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UK Arms exports- the World's Number One?

tim — Wed, 27 Aug 2008 18:20:31 +0000

‘UK becomes biggest weapons exporter’, declared the Financial Times in June, triggering a flurry of media interest and a fresh flood of calls to the CAAT office. The Guardian ran the story in depth several days later. But any news involving both arms and statistics must be doubly suspect, so what’s the reality behind the headlines? In the complex world of arms orders, deliveries and licences, there are many and varied ways to calculate arms exports. However you do the sums, they nearly all show the USA to be the world’s top arms exporter, with the UK in the top five. One of the more simplistic calculations methods is simply to add up the value of orders within a given year – regardless of how long those orders take to deliver. In most years, the USA still comes out on top. But in 2007 the UK was pushed into the lead by one huge order – 72 Eurofighter aircraft to be supplied by BAE Systems to Saudi Arabia.

This is the infamous Al Salam deal (it means ‘peace’ in Arabic – feel free to laugh). It was this deal that the Saudi regime threatened to cancel until the British authorities dropped a corruption investigation into BAE in 2006. When lobbying for an end to the investigation, apologists for the arms trade argued that the deal would create thousands of British jobs. Once the deal was signed in September 2007, BAE admitted that most of the jobs would not even be based in the UK. So Britain‘s role as ‘world’s top arms exporter’ is a temporary phenomenon, dependent on a questionable means of calculation. Nonetheless, the UK sadly retains a leading role in the arms trade, despite the growth in public opposition and the backlash triggered by the BAE scandal.

Outstanding?

When the figures were released, parts of the media asked whether British people should be proud of what trade minister Digby Jones called ‘this outstanding export performance’. I debated this question on BBC Radio Five Live with Ian Godden of the Society of British Aerospace Companies. With Saudi Arabia accounting for nearly half of the 2007 orders, many callers to the programme clearly felt uneasy about a trade that relies on the whims of a violent dictatorship. There can be no doubt that most UK arms exports still go to oppressive regimes or to countries involved in armed conflict or regions of tension.

I was challenged several times on the grounds that the arms trade supposedly brings benefit to Britain’s economy. The obvious answer is that arms companies in the UK are sustained by hundreds of millions of pounds in taxpayer-funded subsidies every year. Money is poured into research and development for the arms industry at a time when we desperately need to develop skills and technology to tackle climate change. And companies such as BAE have been cutting their UK workforces for years, shifting their focus to the USA but being quick to call themselves British when they want public support here.

Real security that really is sustainable

As Steven Schofield argues in CAAT’s recent report Making Arms, Wasting Skills, demilitarisation and an end to arms trade subsidies would provide the resources for major investment in renewable energy and the jobs and skills that would go along with it. This would place the UK at the forefront of real security and sustainable economics. Now that’s something of which we could all be proud.

BAE case in the Lords

tim — Thu, 14 Aug 2008 19:33:54 +0000

Buried

The five senior Judges are technically a committee of the Lords so the hearing took place in a Lords’ Committee room, dominated by a huge painting of the burial of King Harold. Only the tops of the heads of the Judges (without wigs) were visible from most of the public seats as the banks of case documents formed a wall across the room. Between the Judges and the rest of us sat eleven bewigged barristers – CAAT and The Corner House had four (David Pannick QC, Philippe Sands QC, Dinah Rose QC and Ben Jaffey) and the Government five, whilst ‘interested party’ BAE, and ‘intervener’ Justice, a human rights and law reform organisation, had one apiece. All these barristers were backed by teams of solicitors. Even though the Lords’ authorities had added an extra bench, this retinue left little space in the room.

We all crammed in – CAAT and Corner House people; the Guardian‘s Rob Evans, who had done so much to expose the BAE corruption allegations, was there along with journalists from other papers, the BBC and specialist legal magazines; representatives from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, concerned that its 1997 Anti-Bribery Convention will be rendered meaningless if the Government is allowed to stop corruption inquiries as in this case, took copious notes; Peter Gardiner, the former BAE travel agent who gave evidence to the SFO looked on; and many others were present.

The arguments

The Government’s lead barrister, Jonathan Sumption QC, went first. He argued that the Director of the SFO, as an independent prosecutor, had a wide discretion as to which cases he investigated or prosecuted, he just had to act ‘reasonably’ in making his decisions. He also produced a witness statement from the Foreign Office in an attempt to show that, in contrast to what Lord Justice Moses had said in the High Court, the attention of Saudi Arabian officials had been drawn to the separation of powers between the Government and the legal authorities in the UK.

David Pannick challenged this. He said the rule of law had to prevail and that this demanded that the SFO did not give into threats by Saudi Arabia to withdraw cooperation on anti-terrorism until all other options had been exhausted and, even then, only if it was strictly necessary. The Government, he said, did not meet this test, as all bar one of the approaches to Saudi Arabia listed in the Foreign Office statement had been made before the threats were issued and all were fairly casual mentions in the course of other meetings. Additionally, the UK did not seem to have reminded Saudi Arabia of its anti-terrorism commitments.

With regards to the OECD Convention, Dinah Rose argued that this was a relevant consideration because the SFO Director said his decision was made in accordance with it – the question was whether ‘national security’ was an implied exemption or not and she said not – whilst the Government said it was up to the OECD to decide on this issue.

No decision as yet

There was very little intervention by the Judges as the barristers made their submissions. This, we were told, is unusual. Each of five Judges now considers the submissions, looks up the precedents and writes his or her own speech – the verdict is the majority view. The result will be announced, most likely in October, when the Judges’ committee reports to the full House of Lords. Justice?

Campaign update

The House of Lords has overturned the High Court’s ruling that the Government broke the law by stopping the corruption investigation into BAE Systems’ Saudi arms deals. The case had been brought by CAAT and The Corner House with widespread support.

The Serious Fraud Office’s appeal was heard by the House of Lords on the 7th and 8th of July and judgment was given on 30th July.

One of the judges, Baroness Hale, said that she would have liked to have been able to say that it was wrong to stop the investigation as it was “extremely distasteful that an independent public official should feel himself obliged to give way to threats of any sort.” However, she had to agree with her colleagues that the decision taken by the SFO Director was lawful.

The judgment means that those with powerful friends prepared to make threats can effectively evade justice, particularly if the threats are couched in terms of national security. The ruling also confirms that the UK government has driven a coach and horses through a key international anti-bribery convention to protect its friends in BAE.

CAAT and The Corner House are not dejected by the result as it has brought the whole issue into the public realm and clarified the law.

The Regional Role in the Stabilisation of Iraq

tim — Sun, 03 Aug 2008 21:27:49 +0000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In April 2008, 35 policy experts and practitioners gathered in Riyadh to examine the challenge of finding a regional consensus for stabilising Iraq. A number of key issues, opposing views and suggestions for future action emerged from a very rich dialogue. This report provides a detailed synopsis of the discussions, in particular a number of important insights into the view from Riyadh. It highlights five different scenarios for the future of Iraq and then examines competing images of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, the issues of national identity, sectarianism and federalism, and concludes by exploring a number of possible future paths and processes.

The discussions were underpinned by a number of key issues:

1) A real fear in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere) of Iranian regional ambitions and regional sectarianism instigated by Tehran. This led to a powerful policy dichotomy between those wishing to further isolate Iran and those wishing to engage Tehran in dialogue.

2) The central importance in Riyadh of maintaining an Iraqi Arab national identity and Iraq’s territorial integrity with federalism regarded with suspicion because of the attendant risks of secession of the Kurdish north and Shi’a dominated south.

3) A sense of extreme caution and uncertainty in Riyadh about what it can and should do to protect its interests. This was based in part on uncertainty about American intentions in the region and its understandings of key political forces in Iraq, particularly on the role of the Sadrists and the ability of the Maliki government to generate political unity. Concern was also expressed at the absence of a coherent policy towards Iran from Europe.

This report will differentiate between a number of suggestions that were made in the meeting where the attendees participated in their personal capacity and not in official government roles. Oxford Research Group (ORG) co-hosted and co-convened the meeting together with the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and the Diplomatic Institute, Riyadh. ORG acted as rapporteur and are the authors of this report. All efforts have been made to achieve an accurate account of the meeting, and the suggestions below do not necessarily reflect ORG’s perspective. ORG is committed to quiet off-the-record dialogue in which parties are brought together who are not talking to one another and do not sufficiently understand the motivations, agendas and tensions of the other side. It is here that the strength of the organisation lies and four recommendations are made in the introduction for continuing and diversifying the dialogue initiated in Riyadh which reflect our methods of working.

