left for his Caribbean holiday just 48 hours before, and neither the head of the Metropolitan Police Special Operations department nor Britain’s transport secretary was aware that the raids were imminent until the last moment.

That did not prevent the British government using the scare for its political objectives—in pressing for the extension of the period in which detainees could be held without charge for 90 days.

As the WSWS stated, “There undeniably is a conspiracy. It is a plot to use terrorist threats, real or imagined, to terrorise the American people, intimidate them, disorient them, and accustom them to accept the militarisation of every aspect of their lives and the destruction of their democratic rights. The centre of this conspiracy is the American government itself.”

It is this political conspiracy that the British authorities are seeking to perpetuate in demanding a retrial.

Al Qaida- The SWISH Report

tim — Sat, 13 Sep 2008 16:14:33 +0000

An eighth report from the South Waziristan Institute of Strategic Hermeneutics to the al-Qaida Strategic Planning Cell (SPC) on the progress of the campaign

Thank you for inviting us to deliver another report on the progress of your movement. You will recall that our work for your planning cell commenced with an initial assessment in July 2004, a follow-up in January 2005 and further reports in February 2006 and September 2006 and (in light of political developments in the United States) December 2006.

The next analysis was presented in November 2007; but the pace of events in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan – in the context of the evolving United States presidential-election campaign – led to the request for the next report only three months later, in February 2008. This last document clearly signalled to you that this might be the final occasion when our services might be required.

We are then particularly pleased that – even though our February 2008 assessment was somewhat blunt in terms of your movement’s overall prospect – you have invited us to deliver one more report. We understand that on this occasion you require a brief updating of our analysis on your main theatres of operation, together with an analysis of the impact of the possible outcomes of the US residential election in November 2008.

Pakistan and Afghanistan

In our last briefing we made three judgments about Pakistan. First. that the country’s then general-president Pervez Musharraf had been much weakened by the result of the country’s just-held parliamentary election, and that we were not convinced he would survive. Second, that it was doubtful that a stable parliamentary coalition would emerge. Third, that there would be we increased United States military activity within western Pakistan. In all three respects our analysis was accurate: Pervez Musharraf has gone, the domestic governing coalition is in disarray, and the US military is now conducting special-forces operations across the border with Afghanistan.

The assumption of the presidency by Asif Ali Zardari is also an indication that the feudal pattern of Pakistani politics is thriving; though civil-society elements and the legal profession may cause problems for the government. It is likely that President Zardari will be supportive of increased US military action, but this may cause deep unease in sections of the Pakistani military, as well as increasing the more general anti-American mood.

While our predictions seven months ago for Pakistan were reassuringly accurate, we must confess we were less effective in our analysis concerning Afghanistan. There, we were doubtful that the revitalised Taliban would extend their activities to major assaults on coalition forces – in the face of overwhelming firepower we instead expected to see an intense concentration on roadside bombs and martyr attacks. While these have indeed been increased, we also note the effective move towards the targeting of supply-routes, and a willingness, on occasions, to conduct substantial military operations. These have included a successful assault on the main prison in Kandahar and lethal attacks on US and French units.

One outcome of these developments is that the US military now puts a much greater emphasis on the war in Afghanistan and is looking to increase its own military deployments while seeking to persuade its Nato partners to be more supportive.

Iraq

In our February 2008 report, we anticipated that the George W Bush administration, along with neo-conservative commentators, would develop an overall narrative centred on a “probability of victory” in Iraq which would downgrade the significance of the war in that country during the latter months of the presidential campaign. This has indeed been what has happened, with the framers of the narrative placing a great emphasis on Iraq’s increased security. It is interesting in this context, however, that the United States military leadership is deeply reluctant to withdraw combat-troops to a level much below that of the pre-surge (that is, pre-February 2007) deployments. In spite of the pressing need for troops in Afghanistan, it now looks as though just one of the fifteen remaining US combat-brigades will be withdrawn in the September 2008 – March 2009 period.

We strongly suspect that many of the more astute military analysts in US Central Command (Centcom) and the Pentagon believe that security in Iraq is far more problematic than their political masters would like their citizens to believe. This is partly due to the hard line now being taken by the Nouri al-Maliki government, especially towards the integration of Sunni militias into the security forces, but also relates to strains in Shi’a / Kurdish relations and the growing influence of Iran.

