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UK: Don’t Water Down Cluster Ban Treaty

Ellie Keen — Thu, 24 Apr 2008 20:22:29 +0000

The Cluster Munition Coalition, which Human Rights Watch cofounded in 2003, is holding a Global Day of Action on April 19 to raise awareness about the dangers of the weapon and to mobilize support for a comprehensive ban treaty.

The conference to negotiate the treaty will be held in Dublin on May 19-30, and at least 100 nations are expected to participate. The treaty will ban the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions, and will also require clearance of contaminated areas and assistance to affected communities.

“The UK’s support for this treaty is very significant,” said Steve Goose, director of the Arms Division at Human Rights Watch. “But its efforts to water down some important provisions in the treaty could end up being very harmful.”

Cluster munitions are large weapons that release dozens or hundreds of smaller submunitions. Air-dropped or ground-launched, they cause two major humanitarian problems. First, their indiscriminant wide-area effect virtually guarantees civilian casualties when they are used in or near populated areas. Second, many of the submunitions do not explode on impact as designed but lie around like landmines, causing civilian casualties for months or years to come.

The UK used 70 air-launched and 2,100 ground-launched cluster munitions, containing 113,190 submunitions, in southern Iraq in March and April 2003. Human Rights Watch documented dozens of civilian casualties caused by UK clusters in and around Basra.

The UK government supports the cluster munitions treaty but is trying to win an exception for its helicopter-launched CRV-7 cluster munition rockets. While the negative humanitarian impact of these weapons is all too easy to predict, the UK has not made a convincing case that these CRV-7 rockets – which have never been used by the UK in combat – are essential to the UK’s future war-fighting capability.

The CRV-7 cluster rocket itself is not guided, nor are the individual submunitions it contains. Moreover, the submunitions do not have any fail-safe mechanisms to lessen dangers to civilians. The UK recently noted that it has already withdrawn two types of cluster munitions from service because “neither system has target discrimination capability nor a self-destruction, self-neutralization or self-deactivation capability.” The same is true of the CRV-7.

“The UK wants a special exception for its pet cluster munition rocket system, but those rockets can be as deadly as anything this treaty seeks to prohibit,” said Goose “By pursuing this exemption, the UK could weaken the treaty substantially.”

UK negotiators are also seeking to delete or severely weaken a provision in the draft treaty text that would prohibit a treaty member from assisting in the use of cluster munitions by other governments during joint military operations. The United States, which has not participated at all in the Oslo Process, has nevertheless aggressively lobbied with many governments for its “interoperability” concerns to be addressed in the treaty, insisting that its ability to use cluster munitions in NATO and other coalition operations not be impeded in any way.

“Nearly all European governments are supporting this treaty because it bans a weapon that creates huge humanitarian suffering,” said Goose. “If they really believe that to be the case, then NATO shouldn’t be using clusters, either. The UK government should not bend to the bullying of Washington.”

The UK has also indicated that it opposes the provisions in the draft treaty text requiring states parties to provide victim assistance and assigning special responsibility for clearing contaminated areas to those who used the weapons.

Just over one year ago in Oslo, Norway, 46 states agreed to conclude a treaty by the end of 2008 that bans cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.” The treaty was then developed and discussed in subsequent international meetings in Peru, Austria, and New Zealand, as well as regional meetings in Cambodia, Costa Rica, Serbia, Belgium, Zambia, and most recently Mexico (April 16-17).

Following the conclusion of the negotiations in Dublin, the treaty will be opened for signature in Oslo on December 2-3, 2008.

Law Lords Curb Use of Secret Evidence

Ellie Keen — Fri, 02 Nov 2007 00:46:15 +0000

Ruling Limits Government Power to Make “Control Orders”

A decision by Britain’s highest court on the use of secret evidence against terrorism suspects sets an important precedent, Human Rights Watch said today.

“The message is clear: secret evidence isn’t enough,” said Benjamin Ward, associate director for Europe and Central Asia at Human Rights Watch. “The Law Lords have affirmed the basic principle that everyone has the right to know the case against him.”

In four judgments on October 31, the House of Lords Judicial Committee (commonly known as the “Law Lords”) ruled that control orders based solely on secret evidence violate the right to a fair hearing, even when national security is at stake. Lord Brown wrote, “a suspect’s entitlement to an essentially fair hearing ... [is] one of altogether too great importance to be sacrificed on the altar of terrorism control.”