The discussions amongst participants at the meeting yielded a number of suggestions for future action for Riyadh:

1) Initiate a three-way dialogue between Riyadh, Washington and Tehran on stabilising Iraq.

2) Pressure Gulf States, China and Russia, to restrict commercial relationships with Iran.

3) Forceful and repeated expression of Saudi concerns about Iran to highlight and challenge Iran’s regional ambitions.

4) Engage the Sadrists and Sunni “Awakening” movement to bring them into Iraq’s political process.

5) Convene an EU-GCC heads of government meeting on national reconciliation in Iraq.

6) Advocate convening a representative constituent assembly with representatives from Iraq’s multi-denominational tribes, town councils and labour unions.

7) Sponsor proposals for Iraq based on the success of Afghanistan’s national solidarity programmes to fund and empower reconstruction at the local community level.

8) Establish a well-resourced Iraq task force and an Iran task force in the Saudi government to explore strategies and outreach opportunities.

9) Sponsor a detailed examination of what a Helsinki-type OSCE process might look like in the region.

10) Sponsor a UN resolution under chapter seven of the UN Charter on guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Iraq.
This report should be read by all of those involved in, affected by or deeply concerned about future of Iraq, including policy-makers and parliamentarians. ORG intends to pursue a number of options to continue and diversify the dialogue initiated in Riyadh.

INTRODUCTION

The theme of the meeting held in Riyadh on 18-21 April 2008 was “the regional implications of the Iraq crisis and the need for consensus amongst Iraq’s neighbours in order to help support stabilization”. Our host was His Royal Highness Prince Turki al Faisal, Chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, and Dr. Mansour Al Mansour , Head of the Diplomatic Institute, Riyadh.

This was the first such event co-organised by the King Faisal Center, the Diplomatic Institute and Oxford Research Group (ORG). On the first morning we had a clear indication of the seriousness our Saudi hosts ascribed to the meeting when participants were invited to meet the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud bin Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud and the Chief of General Intelligence, Prince Muqrin Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.

The meeting was a reflection of the trust and imagination of the institutes to work together. Whilst it was an experiment, all parties seemed well satisfied and have stated an interest in a continued working relationship. This provides a real opening to making a creative and pragmatic contribution to the resolution of some of the conflicts in the region. ORG particularly welcomes this opportunity.

ORG has a long tradition of hosting and co-hosting quiet, private dialogues and bringing together policy-makers with their critics, in a safe environment, where concerns can be articulated. In order for dialogue to be worthwhile we believe that the chemistry of the group is crucial. The group for this meeting was therefore constructed to reflect a wide range of experience. The quality of international participation was of the highest level in terms of some of the best minds in political, strategic and creative thinking and in the realm of conflict resolution. The key to the success of the meeting, however, was the active and energetic participation of Saudi experts. It was recognized that without listening carefully to the concerns of Saudi participants (as these were critical to an informed understanding of the complexity of the issues) it would be difficult for non-Saudi participants to make a relevant contribution.

The conference provided a secure space for open, critical discussion of difficult issues such as Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iran and its anxieties about Iran’s regional ambitions; the danger of a proxy war in Iraq that could threaten the territorial integrity of its neighbours; ‘legitimate’ interests and ‘illegitimate’ interests and activities in Iraq and the region; the potential for a regional dialogue and perhaps partnership for stabilising Iraq; and the ‘red lines’ for both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

ORG’s intention was to explore the scope for moving away from a power politics perspective where ‘winner takes all’ to more reciprocal agreements in which interests – common and vested – are recognised. The aim was to ask key question such as: what is the scope for a different set of relationships to emerge in the interest of the stabilisation of Iraq based on what regional governments are for, as opposed to what they are against? What is required to find the leverages for the positive exercise of power in support of collective interests? In particular, what are the incentives for Iran to behave more cooperatively?
Such incentives involve exploring the common interests of Iraq’s neighbours and their potential areas for alignment in the future stabilisation of Iraq. It also posed the converse questions of what would be the consequences of failing to find regional common interests in terms of greater tensions and a potential escalation to regional conflict? And are there other diplomatic instruments that could be used to avoid such a confrontation?

The meeting was predicated on the belief that, in the end, any progress in Iraq would be shaped significantly by the stance and actions of its neighbours, and of the United States which continues to hold the balance of military power in the region. The potential risks of large scale intervention by Iraq’s neighbours in pursuit of narrow self-interests are enormous and could spill over at a regional level, drawing states into a proxy war in Iraq and threaten its territorial integrity and that of its neighbours. Before areas of interest could be established, it became clear that there was a need to address some of the concerns of the Saudis in terms of Iran’s pervasive influence in Iraq. Whilst conflict and disagreement are essential aspects of regional relations, the crucial issue is how they are managed. When there is tension between states, and where there is little diplomatic contact, it is more likely to lead to Machiavellian interpretations of the other’s motivations and distortion of judgments due to mistrust and suspicion, which may ultimately lead to escalation and conflict.

This is why, wherever possible ORG is committed to dialogue as a means of understanding the motivation and agendas of all parties engaged in conflict.
Quiet dialogues and more open conversations are key tools used by ORG. There is no doubt that the more open forum with the King Faisal Center and the Diplomatic Institute was rich both in contact, content and chemistry. It was a particularly satisfying experience for the visiting participants to hear the voices of Saudi thinkers. The importance here is to differentiate between open conversations and confidential dialogues that can push the agenda further in a discreet setting that offers the opportunity for deeper exploration of the real fears and concerns of the different parties.

ORG would like to make a number of suggestions on how to take this initiative forward and is proposing some options for consideration.

1) The model of the first meeting as described in this report was clearly useful for the participants both in content and experience. A further meeting using this more open model could be developed in which invitations are extended to a number of regional countries including Iran, Syria, Turkey and Jordan, all of whom are integral regional players in the stabilisation of Iraq. This could include a small group of third party voices to bring in a different perspective. In terms of timing for such a meeting, the US elections and the Iraqi elections may be a decisive factor and thereby the end of November may be a good date.

2) An alternative format to the first meeting could be to invite key regional actors to explore the scope for establishing security mechanisms for addressing regional security concerns. The case for regional dialogue almost inevitably leads to comparisons between the OSCE and a hypothetical Middle East equivalent. Nevertheless, it would be an opportunity to explore what mechanisms would be relevant to this region and experts could be invited who have experience of other security structures.

3) Another track worthy of consideration would be to develop a smaller, more confidential meeting in which high-level US participation would be invited and would include representation from both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Later, Syria and Turkey could also be invited to join the process. The meeting would involve an exploration of each other’s agendas, potential areas of cooperation and common agreement, red lines, and the possibilities for containing and managing differences. It would be necessary to select participation for such a meeting carefully in order to deal with genuine concerns about whether the parties could be trusted to hold the confidentiality. It would also be important to ensure very high quality third party facilitation. Some members of the seminar may help in this regard and could play an important facilitation role here. Again timing may be important and the sense of urgency would need to be balanced against certain political changes, i.e. in terms of elections in the US and Iraq.

4) A recent visit was made to Iran by Oxford Research Group with its specialist Iranian advisor. One of the intentions was to deepen the contacts on the Iranian front with the view to quiet dialogue both on the nuclear issue and on Iran’s intentions in Iraq. Such a channel may offer the possibility of acting as a conduit to the Saudi track and could lead to greater clarification of intentions. This could offer the opportunity both to act as a bridge and open up the opportunity of a dialogue at the right time.

Sustainability and persistence are critical qualities in the resolution of conflict. Key to this are the next steps. ORG sees its role to be both a driver and a container of such forward movement. The strength that ORG brings to this process is the skills of dialogue (both public and private), and ORG would wish to provide the frame for the further facilitation of dialogue as relevant to the development of this project.