The al-Maliki government claims to want a total United States military withdrawal by 2010 or 2011, but oil geopolitics makes this nonsensical – the US is in Iraq for the long term. While your associates in Iraq have had major reversals, we suspect these are short-term. We stand by our assessment of seven months ago:

“Although circumstances will not always be as favourable as 2006-07, rest assured that your paramilitary combat-training zone in Iraq will remain viable and of great use to you for the foreseeable future.”

In this context, we note recent reports that some of your paramilitary associates from Iraq are now active in Somalia.

The American election campaign

In our last report to you it had become clear that John McCain was likely to be the Republican candidate and that Barack Obama might defeat Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination. Our overall view was that:

“What is best for you is that the United States remains resolute in its support for Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt; fully addicted to oil and therefore determined to remain dominant in the Persian Gulf; and prepared to continue to pursue its war against you with the utmost vigour. In other words, eight more years for George W Bush would have been ideal. Sadly for your movement, that cannot be.”

As a whole, we considered McCain to be a far better prospect from your perspective; though we had some concerns that such rightwing incumbents can, on occasions, opt successfully for radical change.

Today, with the Obama/McCain contest fully underway, we indeed believe that a McCain presidency is – by a considerable margin – the more favourable to your movement; not least because the Republican ticket is now supplemented by a vice-presidential nominee who is a Christian fundamentalist as well as a climate-change sceptic from an oil-rich state.

It remains the case that if elected, Barack Obama could be very limited in his security options. His speech to the leading American pro-Israel organisation Aipac in June 2008 was markedly hardline; he supports military reinforcements for Afghanistan; and he has implied that he would be willing to order more direct US military action in Pakistan. Even so, part of the reason for taking such positions relates simply to the realities of electoral politics. What he says now and what he would do in office may be very different, especially if the Democrats have convincing majorities in both houses of Congress.

In any case, whatever his actual policies, we most certainly would expect under an Obama presidency a marked change in style towards a more listening, cooperative and multilaterally-engaged America. That must be of deep concern to you. A more “acceptable” America in global terms is the last thing you want.

In one sense, however, we can reassure you about the outcome; for our associates in our Washington office believe that John McCain will win by a relatively small margin, although Congress is likely to remain Democrat-controlled. Their assessment is based on a prediction that while polls may well give Obama a small margin even up to election-day, a small but significant portion of those voting will be sufficiently influenced by residual prejudice to opt for McCain in the privacy of the polling booth. Their point is that even if only one in fifty voters behaves in this manner, that should help ensure a victory for McCain.

We acknowledge that this is very tentative, and that American politics are currently volatile and unpredictable; and that, after all, our assessment in November 2007 was made in the context of a likely Rudy Giuliani / Hillary Clinton contest!

Your concern must still be with the prospect of an Obama victory, and a key question is whether you should engineer a major attack against US interests shortly before the election. We would advise against this. Whether or not you have the resources to mount a major attack (and we understand why you will not take us into your confidence), the result could be unpredictable.

In the immediate wake of a 9/11-scale attack within the continental United States, Obama’s advisers would know that this would benefit their opponent strongly. They might well then take the risk of going on the offensive against McCain, pointing to the folly of George W Bush’s policies and the manner in which they have made the United States unsafe. It would be a risky strategy but these would be desperate times for the Obama campaign and it might just come off. The risk to you is too great and for this reason alone we do not advocate such an attack.

Instead, we stand by our recommendation in February 2008 that you seek, in the weeks before the election, to make it known that you favour Barack Obama and believe he would be a president with whom you could do business. This would be combined with strong statements to the effect that you believe a John McCain presidency would be a disaster for the United States and that he would be a leader unto darkness and death. Such a strategy, we believe, would go a long way to ensure he was elected, this being the outcome you should most earnestly desire.

Wana

South Waziristan

10 September 2008

Al-Qaida’s afterlife

tim — Sat, 31 May 2008 21:08:11 +0000

A number of current trends in Afghanistan are of far more than local significance. The pattern of violence is the most visible: for example, a series of attacks on 26-27 May 2008 killed [1] thirty seven people (among them police officers, soldiers, and bus passengers) in the provinces of Kandahar, Farah, Khost and Nimroz. But armed action and the bloodshed it causes are also the surface manifestation of a strategic reordering that is inserting the Afghan conflict into regional and even global realities in new ways.