The court affirmed that orders confining suspects to their homes for 18 hours a day breached the right to liberty. But they upheld the lawfulness of the power to make such orders ruling that shorter time periods can be acceptable, and rejected arguments that the restrictions under by the orders amount to a criminal punishment.

“The judgments allow serious restrictions on rights to continue,” said Ward. “But they also make clear that procedural safeguards cannot be set aside in the name of national security.”

The power to restrict the liberty of people suspected of involvement in terrorism without preparing for criminal prosecution was introduced in March 2005 after a December 2004 Law Lords ruling that the indefinite detention of foreign terrorism suspects breached human rights law. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the home secretary can impose control orders on individuals based on secret evidence that person is suspected of involvement in terrorism, where there is no reasonable prospect for successful criminal prosecution. The orders can be appealed, but the suspects and their lawyers are excluded from court when secret evidence is considered. Their interests are instead represented by security-cleared lawyers (“special advocates”) appointed on their behalf.

In the linked cases of MB and AF, the Law Lords determined that the use of secret evidence deprived the two men of a fair hearing, reversing an August 2006 Court of Appeal ruling, and ordered their cases to be reviewed by a high court judge. In JJ and others, the judges upheld a separate August 2006 Court of Appeal ruling that control orders imposing 18-hour curfews constituted unlawful deprivation of liberty in violation of article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In E and another, the Law Lords upheld a May 2007 Court of Appeal ruling that a 12-hour curfew and other restrictions on movements did not amount to deprivation of liberty, and affirmed that the duty of the secretary of state to consider and keep under review the prospects for prosecution were not pre-conditions for making a control order.

Human Rights Watch first expressed concerns about the inadequate procedural safeguards in the Control Order system during the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2005.

UK: Halt Efforts to Extend Pre-Charge Detention

Ellie Keen — Mon, 22 Oct 2007 22:57:18 +0000

Counterterrorism Bill Should Abide by ‘Rules of the Game’

The British government should abandon its effort to extend pre-charge detention in terrorism cases beyond the current 28-day limit, Human Rights Watch said in a briefing paper released today. The home secretary is due to give evidence on Monday to the Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee on proposed counterterrorism legislation, including extended detention.

“Locking up suspects without charge for months at a time is wrong in principle, and wrong in practice,” said Benjamin Ward, associate Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “It violates the basic right to liberty and risks alienating British Muslims.”

Human Rights Watch’s 26-page briefing paper, “UK: Counter the Threat or Counterproductive? – Commentary on Proposed Counterterrorism Measures,” analyzes Home Office counterterrorism proposals from July in light of the UK’s international human rights obligations. The measures are likely to form part of a draft counterterrorism bill to be presented to parliament later this year.

The prime minister has spoken about doubling the pre-charge detention limit to 56 days. The current 28-day period is already the longest in the European Union. The Human Rights Watch paper concludes that a further extension would violate human rights law and be counterproductive in the effort to win the trust of Muslim communities, which is necessary to counter the threat of terrorism.

Recent statements from the government suggest that it has moved away from Tony Blair’s assertion in the wake of the July 2005 transport attacks in London that human rights should be set aside when combating terrorism. Home Office Counterterrorism Minister Tony McNulty has acknowledged that “the rules of the game haven’t changed,” while Prime Minister Gordon Brown emphasizes the need to win hearts and minds to successfully confront terrorism. These statements reflect a greater prominence within the government on preventing radicalization and recruitment as a core element in its counterterrorism strategy.

“The government is finally saying the right things about human rights and security,” said Ward. “But the proof will be in the policy. If the government is serious about playing by the rules, it should shelve extended pre-charge detention.”

The briefing paper concludes that a further extension of detention would create a significant risk of unjust extended detention. According to government figures, over half of all those arrested as part of terrorism investigations since 2001 were released without charge. Were detention further extended, it is highly likely that terrorism suspects, most of them Muslim, would be detained for extended periods and then released without charge.

The experience of internment in Northern Ireland and the indefinite detention of foreign terrorism suspects at Belmarsh prison indicate that such measures can sour community relations and undermine cooperation with the police.

The Human Rights Watch briefing paper recommends that the government improve safeguards for the current 28-day period, and a relaxation of the ban on intercept evidence. It also calls on the government to narrow the definition of terrorism, and improve safeguards for a new notification system for those convicted of terrorism-related offences.

For details, see the HRW briefing paper: UK: Counter the Threat or Counterproductive? – Commentary on Proposed CounterterrorismMeasures