We greatly valued the opportunity provided by our hosts and we hope this is the beginning of a strong and trusting long-term working relationship. We wish to salute the high quality of exchanges that took place, a consequence of the depth of experience of the group, its potential for creative thinking and the calibre of the participants. We would welcome the continuation of such a process. Gabrielle Rifkind, Human Security Consultant, Oxford Research Group, June 2008

“FROM THE SWAMP TO TERRA FIRMA: FINDING A REGIONAL CONSENSUS FOR STABILISING IRAQ”

The meeting in Riyadh on a regional consensus for national reconciliation in Iraq drew together policy experts and practitioners from Europe, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. The discussions came at an important time for Iraq: the American military ‘surge’ had reduced levels of violence but a corresponding political ‘surge’ had not occurred and American troop levels are now set to be reduced; there is profound disagreement between Republican and Democratic presidential candidates about the breadth and depth of American involvement in Iraq leading to considerable uncertainty about medium and long-term American intentions; and forthcoming provincial elections in Iraq planned for October 1, 2008 are seen as a vital test of the degree to which national reconciliation based on an equitable political and economic power sharing is a realistic prospect for the future of the country.

The purpose of this report is not to provide an objective analysis of the current situation in Iraq and the possibilities for regional consensus, but to provide a detailed synopsis of two days of frank exchanges and distil a number of suggestions for future action, particularly for the Saudi government. It is divided into a number of themes that permeated the discussions:

1) Alternative scenarios for Iraq and the region and the pressure of time.

2) Competing images of the intentions and capabilities of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States.

3) Challenges to an Iraqi national identity and deep uncertainty about the future of Iraq.

4) Political processes to facilitate a regional consensus on Iraq and national reconciliation.

From these four themes emerged five key issues:

1) There is a real concern in Saudi Arabia and many other countries about Iranian regional ambitions that increased exponentially following the invasion of Iraq and the emergence of sectarian conflict. While the Iranian state is weak, the theocratic revolution remains capable of destabilising the region.

2) Riyadh is not prepared to allow the demise of an Iraqi national identity and the sectarian disintegration of the Iraqi state to go unchallenged. These are its ‘red line’ vital interests.

3) Extreme caution underpins the Saudi narrative on Iran and Iraq based in part on uncertainty about American intentions and the exercise of American power and a sense of ambivalence on behalf of the European Union.

4) There is a powerful policy dichotomy between those wishing to further isolate what is deemed a belligerent and uncompromising Iran and those wishing to engage Tehran through a regional dialogue that is prepared to recognise Iran’s legitimate interests.

5) There is a need to find a common understanding between Riyadh and Washington on the political forces in Iraq, particularly on the nature and extent of Iranian intervention, the role of the Sadrists and the Sunni factions, and the ability of the Maliki government to generate political unity.

A WAITING GAME?

Competing interpretations of Iraq’s political evolution since its invasion in March 2003 gave rise to five different scenarios for the country’s future. Differing assessments of the likelihood of each scenario affected the type of recommendations for those governments capable of shaping Iraq’s future:

1) Stable Iraq: the central government successfully amends the constitution and holds free and fair provincial elections with wide participation leading to a growing sense amongst the electorate of an equitable sharing of political and economic power at national and local levels.

2) Shi’a dominance: an uneasy stability is reached in which Shi’a political parties and militias dominate the institutions of national power, some or all of which have close links to Tehran, with political power devolved in a federal structure.

3) Military strongman: a powerful nationalist figure emerges from Iraq’s armed forces and succeeds in unifying a national army and imposing stability through an authoritarian regime.

4) Proxy war: Iraq’s central government fails to assert national political, economic and military authority. Inter-communal sectarian violence escalates drawing in external regional powers that provide substantial financial and military support to competing factions in a civil war.

5) Total state collapse: Inter-communal sectarian violence escalates to the extent that the institutions of national power cease to function, political processes for national democratic governance collapse, any remaining sense of Iraqi national identity dissolves, the Iraqi state disintegrates into many ‘statelets’ with local militias as the dominant political players and a wholly criminalised economy.

Some of these scenarios clearly favour regional stability more than others but there was a widespread acceptance that time may not be on the Kingdom’s side. Waiting to see what the next White House decides to do may allow Iraq to sink further into civil war as the situation on the ground changes and violence returns after the surge, perhaps drawing in regional countries as the situation deteriorates. Some argued that there is only limited time to avoid this.

Waiting may allow Iran to consolidate its position in Iraq at the expense of Arab and broader regional interests. For others the October 2008 provincial elections represent a cut-off point beyond which judgements must be made as to whether Iraq is on a genuine path of national reconciliation or civil war/state disintegration. Progress may be possible if the elections are generally considered free and fair, much of the electorate views the process as legitimate and an improvement in everyday living is experienced through a reduction in violence and increased reconstruction. Conversely progress may be stymied through direct and indirect Iranian interference in the elections and the extent to which they might encourage political devolution, particularly in the south.

1. COMPETING IMAGES OF IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND AMERICA

Iranian hegemony

Many participants expressed deep concern about Iran’s involvement in Iraq and its wider regional ambitions. Iran was widely regarded as a primary obstacle to national reconciliation in Iraq with the primary solution being the further isolation of Tehran by the international community.
A key feature of the discussions was the simultaneous strength and weakness of the Iranian state. The primary concerns were not about the existence of the Iranian state per se, but about the export of a sectarian Iranian ideology to the region, the risks of the religious subordination of Iraq to Iran, and the threat to the stability of Saudi Arabia’s Shi’a dominated Eastern Province.

The Saudi narrative of its relationship with Iran placed the two countries in a long-term regional ‘Cold War’ sparked by the Iranian revolution in 1979. Both countries have since been locked in a zero-sum ‘chess game’ competing for religious and cultural leadership of the region epitomised by the competing types of political system they champion (traditional Gulf monarchy vs. Islamic theocracy), competing claims to leadership of the Islamic world, and competing policies for security in the Gulf (Iranian regional hegemony vs. balance of military power or American military predominance). The current conflict in Iraq is seen as part of this competition that also encompasses the conflicts in Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan as well as Iranian activities in Bahrain.

The Saudi narrative in the context of Iraq revolves around fear of Iranian regional hegemony, not in the traditional Western sense of military or economic power but in terms of religious and cultural power derived from successful prosecution of an insidious grand strategy to promote client Shi’a theocratic groups to power in states throughout the region and export the Islamic Revolution to other Muslim countries. This expansionist strategy is not based on seizure of territory but on sectarian affiliation that provides political entrée to the highest levels of political and economic decision making in other countries in the region. The American-led invasion of Iraq handed Iran a golden opportunity to pursue this strategy by ridding the region of Saddam Hussein and unleashing powerful sectarian forces in the country. Iran is now perceived to be ‘winning’ the regional chess game and successful consolidation of an already strong presence in Iraq will provide Tehran with a stepping stone to other countries.1

The image of politically dispossessed Sunni Muslims governed by Iranian satellite theocratic regimes challenges the core of the Saudi identity of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, natural and benign leader of the faith with its overwhelming global majority of Sunni worshippers, and a leader of the Arab world in which Iran has no right to interfere. More specifically Riyadh is wary of Shi’a political agitation in its Eastern Province fuelled by Iran that could, some argue, destabilise the Saudi state. It is in this context that Iranian regional ambitions constitute an existential threat to the Kingdom.

These powerful identities operate at many levels but the narrative suggests that the Arab-Persian identity clash supersedes a sectarian Sunni-Shi’a divide. In this context Iraq is claimed as part of the Arab world with national reconciliation deemed an Arab, not a Persian, affair. Iranian activities are castigated as destabilising ‘external interference’ that should be halted immediately whilst the presence of 160,000 coalition troops in Iraq is accepted.

The narrative argues that lasting Iranian influence in Iraq will be secured through a weak central government, army and police dominated by Shi’a parties and a federal structure promoted as the solution to long-term stability that will allow Tehran to dominate a federal Shi’a political entity in the south of Iraq, including decisions affecting its oil resources. This strategy is being pursued through widespread support of all Shi’a, as well as some Sunni, political parties and militias and playing a waiting game until coalition forces leave Iraq allowing Tehran to inherit the south and exert significant influence at the national level. Iran will ultimately emerge as the controlling centre of a Shi’a crescent dividing the region and carving up the Arab world. This grand strategy is being pursued with relentless vigour with the added dimension of a provocative nuclear programme.