These incidents reflect the fact that many of the paramilitary groups in the country [2] (and not just the Taliban) have become cautious about frontal assaults on western forces and are instead laying roadside- and suicide-bombs (see “Afghanistan’s Vietnam portent [2]”, 17 April 2008). The tactic is routinely directed against Afghan police and army units, as well as government officials and NGO workers (mostly local, since a majority of international agencies have withdrawn).

This incremental rise [3] in the level of violence may continue after the opium-poppy harvest, though so too in all probability will the current minimal level of western media coverage (diminishing to near-invisibility in the United States). But if the media and publics are less than engaged in this, the first theatre [4] of the “war of terror” after the assaults of 11 September 2001, the Pentagon is treating events in Afghanistan [5] with utmost seriousness – and ever greater ambition.

A military-political purpose

A 2,400-strong force of US marines is now deployed in Helmand province, reportedly with as much air support as the British ground forces in the same province (which number 7,300). There are indications that further US contingents amounting to 7,000 extra troops will be deployed; inaddition, the operations in Afghanistan’s embattled [6] southern region will be transferred from Nato to direct US control (see “A war of money as well as bullets [7]”, Economist, 24 May 2008). British, Dutch and Canadian forces in southern Afghanistan have, notwithstanding differences of approach with the US, won a certain professional respect from US military commanders.

But deep divisions among these distinct Nato forces remain, and they are not helped by continuing resource constraints (US demands at the Nato conference [8] in Bucharest in April 2008 for its allies to contribute more have had little effect, apart from a few hundred additional French troops). The result is an American plan (born partly out of frustration) to substantially increase the firepower within the country. But this is only one part of a programme that places as much emphasis on events on the other side of the border with Pakistan.

Two aspects of the Afghan dimension of this agenda are central. The first is to intensify pressure [11] on the Pakistani government over its attitude to Pakistani Taliban leaders – in favour of a tougher approach, rather than continue with the present policy of local negotiations (see Bill Roggio, “Pakistan strikes deal with the Taliban in Mohmand [12]”, Long War Journal, 28 May 2008).

From Islamabad’s perspective, the advantage of the latest phase of its deal-making policy (highlighted in September 2006 when a formal agreement [13] was made with Taliban fighters in the region of North Waziristan) is that this will help ease tensions in the frontier districts. Washington takes a different view: that it creates entire zones free of any government authority where Taliban militias can operate (reminiscent of the territories held by the Farc guerrillas in Colombia [13]). The US military wants to expand its ability to operate in these districts – as does the CIA. Both have already stepped up their activities in the region, such as aerial surveillance and ground-based intelligence (the latter from new posts just inside Afghanistan).

The current state of Pakistani politics complicates this project. The elections [13]Â of 18 February 2008 have opened a new phase of instability, characterised by divisions among the leading parties and personalities (see Irfan Husain, “Pakistan’s rivalrous coalition [13]”, 19 May 2008); but the formation of a new government has also constrained further the ability of the president, Pervez Musharraf, to ensure that Pakistan accedes to American demands. Musharraf was already isolated in his pro-US stance before he was forced to allow a return to (albeit flawed) electoral democracy; now the political leaders are more able to represent the broadly anti-American mood of the country (see Jonathan Manthorpe, “Democracy in Pakistan makes it tougher for its allies [14]’, Vancouver Sun, 28 May 2008).

The power of Pakistan’s military and the rooted influence of the US in the region mean that these US efforts to increase operations in western Pakistan – to, for example, interrupt the Taliban’s delivery of supplies and personnel across the border into Afghanistan – will not be halted altogether. But the Americans now have to tread more carefully with their Pakistani “ally”. The second Afghan aspect of the US’s plan in Pakistan is equally significant: a new-found determination to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

A meeting seems to have taken place at a US base in Qatar to plan an operation to this effect, attended by General David Petraeus (the incoming heads of US Central Command), and Anne Petersen (the American ambassador to Pakistan (see Syed Saleem Shahzad, “In the Footsteps of Osama [15]”, Asia Times, 28 May 2008). The focus was on the areas where bin Laden is assumed [16] to operate: western Pakistani areas such as Bajaur Agency [17]Â and neighbouring districts of Nuristan province.

The US’s triple aim, then, is:

to pressure Pakistan to limit [18] negotiations with militia-controlled areas of its own country

to increase its force-level in Afghanistan to enable it to take full control of military operations in

the most violent parts of the country

to intensify the operation to eliminate Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

All three aspects, if reflected in actual achievement, would have an important public-relations component. The first and second would be portrayed in terms of effective counterinsurgency policy and action that parallel the advances championed in Iraq (even if the latter are less impressive on close inspection; see “The Iraqi whirlwind [18]”, 3 April 2008). The third objective would be especially welcomed by a George W Bush administration desperate for signs of tangible proof that the “war on terror” is bring won; it would also burnish a discreditable presidential record and may help secure a continuation of Republican control of the White House, while reducing the scale of any electoral reversals in Congress.

A life in death

Such outcomes represent very much the optimal scenario for the United States over the next four months. But even if this arrived by the time the votes are cast, it could not possibly end the serious problems posed by the current he has embodied. True, the death or detention of Osama bin Laden would undoubtedly have an impact on the al-Qaida movement, not least in curtailing some of the funding coming from Saudi Arabia, where the aura of bin Laden’s leadership still carries a cachet (see Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens: The Story of a Family and its Fortune [19] [Penguin, 2008]). At the same time, al-Qaida is a far looser entity than in 2001: a new generation of leaders is coming to the fore, and bin Laden himself is increasingly a figurehead rather than a formative influence on this dispersed and often pervasive transnational entity.

Moreover, his death (and to a degree that of al-Qaida’s chief ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri) would make him a “martyr” to more than his followers; while his detention (assuming the Americans would be able or prepared to take him alive – and that the “surprise” is not in the other [20] direction) would have the effect of creating a worryingly unpredictable and uncontrollable media cycle and legal process (see “A world beyond control [20]”, 22 May 2008). In strict military terms too, the precedent of Saddam Hussein’s capture [20] in December 2003 – which the Americans confidently predicted would lead to the collapse of the Iraq insurgency, and did no such thing – does not augur well here.

But the Iraqi insurgency has been confined to Iraq. The wider point is that in the years since the “war on terror” was launched, a largely unrecognised process has transformed the Taliban and its partner militias from an Afghan-centred movement with ethnic and nationalist elements to a much more globally-orientated jihadist one (see Malise Ruthven, “The Rise of the Muslim Terrorists [21]”, 29 May 2008). In this light, even “success” for American forces in their current endeavours may well be the seed of further failure.

For if US forces deploy to greater effect in the region – and especially if they capture or kill theirtwo main human targets [22] – the domestic political effect would be more likely to favour the continuation of a hardline military policy by Washington in 2009. That, though, would be just what bin Laden’s successors – who, like their “martyr”, measure in decades the conflict they are involved in – want. Another four years of sustained US military involvement in the middle east and southwest Asia will be sweet indeed for the jihadist camp. In that case, Osama bin Laden’s sacrifice will not have been in vain: indeed, it would symbolise and reinforce the trends that are making the conflict in AfghanistanÂ part of a still-evolving global confrontation.

Links:
[1] http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0529/p99s01-duts.html
[2] http://geology.com/world/afghanistan-satellite-image.shtml
[3] http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-afghan-pakistan_barkermay24,0,521…
[4] http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/Operat…
[5] http://www.operations.mod.uk/mapping/Afghanistan.jpg
[6] http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/maps/images/maps/afghan_violence
[7] http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11402695
[8] http://blogs.sipri.org/Afghanistan/my-first-blog-entry
[9] http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/paulrogers.htm
[10] http://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745641966
[11] http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jk2aVRuVhP0HgNAsCVkEplizhCrA
[12] http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/05/pakistan_strikes_dea.php
[13] http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0908/p01s04-wosc.html
[14] http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/editorial/
story.html?id=d390ebe1-47c4-42b9-b767-71aab0b33f47
[15] http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JE28Df01.html
[16] http://www.business-standard.com/common/storypage_c_online.php?leftnm=10…
[17] http://bp1.blogger.com/_h5L0bq0pIhY/R3tSY1ixILI/AAAAAAAAAbg/I_59rNcK0fU/...
[18] http://www.cfr.org/publication/16317/
[19] http://www.penguin.co.uk/nf/Book/BookDisplay/0,,9781846141249,00.html
[20] http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,544921,00.html
[21] http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21438
[22] http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080528/FOREIGN/546311031/1103/ART&Pr…