A less alarmist view that highlights Iran’s weakness cautions against such a stark image of a monolithic Iranian state bent on regional domination at all costs. It recognises Iran’s cultural heritage, the historic role of Persian civilisation and that Iran has legitimate interests in Iraq and the region. It also recognises that the Iranian state is not a regional superpower, despite Tehran’s repeated proclamations to the contrary. Iran is burdened by considerable domestic political and economic problems and lacks the national capabilities to realise its regional ambitions; it has failed to provide the basic needs for its expanding population (Saudi GDP is twice that of Iran); it does not enjoy stable relations with any of its neighbours; and its revolution was essentially exhausted by the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad’s confrontational approach is an aberration that has the potential to do great harm to itself as well as others and the overwhelming imperative of preserving the revolution by minimising risks to the state will eventually see a return to a more cautious strategy in Tehran, in particular to avoid another devastating regional war.

This view recognises the diversity of political opinion and influence in Iran and focuses its concerns on the activities of non- and semi-state actors such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its emergence as a major economic power in the country, and the powerful role of the Shi’a clergy. Particular concern was voiced about the Najaf hawza falling under de facto Iranian control since Saudi Shi’a follow the Najaf clergy rather than Iran’s seminary centre at Qom. This view also acknowledges the detrimental impact of American threats of ‘regime change’ in Iran by fuelling Iranian insecurity and reactionary policies by the Ahmadinejad administration. In this sense Iran is less of ‘roaring lion’ than a ‘paper tiger’, but still one capable of very threatening actions. To paraphrase one participant, “the dreaded hegemony of Iran is more in the eye of the beholder than the acts of the perpetrator”.

The dominant Saudi narrative in the discussions, however, stipulated that Iran cannot be deterred from pursuing regional hegemony, so it must be stopped and it must be stopped soon because the status quo works in Iran’s favour. The solution is to keep tightening the economic screw on Tehran through universal implementation of economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council and by the American, European and regional banking sectors. The hope is that the regime in Tehran will be forced to acquiesce, undergo a fundamental reconceptualisation of its relationship with the United States and countries in the region, cease its interference in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan and take a strategic decision to abandon its WMD programmes, particularly its uranium enrichment programme, in the manner of Libya in 2003. There is no strong Saudi desire to see military-led ‘regime change’ in Tehran, but to somehow convince the leadership in Tehran to stop fighting its battles in other countries by applying maximum political and economic pressure and exploiting political divisions in Iran.

One of the problems is that a number of Gulf States, as well as China and Russia, continue to do business with Iran. An important question asked of Saudi Arabia is whether it can use its influence to restrict these commercial relationships and further isolate Iran. In addition a number of participants argued that the Saudi government more forcefully express its concerns about Iran, highlight the degree of Iranian interference in Iraq and should ensure its American and European allies share a common threat perception.

Saudi caution and uncertainty

A strong sense Saudi frustration with Washington in the face of Iranian ‘hegemonic ambitions’ also emerged from the discussions. The Saudi narrative suggested that the Kingdom has little influence in Iraq and little ability to stop Iran pursuing its grand strategy in the region and must therefore proceed with caution. It was argued instead that Europe needs to apply more pressure (particularly economic pressure) on Iran: pressure needs to be applied to the smaller Gulf states to sever, or at it least significantly curtail, commercial exchanges with Iran; the United States, France and Britain need to convince Russia and China to cease cooperating with Tehran; and the United States needs to fully appreciate Saudi concerns about the extent and malignancy of Iran’s intervention in Iraq and take appropriate actions in defence of Saudi interests. There was also a reluctance to consider any direct Saudi intervention. When it was suggested that the Kingdom exert greater influence in Iraq the reply came back that “Iraq is a swamp – whoever goes in doesn’t get out”. It is up to America to restore stability based on an equitable sharing of power because it is America created the current mess in the first place.

This reflected an important current of resentment built on Saudi frustration that American actions in Iraq have fuelled sectarian divisions and supported SCIRI and the Da’wa party and by extension their Shi’a militia wings that have co-opted the United States by engaging fully in the evolving political process. This, in turn, has facilitated greater Iranian influence and federalist tendencies in Iraq at the expense of Saudi interests. In fact one participant argued that America has accepted Iran as a security partner in Iraq and is prepared to discuss issues affecting Iraq bilaterally with Tehran to the exclusion of Riyadh. This reflected a wider view that America has essentially accepted the dominance of Iranian political forces in Iraq in the name of ‘stability’, is protecting groups close to Iran such as SCIRI and has pursued a largely anti-Sunni agenda through extensive de-Baathification and destruction of the institutions of government. Perhaps, some argued, America’s intention was to leave Iraq permanently weakened.

American demands on Riyadh have fuelled this resentment. Despite the fact the America has inadvertently worked against Saudi interests and has failed to comprehend the nature of the threat a Shi’a dominated Iraq poses to the Kingdom, Washington is now asking the Kingdom to open an embassy in Baghdad, do more to seal its long desert border with Iraq, cancel Iraq’s debts and make a greater contribution to reconstruction. One Saudi participant rejected the opening of an embassy in Baghdad as “a fantasy of American policymakers” that would serve little purpose, noting that American requests that the Kingdom send an Ambassador to Baghdad are undermined by the severe limits on diplomatic activity imposed by the security situation. The problem is highlighted by the manner in which senior American officials visit Baghdad in relative secrecy, stay within the Green Zone and move around in armed and armoured convoys. It was strongly suggested that unless America is prepared to better understand Saudi concerns and listen to Saudi advice when it is given then assistance from Riyadh may not be forthcoming.

The narrative also suggested that Saudi Arabia can only exert influence in Iraq and pressure on Iran via Washington. The Kingdom’s sense of uncertainty and the need for caution have been amplified as the line of communication has faltered and America turns inward for the 2008 presidential election. It was stated several times that Saudi Arabia is looking in vain to Washington for direction. Others familiar with the Kingdom insisted that it has always had much greater influence than it has been willing to show or exercise, for example through Sunni tribal leaders in Iraq, through the Arab League and through the example of the 2007 Mecca Agreement. The Kingdom has the potential to play a major role in Iraq but its tradition of discretion has so far prevented it from doing so. This led several participants to point to a dependency culture in Riyadh in which the Kingdom relied too heavily on leadership from Washington.

American power and intentions

Long-term American intentions in Iraq are uncertain as the final months of the George W. Bush administration approach. The diversity of political opinion in America about the war in Iraq and Washington’s preoccupation with domestic politics around the presidential election present a number of difficulties. First, the United States is clearly a central driver of change in Iraq but regional governments cannot look beyond January 2009 because American policy could change dramatically through a sudden single change or a series of incremental changes throughout 2009. A lasting regional consensus involving the United States is therefore difficult to contemplate at this stage. Second, the Kingdom is likely to be disappointed if it continues to seek leadership and direction on Iraq from Washington, at least for the next 12 months, increasing pressure on Riyadh to take the initiative. In fact several participants cautioned that the Kingdom cannot expect any real direction from Washington until mid-2009 that could potentially put Saudi minds at ease about America’s long-term commitment to Iraq. Obama and perhaps McCain may also use the threat of withdrawal to galvanise Iraq’s neighbours into forging some form of regional consensus to prepare the ground for a change of American policy.

The implications of General David Petraeus’ assessment that only 20 per cent of a successful counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq is based on America’s military presence with the other 80 per cent dependent on political and economic reform were discussed. A number of participants suggested that this has de-emphasised the future role of American forces making the prospect of withdrawal more realistic. It was noted that there is a growing view in America that the continued presence of American troops cannot achieve the necessary political goals in Iraq at reasonable cost. It also prevents America addressing other pressing issues in the region including the Israel-Palestine conflict, Lebanon and Iran. The extent to which Washington can focus significant and sustained political attention on these other issues is limited as long as there are 160,000 American troops in Iraq.

The effect of the war on the U.S. Army has also produced its own imperatives irrespective of Washington’s political calendar. The Army is broken according to some and cannot continue on its current trajectory for much longer. It is suffering considerable war fatigue and lacks important human and material resources that will take many years to correct. 140,000 troops will likely remain in Iraq for the remainder of 2008 to try and create political space for national reconciliation, but they will not stay forever.