Nottingham University demonstration in defence of academic freedom

tim — Thu, 29 May 2008 18:51:31 +0000

Today at the University of Nottingham, academic staff gave a public reading from an Al-Qaeda training manual, outside the Hallward Library, University Park Campus. The demonstration expressed the outrage amongst staff and students after two innocent members of the academic community were arrested under ‘terror’ legislation in connection with this document, downloaded from an official US government website. Strong concerns were voiced over academic freedom at the university, in addition to a focus of support and solidarity with one of the arrested, Hicham Yezza (1). Hicham is an employee (2) within the School of Modern Languages, who is now facing imminent deportation on Sunday 1st June (3).

Around 500 staff and students gathered in front of the library to hear the readings of the alleged ‘radical material’. Banners with messages such as ‘protect academic freedom’, ‘Right to research’, and ‘Free Hich’ were on display. Snacks, ‘Free Hich’ T-shirts and copies of Ceasefire (the peace movement journal of which Hicham is editor), were on sale to help raise money to cover Hichams’ legal costs.

Alan Simpson, MP for Nottingham South attended to show his support for the demonstration. He described the arrests as a “dreadful cock-up”. Addressing the university authorities he said, “how ashamed you should be of yourselves. How ashamed that you cannot come to the defence of one of your staff.” Speaking on the terror legislation Simpson said, “we would live in a society where we fear each other and that is what the treatment of Hicham and Rizwaan actually demonstrates.”

The protestors then marched across campus to Trent Building, the administrative centre of the university. A silent protest was held in the building courtyard, with protestors standing still and silent, symbolically gagged in the pouring rain. Hicham was called and addressed the protestors from detention. Hicham said, “I am humbled and buoyed by all the support I have received, and my spirits are high. Thank you everyone, you are a credit to Nottingham.”

The demonstrators are demanding that the university offers full support to their employee, Hicham, who has made immense contributions to Nottingham life. The event successfully highlighted the outrage felt by large portions of Nottingham over the Home Offices’ rushed and unjust attempt to deport such a valued member of the academic community, without a fair haring in a court of law.

Notes

(1) Hicham’s arrest took place on Wednesday 14th May. Rizwaan Sabir, an MA Politics research student was also arrested. Both were released without charge six days later. It has subsequently become clear that these arrests, which related to so-called “radical materials” involved an Al Qaeda manual downloaded by Sabir from an official US Government website, as part of his dissertation research into political Islam, and emailed to Yezza for printing.

(2) Hicham is employed as PA to the Head of the School of Modern Languages and Cultures, Professor Lesley Milne.

(3) Hicham was re-arrested on immigration grounds. Hicham was re-arrested under immigration legislation and charged with offences relating to his immigration status. On Friday 23rd May, the Home Office informed his solicitor that he was being removed on Sunday 1st June and Hicham was moved to an immigration detention centre. He now faces imminent deportation to Algeria without due process.

The Blair Legacy

Ellie Keen — Thu, 20 Mar 2008 21:48:30 +0000

Hundreds of thousands dead, Britain less safe

Is there a causal link between British military intervention in the Muslim world and terrorism by Muslims in Britain? That is a vital question. After all, the Government is never done telling us that it is the first duty of government to keep us safe.

Yet, the Prime Minister cannot bring himself to admit the existence of such a link, even though the British intelligence services say:

“We judge that the conflict in Iraq has exacerbated the threat from international terrorism and will continue to have an impact in the long term. It has reinforced the determination of terrorists who were already committed to attacking the West and motivated others who were not.”

Blair cannot bring himself to admit that there is a causal link. For him to do so is to admit that his military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which he justified to counter alleged threats to Britain’s security, have in reality made Britain less safe.

As for the threats to Britain’s security, there were none, neither from al-Qaida in October 2001, nor from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in March 2003.

That is Blair’s legacy. He has made Britain less safe by his military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and, in the process, he has caused the deaths of nearly 200 British soldiers, and hundreds of thousands of Afghans and Iraqis.

That should be engraved on his tombstone.

This pamphlet traces Blair’s deceit about the threats facing Britain in order to take us to war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It also shows that Bush and Blair misrepresent the objective of al-Qaida, which is not about overthrowing “democracy and freedom” in the West, but about ending Western, especially British and American, interference in the Muslim world. It can be guaranteed that al-Qaida will not attack Sweden.

As Michael Scheuer, who was the first head of the CIA’s al-Qaida desk, wrote in his bookImperial Hubris: Why the West is losing the War on Terror:

“...the greatest danger for Americans confronting the radical Islamist threat is to believe – at the urging of US leaders – that Muslims attack us for what we are and what we think rather than for what we do.

“Rhetorical political blustering ‘informs’ the public that Islamists are offended by the Western world’s democratic freedoms, civil liberties, intermingling of genders, and separation of church and state. However, although aspects of the modern world may offend conservative Muslims, no Islamist leader has, for example, fomented jihad in order to destroy participatory democracy, the national association of credit unions, or coed universities… “

Al-Qaida’s public statements condemn America’s protection of corrupt Muslim regimes, unqualified support for Israel, the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a further litany of real-world grievances. Bin Laden’s supporters thus identify their problem and believe its solution lies in war.”

If the West stops interfering in the Muslim world, then the al-Qaida threat to the West will disappear. It’s as simple as that.

This is a summary of David Morrison’s pamphlet “THE BLAIR LEGACY”. Read the full pamplet (pdf).

Into Year Seven

JamieSW — Wed, 17 Oct 2007 18:07:12 +0000

War the Only Option?

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks there was widespread sympathy for the people of the United States and what they had experienced. This was particularly strong in Europe, where substantial political opinion supported the idea of a vigorous response directed primarily at the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In harbouring al-Qaida and its leader, Osama bin Laden, the Taliban regime was implicated indirectly in the atrocities – indeed while bin Laden was immediately dubbed the “Public Enemy No. 1” in the United States, the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, was second on the list.

The war in Afghanistan began within four weeks of 9/11 and although limited attempts had been made in those four weeks to extricate bin Laden from the protection of the Taliban, the start of the war was determined primarily by the logistics of getting military forces in place and starting the process of supporting the Northern Alliance, rather than negotiating with the Taliban. The Northern Alliance connection became a key part of the strategy, with its re-arming aimed at altering the balance of power in the Afghan civil war against the Taliban regime in Kabul.

What was clear, immediately following 9/11, was that the Bush administration was certain to respond with heavy military force and even in the first couple of months there were indications that the administration was contemplating extending the war to include regime termination in Iraq. While that did not come to the fore until President Bush’s State of the Union address in January 2002, with its identification of an “axis of evil”, it was clear that the administration saw the attacks as presenting a fundamental threat to the concept of a New American Century. This necessarily required a formidable response in order not only to ensure the security of the country but also its role as world leader.

Although most western states accepted the policy of regime termination in Afghanistan, not all analysts took this view. Indeed there was a minority outlook in some western countries that cautioned against such a response and proposed, instead, a response predicated much more on the rule of law. This was, moreover, a much more widespread view in the majority world away from the countries of the North Atlantic community.

An analysis published by Oxford Research Group immediately after the 9/11 attacks (The United States, Europe and the Majority World After 11 September, October 2001) argued against a strong military response and quoted a perceptive paper by Walden Bello, Director of Focus on the Global South in the Philippines. Bello condemned the attacks as horrific, despicable and unpardonable but cautioned against what he called an automatic “iron fist” response that ignored the underlying context. He pointed to the frequent use of indiscriminate force by the United States, not least in Vietnam and to the bitter mood throughout much of the Middle East and South West Asia, directed partly at the United States because of its perceived dominance of the region but also against autocratic states dependent on continuing US support. Bello concluded:

The only response that will really contribute to global security and peace is for Washington to address not the symptoms but the roots of terrorism. It is for the United States to re-examine and substantially change its policies in the Middle East and the Third World, supporting for a change arrangements that will not stand in the way of the achievement of equity, justice and genuine national sovereignty for currently marginalized peoples. Any other way leads to endless war. (Walden Bello, Endless War, Focus on the Global South, September 2001)

This view found no favour in Washington, since it represented a fundamental contradiction to the prevailing “control” paradigm. Instead, the ORG report predicted that:

Over the next months, and probably years, military action will seek to destroy the people and supporting network of those presumed responsible for the atrocities of 11 September, and will probably seek also to destroy the Taliban regime in Kabul. In the view of the more hard-line security advisers in the Bush administration, action should also be taken against Iraq and other supporters of anti-American terrorism.