Others argued that the continued presence of American forces is essential in order to maintain sufficient political space for the political ‘80 per cent’. Most participants accepted that a precipitate American withdrawal could cause the security situation to worsen markedly due to the absence of a strong national army and police force to maintain a semblance of order. There is also a powerful constituency in America for whom any formal acceptance of ‘defeat’ is unacceptable. Some Saudi participants were reluctant to accept that American forces might leave in the near future, considering this to be a “remote possibility” based on the logic that America is a superpower, it can deliver and it will deliver. It is not fundamentally weakened by its experience in Iraq, but it has placed itself in a weak position. America has created the problems in Iraq and it must stay the course until a lasting solution emerges. General Saudi acceptance that American withdrawal is inconceivable before Iraq has been stabilised may be creating a climate within the Saudi government in which other options in response to such an eventuality are not fully explored.

2.NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FEDERALISM IN IRAQ

At the heart of the discussions lay the issues of national identity in Iraq and the impact of federalism. Sectarian-fuelled federalism was presented as the antithesis of Iraqi nationalism and a crucial identity distinction was drawn between Iraq Shiites and Shiite Iraqis as part of the broader Arab/Persian identity clash. An important distinction is therefore drawn between Iraqi Shiites who emphasise a national political identity above religious denomination, and Shiite Iraqis who stress their religious identity and affiliation above that of the nation-state. Several Saudi participants argued that there was a major misunderstanding of the sectarian division in Iraq and stressed that Arabs do not object to the influence, or even dominance, of Shi’a political groups in the political process, but to the dominance of Shi’a clergy in Iraq, especially those that are beholden to Iran and might seek to use Iraq’s state apparatus to advance the Iranian revolution. Participants commented that Riyadh is prepared to support Arab but not Persian Shi’a groups.

This underpinned many of the conversations on Iranian regional ambitions, American intervention in Iraq and Saudi fears based on three concerns: First, that an Iraqi Arab national identity was being pushed aside by the sectarian nature of the Maliki government and Iranian intervention and support for Shi’a militias to the detriment of Saudi interests. Second, federalism could lead to decentralisation, regional self-determination within Iraq and finally total independence following the controversial Kosovo model supported by much of the West that could set a dangerous precedent in the region. Third, the drive towards federalism could result in a prolonged civil war as happened in Lebanon after 1975.

Moqtada al-Sadr and Nouri al-Maliki

These issues were particularly pronounced in competing perceptions of Moqtada al-Sadr and Nouri al-Maliki that highlighted the need to reach a common understanding between Riyadh, Washington and London. The Sadr family in Iraq is the only major Shi’a family considered by Saudi Arabia to be nationalistic and not inherently a tool of Iran. Saudi participants argued that Sadr could be a positive force as an Arab Shi’a and an Iraqi nationalist highlighting the importance attached to an Iraqi national identity first and denominational identity second.

Others perceived Sadr as a significant obstacle to national reconciliation and pointed to a British and American government consensus that Sadr was creating difficulties by keeping himself outside the political process in contrast to the Sunni “Awakening” tribes, SCIRI and al-Hakim, Da’wa, the Kurds and Fadilah. Sadr and the Jaish al-Madhi (JAM) militia were compared to Hezbollah in Lebanon: a non-state actor seemingly determined to undermine the state and maintain military power to intervene against state institutions. Concern was also expressed that Iran has extended its influence over Sadr indicated by his frequent visits to the country.

It was widely recognised that Sadr needs to be brought back into the Iraqi political state-building process as an Iraqi nationalist, but he cannot be enlisted by America or Britain because his legitimacy and popularity stem from his opposition to the occupation. Atrocious ethnic cleansing activities by Sadr’s militias have also made it very difficult for Sunnis to accept Sadr as an Iraqi nationalist. It is also clear that not all of the militia groups associated with Sadr are under his control. Saudi Arabia hosted Al Sadr in 2006, but his opposition to the presence of foreign forces made him a target of American military action and a recipient of Iranian support. Riyadh could now play an important role by engaging with both the Sadrists and Sunni “Awakening” movement and drawing them further into the political process.

Considerable suspicion and concern was expressed about the sectarianism of Nouri al-Maliki’s government. Saudi participants generally argued that Maliki had offered a promising programme when he came to power but has done little to implement it. He is considered a sectarian leader incapable of and unwilling to foster national unity, and a major obstacle to national reconciliation. The Kingdom cannot support national reconciliation with a sectarian government whose actions could lead to secession of the Shi’a dominated south, a confederation of separate political entities and civil war. America, on the other hand, does not consider Maliki a sectarian force but a politician who has escaped his sectarian identity as demonstrated by his pursuit of Sadr in Basra in March 2008.

Federalism

From the Saudi perspective blueprints for a federal political structure and the gathering momentum behind a federal solution to Iraq’s violence and instability must be resisted as it will inevitably lead to the secession of a Kurdish federal entity in the north and a Shi’a political entity in the south, de facto dissolution of the Iraqi state and with it the disappearance of a national Iraqi Arab identity and the prospect of an enduring civil war. The Saudi narrative condemns any form of federalism as a ‘win’ for Iran, although it was noted that many forms of federalism are practised in the world in which state sovereignty remains inviolable.

The Kingdom is reluctant to discuss the possibility of federalism and seeks reassurance from Britain and America that there will be a strong central government and that the means of production, policing and military protection will remain under central control. There was considerable uncertainty as to whether America and Britain are committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq or will actively pursue federalism in the name of stability and to facilitate early troop withdrawal. Further concerns were raised about the effect on the drive towards federalism of failure to rewrite the constitution and the degree to which the oil law and provincial elections due to be held in October 2008 will support economic and political autonomy for Iraq’s regions.

The solution is to reinvigorate an Iraqi national identity and a number of proposals are discussed in the next section. Nevertheless, a number of participants cautioned that nationalism may not be the best antidote to sectarianism because whichever nationalist group might assume central control of the Iraqi state it will likely achieve legitimacy through opposition to foreign occupation. A nationalist government may therefore not suit America, Saudi or even Iranian interests. An Iraqi national identity may best be fostered through patriotism, rather than nationalism, via creation of a central state infrastructure with effective institutions that allow political space for other important identities.

3. FUTURE PATHS AND PROCESSES

A number of ideas, themes and suggestions for future action emerged from the discussions that focus on processes for national reconciliation in Iraq, reconstituting a national Iraqi identity and achieving a regional consensus.

National reconciliation in Iraq

It was recognised that agreement may be possible on most crucial issues and that this could lead to national reconciliation. This will, however, require cooperation and interaction and some form of political compact at three levels: 1) within Iraq between competing political-militia groups; 2) between countries in the region and America to avoid a worst-case scenario of total state collapse in Iraq; and 3) the international level involving the EU and UN Security Council members. There was a strong sense that national reconciliation cannot lead to regional consensus or vice versa, both must move forward together and mutually reinforce each other with the highest levels of commitment from the state and non-state actors involved.

At the national level there was general agreement that a way must be found to avoid a prolonged civil war. This will require movement on three broad areas.
First, a political reform package to change the constitution, foster a more equitable sharing of political power and allow ex-Baathists back into the political process. Political processes that freeze one group in power tend to backfire if there are no means of expanding participation in government. It was noted that the Loya Jirga process in Afghanistan sequenced expanding political participation over time in which participatory rules were not final and binding. A specific recommendation for overcoming sectarian division was to reconstitute and empower a representative constituent assembly consisting of representatives from Iraq’s multi-sectarian and multi-ethnic tribes, city and village councils, and labour unions.

The assembly would work towards national reconciliation, amending the constitution and ensuring equitable distribution of Iraq’s natural resource wealth and state finances and inclusion of all Iraqis in the political process to establish a strong central government. There were competing arguments on the extent to which Iraq’s current ruling elite will only relent to outside political pressureand the extent to which a fundamental renegotiation of the constitution is needed to accommodate those currently excluded from the political process.

Second, much greater control of Iraq’s many militias. There were competing arguments as to the extent to which coalition forces are required to limit militia activity and create space for political processes and the extent to which the presence of occupation forces incites insurgent activity and sectarian violence and closes down as much political space as it opens.

Third, credible state institutions need to be rebuilt to ensure provision of government services that are national rather than sectarian in composition. This must include measures to ensure equitable distribution of Iraq’s oil wealth and to strengthen the rule of law and an independent, effective judiciary. Powerful arguments were heard that there is a profound need to massively improve the national government’s ability to spend its budget, mobilise its resources and invest in reconstruction. It was noted that the government has not been able to spend more than 14 per cent of its capital budget. The institutional capacity for managing and administering public finances is woeful, accountability is extremely low to non-existent, particularly amongst American contractors, and corruption is rife with abuses involving up to $1 billion and a failure to account for $24 billion in oil revenues. The current fragmentary approach involving over 30 agencies lacks coordination and accountability and leads to duplication. Privileging external contractors over local people marginalises Iraqis from the development and reconstruction processes based on Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) head L. Paul Bremer’s fundamental mistake of trying to rebuild Iraq from scratch rather than utilising existing processes and institutions. Iraqi citizens need to be engaged and their urgent needs must be addressed.

A specific recommendation was to learn from the success of the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan to channel resources directly to communities. This led to between $20,000 and $60,000 being distributed to 32,000 villages with decision-making devolved to the local community level. A similar approach could be applied to Iraq to ensure accountable channelling of resources to Iraq’s challenges of reconstruction and establishing an efficient and fair set of social policies. Application of the National Program approach for Iraq would include building a public finance system that ensured full accountability in management of resources, and design of effective expenditure programmes, including urban housing programmes that mobilised a domestic construction industry that in turn would secure large-scale job creation.

Reinvigorating Iraqi national identity (and countering Iran)

A number of ideas and proposals were discussed for reinvigorating a sense of Iraqi national identity as a counter to sectarianism, federalism and Iranian influence. First, forthright and repeated statements from the highest authorities in the Kingdom that Iranian regional hegemony will not be accepted. This could be complemented by a major non-official public awareness campaign to highlight the extent of Iranian interference in Iraq. A number of participants urged Saudi Arabia, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and the UN to take action so that Iran does not think it is succeeding because it is hearing no opposition to its activities in Iraq.

Second, a guarantee of Iraq’s territorial integrity by a United Nations Security Council Resolution under chapter seven of the UN Charter. Such a resolution could change the mission of Coalition forces in Iraq from one of occupation and counter-insurgency to protecting Iraq’s territorial integrity with the support of all UN member states. The extent to which this distinction would be recognised and accepted by competing factions within Iraq was contested.
Third, a process to bring Iraq’s Arabs together in a political coalition with American support to counter Iran-dominated Shi’a groups, perhaps involving mobilisation of the Iraqi Diaspora in Jordan. The Kingdom and EU should be encouraged to actively support Iraqi national political forces rather than sectarian political forces in forthcoming elections and the dilution of the role of religious guidance in the political process and to act as if Iraq is and will remain a single political entity to mutually reinforce other governments’ behaviour in support of territorial integrity.

Fourth, the development of a strong national police force and military, perhaps led by a Kurd, to embody Iraqi nationalism/patriotism and protect Iraq’s territorial integrity. It was noted that building such institutions is a ten-year project. At the extreme some participants advocated a ‘civilised’ military coup in support of Iraqi nationalism based on the argument that a military solution has worked in Pakistan, Turkey and Algeria.

Regional dialogue

A lasting political compact in Iraq will require engagement and political investment of regional governments to prevent them playing a spoiling role. Many participants’ accepted that this will require a regional consensus reached and sustained through dialogue and negotiated compromise. This logic suggests that a process of regional dialogue must be initiated, particularly given the absence of any other Arab or American regional initiative after major regional concerns were expressed over the Bush administration’s 2004 Greater Middle East Initiative.

Regional consensus need not involve all of Iraq’s neighbours and interested parties or all of the issues affecting key governments in the region. Whilst it was recognised that many issues in the wider Middle East affect each other, including the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Israel-Lebanon-Hezbollah-Syria conflict, the confrontation over Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons programme, the ongoing conflict in Iraq, and the plethora of humanitarian issues spilling out of these conflicts, a comprehensive framework to address all of these issues would in all likelihood be self-defeating in the short term. These regional issues may be interconnected, but not in concentric circles with Israel-Palestine at the centre. Instead these issues overlap with multiple intersections in which the centre of gravity of the interconnected conflicts now includes not only Palestine but also Iraq.

A number of participants accepted that a dialogue process should focus on Iraq and initially involve only Iran, America and Saudi Arabia. It is these three states that will shape the future of Iraq since all three can effectively veto any reconciliation initiatives that are judged to threaten their interests. A deeper, broader dialogue between the Kingdom and Iran would focus on whether there is a solution to national reconciliation in Iraq in which neither the United States, Saudi Arabia or Iran judge their core interests and identities to be threatened beyond a tolerable and negotiable limit.

Participants recognised that the price of cooperation in dealing with Iraq will vary according to competing perspectives, interests and identities at stake and the political veto power of the governments involved. In particular the dialogue between Iran and the P5 plus Germany over Tehran’s suspected nuclear weapons programme could have an unpredictable bearing on any long-term Iraq-centred discussions. Indeed it may not be possible for America to stabilise Iraq whilst simultaneously attempting to destabilise and further isolate Iran. A difficult trade-off in foreign policy goals may be required but one that that recognizes state’s legitimate interests.

The case for a three-way dialogue is built on a vested interest of all three parties in avoiding a ‘lose-lose’ outcome of total state collapse in Iraq. Playing a waiting game may not, after all, yield a positive result for Iran since the break-up of the Iraqi state could encourage secessionist activities amongst its own Arab, Baluchi, Azeri, and Kurdish communities. The possibility of this scenario becoming reality and the existence of a common interest in avoiding it need to be recognised. The danger is that the absence of communication will lead to actions based on worst-case assumptions of others’ intentions and a self-fulfilling worst-case scenario in which all three parties “labour towards the ends they want to avoid”, to paraphrase one participant.

It is also clear that there are important differences in perception around some of the key political dynamics in Iraq and a process of sustained dialogue would serve as a useful medium for a frank, informal or formal exchange of views and appreciation of and perhaps tacit agreement on individual governments’ ‘red lines’. In fact some participants argued that stability rests on mutual recognition and acceptance of red lines by actual or potential adversaries whether through informal networks or formal inter-governmental processes and that dialogue to establish red lines should not be confused with appeasement.

For example, Iranian intervention in Iraq is not disputed but the extent and purpose of its intervention are subject to debate. Iran’s negotiable and non-negotiable interests and the extent to which its intervention in Iraq is motivated by a desire for a specific outcome, a specific vision of the region and the character of its relationship with America can only be understood through dialogue. A sustained dialogue process could provide a means of limiting Iranian ambitions whilst addressing its anxieties and fears, particularly the fear of US-led regime change that many participants argued should be explicitly ruled out. Persuading Iran to be part of a regional solution and not part of the problem, convincing Tehran that a regional hegemonic strategy will fail and managing and mitigating Iranian paranoia of regime change will probably be an essential component of a lasting regional consensus on Iraq.

A Gulf Helsinki process

The case for regional dialogue almost led to comparisons between the OSCE and a hypothetical Middle East equivalent. There are obvious problems with any attempt to transpose a cooperative security institution from one socio-historical context to another. Nevertheless, some of the principles and ideas that informed the evolution of the OSCE may be salient to the current situation in the region rather than its particular formal structure. Participants made a number of suggestions, including:

• Identifying three or four common areas of interest for regional cooperation at different levels, such as the Gulf region, or a broader level involving countries such as Turkey and Pakistan.

• A process involving all parties, both strong and weak and perhaps including non-state actors.

• A declaratory focus on reducing anxieties and worst-case threat perceptions and anticipating future problems through a series of timetabled military, socio-economic and political confidence-building measures (CBMs).

• Expansion of the current Neighbourhood Process involving discussions between Iraq’s neighbours and other countries into a regional forum based on the principles of cooperative security. This could begin with an EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leadership conference involving the heads of government from Gulf and European countries.

• A two track process based on negotiations with all actors on all relevant issues affecting Iraq as well as a negotiable Helsinki-type process that would give Iran the responsibility of either engaging in the process or excluding itself.

Some participants argued that more work needed to be done to explore what a Helsinki process might look like in the region whilst others dismissed the applicability of such a process to the Gulf region and wider Middle East. One specific recommendation was that the Saudi government establish a well-resourced Iraq task force and an Iran task force within the government (perhaps the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with the King’s support to explore in detail various strategies with regard to the two countries and outreach opportunities.