For the bin Laden network and its associates, such a strong military counter-reaction will have been anticipated and will almost certainly be welcomed… They will anticipate very forceful military action and they will expect it to lead to civilian casualties and huge movements of refugees, to instability in Pakistan, to an increasing anti-American mood in the Middle East and to more support for their own cause…

In short, the United States will engage in a sustained war against the paramilitaries, who will see this as one more stage in a cycle of violence that will serve their longer-term strategy of forcing the United States from the Gulf region and bringing about the collapse of the elites of the region that they so bitterly oppose. (p.13)

War Aims

These and other views had no impact on the US strategy, and over the period through to early 2003, there evolved clear-cut aims for the war on terror. It is worthwhile recalling the strong and confident expectations in Washington at that time, in order to contrast them with the actual developments. They help give us some understanding of how difficult it may be for the United States to develop a new approach in the face of the difficulties now being experienced. What was expected through the response to the 9/11 attacks were three broad outcomes.

Al-Qaida

The Taliban regime in Afghanistan would be terminated and the al-Qaida movement would be greatly weakened and dispersed. It was confidently expected that Osama bin Laden and other leaders would be killed or captured. While it was not expected that the al-Qaida movement would be defeated in the conventional sense, it was certainly expected to whither away to the point where it was of little consequence. Afghanistan would make a transition to a stable pro-western country with a long-term US military presence to ensure the security of the state. A consequence of the war would also be the establishment of military bases in key states in Central Asia, notably Uzbekistan. This would have the long-term advantage to the United States of developing influence in a region that was rich in fossil fuels, especially oil, was at that time more under the influence of Russia and could potentially be subject to Chinese overtures.

Iraq

The termination of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq would be rapid, largely due to a “shock and awe” air assault accompanied by a rapid intervention by highly mobile and well-armed ground forces. Most Iraqis would see this as liberation, not occupation. With the Saddam Hussein regime terminated, Iraq would rapidly make a transition to a very pro-American state, developing a free market economy with a minimum of regulation. In many ways it would become a model for the kind of open market that was required across the region. It would be opened up to international investment and its immense oil reserves would be secure. There would be a long-term US military presence at a small number of bases, and while the troop numbers would be modest, the capability for rapid reinforcement through US Central Command would ensure the long-term security of the country.

There is a tendency to claim that the insurgency developed in Iraq because the United States had done little in terms of post-regime planning, but this is far from accurate. In the first year of the insurgency, the Coalition Provisional Authority under Paul Bremer had a very clear idea of what was appropriate for Iraq. Many steps were taken to ensure that there would be an exceptionally liberal economic environment and there was a real confidence that the constraints on the market that existed in the United States, not least through organised labour, would be avoided in Iraq, with the result that the country would rapidly become a beacon for the free market.

Iran

AThe regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq would greatly constrain Iran. Indeed, this key member of the “axis of evil” would be so limited by the fundamental changes in the states to its east and west that it would become a compliant state unwilling to challenge US influence across the region. This would be ensured indefinitely by the US military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and the control of the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea by the ships of the US Fifth Fleet. Although the crippling of the al-Qaida movement, the increased influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia and the transition of Iraq to a pro-western free market economy would be hugely valuable, many people in the Bush administration saw the constraining of Iran as the real prize arising from the successful pursuit of the war on terror.

Realities

All of these outcomes were confidently expected to be well under way by the end of 2003. They would ensure US security and economic dominance in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf region. Given the increasing significance of the region’s oil reserves, and the rapidly rising oil import dependency of the United States and China, this would be a hugely welcome outcome. Above all, the idea of the New American Century that was at the heart of neoconservative thinking in the United States would have been solidified. Indeed, the threat to that idea posed by the atrocities of 9/11 would not just have been eliminated, but the very demonstration of power and determination shown by the vigorous pursuit of the global war on terror would now demonstrate American world leadership.