Start with Syria

A number of participants argued that a regional consensus on Iraq and further containment of Iran must begin with Syria and a determined effort to engage Damascus and draw it away from Iran. Current conditions provide a genuine opportunity for success, according to several participants, based on the argument that the government in Damascus is both very confident and at the same very afraid of the growing sectarian-nationalist tensions in the region. A process of engagement could begin by supporting negotiations between Israel and Syria leading to a lasting solution on the future of the Golan Heights and other issues plaguing the relations between the two. One participant in particular asserted that lasting stability in the region required “a more balanced order”, and the best place to begin was with Syria.

Others insisted that change in Syria will first require change in Washington since Syria currently has no incentive to alter its position either in Lebanon, Iraq or its relationship with Iran. The price for persuading Syria to de-link itself from Iran may be deemed too high. Furthermore, breaking the Syria-Iran alliance may be positive, but perhaps not transformative. Syria, together with Turkey, could also be usefully brought into a dialogue process initially involving the United States, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Confrontation?

It was repeatedly stated that the Kingdom’s basic intent is peaceful and military force is not considered a useful or desirable option. Nevertheless, a number of Saudi participants argued that talks between the Kingdom, America and Iran will not work because Tehran is in a “winning position” and has no incentive to engage in meaningful dialogue to foster a regional consensus on Iraq. From this perspective it is difficult to contemplate dialogue and negotiations to establish a regional consensus for reducing instability in Iraq when instability supports Iran’s long-term strategy of dominating Iraqi politics.

Concern was also expressed that a Helsinki-type process could legitimise Iranian intervention in the Arab world and encourage further consolidation of Iran’s position in Iraq. Saudi efforts should focus instead on developing a common Arab position on Iraq and engaging America, the EU and Israel in a more concerted effort to further isolate Iran. This may require a more assertive Saudi role even if it increases the risk of conflict with Tehran and total state collapse in Iraq. In fact military solutions to Iranian intervention in Iraq were not exclusively dismissed and a number of Saudi participants forcefully insisted that anarchy in Iraq and a proxy war with Iran would be preferable to an Iraq ruled by sectarian forces in league with Tehran, even as the costs and risks of the unintended effects of another regional war were acknowledged. Others countered that a military response would not undermine Iran’s position in Iraq – an objective that can only be achieved through political accommodation.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION

Ten key suggestions for future action that Riyadh might usefully consider were articulated during the discussions. These cover a number of issues and do not reflect unanimous agreement of the participants.

1) Take the first step to initiate a three-way dialogue between Riyadh, Washington and Tehran on stabilising Iraq.

2) Bring pressure to bear on Gulf States, China and Russia, to restrict commercial relationships with Iran.

3) Forceful and repeated expression of Saudi concerns about Iran to highlight and challenge Iran’s regional ambitions.

4) Engage with both the Sadrists and Sunni “Awakening” movement to bring them into the political process.

5)Convene an EU-GCC heads of government meeting on national reconciliation in Iraq.

6) Advocate convening a representative constituent assembly with representatives from Iraq’s multi-denominational tribes, town councils and labour unions.

7) Advocate replicating Afghanistan’s national solidarity programmes to fund and empower reconstruction at the local community level.

8) Establish a well-resourced Iraq task force and an Iran task force to explore strategies and outreach opportunities.

9) Sponsor a detailed examination of what a Helsinki-type process might look like in the region.

10) Sponsor a UN resolution on guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Iraq under chapter seven of the UN Charter.

Dr. Nick Ritchie, Oxford Research Group, June 2008

Notes

1. The parallels to the American construction of the Soviet threat, the ‘relentless expansion’ of global communism, and the moral imperative of political, economic and military containment in the first decades of the Cold War are striking. History now allows us to recognise the dangerous misperceptions that clouded understandings of the other’s actions and intentions during that period.

SFO wins appeal in BAE-Saudi case

tim — Thu, 31 Jul 2008 12:54:04 +0000

The Law Lords have this morning upheld an appeal by the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) against the High Court’s ruling that he acted unlawfully in terminating a corruption investigation into BAE Systems’ arms deals with Saudi Arabia.

The appeal followed a High Court judgment in April that the SFO, acting on government advice, had dropped the investigation following lobbying by BAE and a threat from Saudi Arabia to withdraw diplomatic and intelligence co-operation if the investigation were not dropped. This judgment was in response to a judicial review brought by the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) and The Corner House.

Nicholas Hildyard of The Corner House said:

“Now we know where we are. Under UK law, a supposedly independent prosecutor can do nothing to resist a threat made by someone abroad if the UK government claims that the threat endangers national security. The unscrupulous who have friends in high places overseas willing to make such threats now have a ‘Get Out of Jail Free’ card – and there is nothing the public can do to hold the government to account if it abuses its national security powers. Parliament needs urgently to plug this gaping hole in the law and in the constitutional checks and balances dealing with national security. With the law as it is, a government can simply invoke ‘national security’ to drive a coach and horses through international anti-bribery legislation, as the UK government has done, to stop corruption investigations.”

Symon Hill of CAAT said:

“BAE and the government will be quickly disappointed if they think that this ruling will bring an end to public criticism. Throughout this case we have been overwhelmed with support from people in all walks of life. There has been a sharp rise in opposition to BAE’s influence in the corridors of power. Fewer people are now taken in by exaggerated claims about British jobs dependent on the arms trade. The government has been judged in the court of public opinion. The public know that Britain will be a better place when BAE is no longer calling the shots.”

CAAT and The Corner House will issue a more detailed statement following an analysis of the Lords’ judgments.

Saudis had ‘advance information’ on BAE case

Ellie Keen — Thu, 17 Jul 2008 00:11:15 +0000

THE Saudi governments seemed to have advance knowledge of the probability of Britain halting a bribery investigation before the official decision was taken, the former British ambassador to Riyadh revealed this week.

The disclosure appeared in evidence submitted to court by the Serious Fraud Office, as the House of Lords heard its appeal against a High Court ruling that it acted unlawfully in ending the inquiry against BAE Systems, who allegedly bribed Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia with £1 billion.

Lawyers for the SFO told the court that fraud office director Robert Wardle stopped the investigation in December 2006 because he believed that Saudi Arabia would cut off counter-terrorism co-operation with Britain, putting national security at risk.

Jonathan Sumption QC, for the SFO, said Mr Wardle only became aware of the full scale of the “threat” after receiving a minute in December 2006 from then Prime Minister Tony Blair, together with information from Government departments, warning of an “immediate risk of collapse in UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic co-operation”. Six days later he announced the investigation had been stopped.

But according to evidence presented by the Foreign Office, then British ambassador to Saudi Arabia Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles wrote three months earlier that he had discussed the SFO case with an unnamed senior Saudi government representative, who was “more optimistic about the SFO enquiry than seemed justified on the facts available to me”, and “always gave the impression that he had his own information”. The representative suggested the inquiry could be stopped on public interest grounds.

Lawyers for Campaign Against Arms Trade and Corner House Research, who are opposing the appeal, attacked the SFO and the Government for claiming that they had not broken international law in dropping the inquiry. Government documents disclosed last year revealed that the Saudi threats were considered so grave that the inquiry would have been stopped even if that breached Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s anti-bribery convention.

Article 5 of the convention bars states from allowing economic interests or foreign relations to influence bribery investigations.

Dinah Rose QC, for the campaigners, said it was illogical for the Government to “maintain the position ‘We acted in accordance with Article 5’ while saying, ‘You can’t consider that [in court] because we would’ve acted the same way if it was a breach’.”

The Attorney-General, who advised the SFO and Mr Blair, had misinterpreted the convention, Ms Rose said, adding: “If the decision maker has misunderstood the legal effect of the instrument he’s purporting to take into account, then his decision is flawed.” The SFO’s lawyers deny all wrongdoing and insist that Mr Wardle’s decision was rational and informed. The judgment is expected this autumn.

Victory in the Courts: BAE Saudi inquiry ruled unlawful

tim — Tue, 08 Jul 2008 00:06:16 +0000

The decision followed a legal challenge brought jointly by CAAT and The Corner House, a respected organisation that has worked on anti-corruption issues for many years. In a strongly worded judgment on 10th April, the Court described how BAE and the Saudi regime had lobbied Tony Blair and his ministers to have the investigation dropped. The judges went so far as to describe the Saudi threat as a ‘successful attempt by a foreign government to pervert the course of justice in the United Kingdom’.