Six years after 9/11 and as we move into the seventh year of the war, the reality is extraordinarily different. The al-Qaida movement is much dispersed but its very dispersal makes it far more difficult to track and counter, especially as support comes from within diasporas across Europe. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri and Mullah Omar all remain at large, there have been attacks in numerous countries, including Britain, Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kenya, Pakistan and Indonesia, and there has been a marked rise in anti-Americanism across the Middle East and beyond. While the great majority of Muslims deplore the violence of the movement, there is deep anger at the manner in which the United States and its dwindling coalition have fought the war. Regional satellite TV news channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya give round the clock accounts of the violence in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, often focusing on civilian casualties.

Full casualty figures are not known but they are likely to have exceeded 100,000 civilian deaths in Iraq alone. Moreover, many of the security functions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been privatised, with contractors able to operate with near-impunity. Well over 100,000 people have been detained, some of them for over five years and almost all of them with no recourse to any recognised judicial system. Instead, prisoner abuse, rendition and torture have become features of the western way of war.

Across southern and south-eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan, there has developed a large area of territory that is now dominated by warlords, Taliban militias and the al-Qaida movement, greatly aided by the huge increase in opium cultivation and the money that this brings in from the export of heroin. The come-back of the Taliban/al-Qaida group has been quite astonishing and provides a focus for undermining the Musharraf regime in Islamabad and threatening the stability of the Karzai government in Kabul. It even enables the al-Qaida movement to plan further actions beyond the region.

Perhaps the most surprising outcome has been the two elements of the Iraq conflict that have come to the fore in recent months. One is the manner in which Iraq has become a jihadist combat training zone in which young paramilitaries from across the region gain experience in urban warfare against well-armed and well-equipped American troops. This is altogether more relevant to the long term aims of the al-Qaida movement than the experience of an early generation of guerrillas fighting against poorly trained Soviet conscripts in 1980s Afghanistan.

The second is the manner in which regime termination and the subsequent conflict in Iraq has increased the power and influence of Iran. Regime termination in Iraq and Afghanistan may have been expected to curtail Iranian ambitions but it has had the opposite effect. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and as war with Iraq loomed, there was a widespread view within the Bush administration that “if we get Iraq right we won’t have to bother about Iran”. Iraq has not been “got right” and this is at the root of the current antagonism towards Iran, an antagonism that is deepened by claims of Iranian involvement in the Iraq insurgency and by suspicions about the Iranian civil nuclear programme.

In spite of the political propaganda that has surrounded the recent “surge” in Iraq, informed military sources anticipate a US military presence in Iraq that will last at least another decade. Similarly, there is a firm anticipation that the war in Afghanistan will last at least as long. Indeed, there is a belief that there will be a US presence in both countries that will effectively be permanent. Moreover, a direct military confrontation with Iran cannot be ruled out before the 2008 Presidential Election.

Alternatives

Moving away from the current posture in the war on terror would involve radical changes. These are discussed in some detail in the new ORG International Security Report mentioned earlier and might involve, for example:

Radically decreased military action in Afghanistan, especially in terms of the use of air power, combined with a willingness to bring some Taliban elements into the political process.
A military withdrawal from Iraq conducted in parallel with intensive diplomatic negotiations with regional actors including Syria and Iran.
Intense support for a just settlement of the Israel/Palestine conflict.
Support for human rights and improvements in governance across the Middle East.

Cessation of detentions without trial, prisoner abuse, torture and rendition.

Some aspects of these are seriously discussed in a manner that is relatively new, an example being the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, saying that negotiations with the Taliban will be necessary, but there is little or no sign of any substantive change of outlook in the United States, at least for the next fifteen months. In no small measure this is because there is still a belief that those original aims of the war on terror are essential to US security. Furthermore, they are essential to the wider aim of world leadership. Among the supporters of the idea of a New American Century, whether neoconservatives or assertive realists, even the unpopularity of the Bush administration is not enough reason to give up on this aim. To do so would, in their view, be hugely damaging to the United States. It would be a foreign policy disaster that would be greater than the withdrawal from Vietnam, and will take an even more adverse predicament than is currently faced for it to be seriously considered.

Given the problems of the Bush administration, it might be assumed that changes in policy will at least be considered. That this is unlikely to be the case owes much to the original expectations of the war on terror. It is easy to forget that prospects seemed so bright in early 2002. There seemed every likelihood of success, with this leading to the resumption of a US global leadership that had been so shocked by 9/11. Remembering this is essential in any attempt to understand why it will be so difficult for any US administration, present or future, to move away from the current security paradigm.