The history

The legal challenge began sixteen months previously, at the end of 2006. At that point, SFO investigators had spent two and a half years delving into allegations that BAE paid multi-million pound bribes to Saudi princes to secure the arms deals known as Al Yamamah. In autumn 2006, the media reported that the Saudi regime was threatening not to sign a deal with BAE for Eurofighter Typhoons if the investigation was not stopped. Apologists for the arms trade appeared in the media to make wildly exaggerated claims about the number of British jobs dependent on the sale.

The investigation was terminated on 14th December 2006. Within days CAAT and The Corner House had instructed solicitors at Leigh Day & Co and barristers from Blackstone Chambers to begin a claim for judicial review. This is the process by which a court considers whether a public body has behaved unlawfully.

A long process followed, with moments of both joy and exasperation. BAE spied on CAAT and got hold of an email containing advice from our lawyers. A comedy gig organised by Mark Thomas, with comedians including Russell Brand and Ed Byrne, raised thousands of pounds for the legal challenge. We applied successfully for a Protective Costs Order, placing a limit on how much CAAT would have to pay if we lost the case. Our claim for judicial review was initially rejected, but in November the High Court gave permission for it to proceed. Finally, in February, the hearing took place.

Documents released during the hearing exposed the lengths to which BAE was prepared to go to stop the investigation. They revealed that the company had lobbied the SFO to have it dropped as early as 2005. At that point, the SFO told BAE quite clearly that commercial and political considerations were not valid reasons for stopping a criminal investigation. During the following year the SFO obtained access to Swiss bank accounts and Tony Blair was personally lobbied by the Saudi prince Bandar – an individual who was himself at the centre of the corruption allegations. As his threats included the withdrawal of cooperation over fighting terrorism, BAE and the UK government were able to use ‘national security’ as a fig-leaf to cover up their motivations.

Decision unlawful

Contrary to Blair’s claim to be protecting the UK, the High Court found that the UK’s adherence to the rule of law had been undermined by the decision to drop the investigation in the face of the Saudi threat. The judges, Alan Moses and Jeremy Sullivan, ruled that the SFO’s director ‘failed to appreciate that protection of the rule of law demanded that he should not yield to the threat’. They added that surrender to a threat ‘merely encourages those with power, in a position of strategic and political importance, to repeat such threats’. It was not the investigation, but the decision to cut it short, that had endangered national security.

The judges went on: ‘There is no evidence whatever that any consideration was given as to how to persuade the Saudis to withdraw the threat, let alone any attempt made to resist the threat’. They then moved on to a vital point about motivations: ‘Too ready a submission may give rise to the suspicion that the threat was not the real ground for the decision at all; rather it was a useful pretext. It is obvious, in the present case, that the decision to halt the investigation suited the objectives of the executive. Stopping the investigation avoided uncomfortable consequences, both commercial and diplomatic.’

The judgment was welcomed by a wide range of newspapers (see page 12), politicians from all the main parties and others. Messages of congratulation flooded in to the offices of CAAT and The Corner House, by post, email and phone. The Government and BAE were alarmed. Clutching at straws, several right-wing columnists – who sixteen months before were confidently predicting that our challenge had no chance of success – suddenly revived their commitment to British jobs. Their claims were even less believable this time. BAE has already admitted that most of the jobs created by its latest Saudi deal will not even be based in the UK. Lord Woolf’s report into BAE’s ethics was greeted with similar derision for its failure to consider some of the most basic ethical issues about the arms trade (see page 3).

Government to appeal

The Government almost immediately announced its intention to appeal against the decision. The appeal will be heard by the House of Lords on 7th and 8th July. Considering the questions raised by the case to be of general public importance, the High Court has ordered the Government to pay all the costs both for the case so far and for the appeal regardless of the outcome.

The High Court’s decision means that the investigation is technically reopened. However, the new director of the SFO, Richard Alderman, has said that he will make no decision in practice until after the House of Lords has ruled on the appeal.

Regardless of the outcome, the political repercussions of the High Court victory should not be underestimated. The arms industry in the UK is struggling to get used to the fact that it can no longer expect to have everything its own way. Ministers know that their subservience to arms dealers is coming under greater public scrutiny. BAE has discovered that it cannot always bully its way to the desired result and the Saudi regime has realised that the British people do not share their Government’s willingness to submit to human rights abusers.

Just as importantly, public and media awareness has shot up on the issue of arms companies’ influence in the corridors of power. People from all walks of life are determined to campaign against this situation, recognizing that it is as harmful for the UK’s democracy and economy as it is for international peace and security. And more people than ever are now aware that CAAT is a key organisation working to change this situation.

One more thing is very clear. While staff at CAAT and The Corner House, along with our barristers and solicitors, have worked extremely hard on this case, we could not have done it with out the encouragement and help of thousands of supporters. Countless individuals have made donations to CAAT, lobbied their MPs, written to their local papers and gone out on to the streets to promote the campaign. Many have offered encouragement that has kept the staff going at the most difficult times. Our success would not be possible without them. This, then, is a victory for every CAAT supporter and for everyone committed to justice, accountability and peace.

Media Commentary on the Oil Price Crisis

tim — Sat, 05 Jul 2008 12:21:34 +0000

Introduction

The past few months have seen an upsurge in comment on Saudi Arabia in the British media at a similar rate to the upsurge in oil prices, the current cause of the country being in the news.

While previous Arab Media Watch studies found that portrayals of Saudi Arabia were “often negative and sometimes openly hostile” – particularly at the time of the Saudi royal visit to Britain in November 2007, and the BAE arms deal – the current spike in media attention has a far more reasoned character to it. For this report, AMW monitored all the British national daily newspapers (except the Financial Times), as well as the Evening Standard.

Blame Saudi

Out of a total of 20 editorials and commentaries, just five contained comments that seemed to place blame for the current oil price crisis on Saudi Arabia. The Daily Telegraph’s executive foreign editor Con Coughlin argued that “as things stand, protecting their precious reserves, rather than providing the world with cheaper oil, appears to be their main priority” (20 June 2008).

The newspaper’s international business editor Ambrose Evans-Pritchard described the visit of President Bush to the country in January “to plead for higher oil output,” only to be “politely rebuffed” (16 May 2008). Of Bush’s subsequent visit in May, Evans-Pritchard wrote: “If the Saudis deny help once again, they risk incalculable damage to their strategic alliance with Washington. The price of crude has rocketed by over $30 a barrel since that last fruitless meeting.”

He continued: “The US-Saudi tango has been on thin ice ever since the terrorist attacks of 9/11…Riyadh is giving no ground…The Saudis have let their output fall from 9.5m to 8.5m bpd over the last two years.” A few days later (20 May 2008), the Times’ US editor and assistant editor Gerard Baker wrote that following this meeting, “the helpful chaps at the House of Saud duly agreed to ramp up output by a few hundred thousand barrels a day.” He described this as “a drop in the tanker of Saudi,” which “to nobody’s great surprise…had no effect whatsoever.”

However, Baker cast doubt on Bush’s efforts, suggesting they were “more of a political gesture than a meaningful policy initiative.” The Times’ chief foreign affairs commentator Bronwen Maddox labelled the Opec summit in Jeddah “a Saudi show, to deliver a Saudi message” (25 June 2008), adding: “Before Sunday’s meeting, King Abdullah bin Abdelaziz al-Saud said that the kingdom was resolved to prevent oil prices from rising ‘in an unjustified and abnormal manner’, while announcing an increase in production too small to have any such impact.”

Don’t Blame Saudi

Saudi Arabia, as the world’s largest producer, naturally loomed large in recent coverage of the oil price crisis. Shadow business secretary Alan Duncan noted in the Daily Telegraph that it was “the only country with enough capacity and flexibility to turn on the taps…” (27 May 2008).

However, “life isn’t so simple,” he continued, explaining the relevance of various grades of oil and the corresponding different markets, concluding that “just turning on Opec’s taps would not necessarily solve the current problem.” In fact, he issued a word of warning: “…watch carefully the unbridled folly of those such as the Lib Dems who want to gang up on Saudi Arabia. Those same naifs who delighted at the fall of the Shah seem to want the same ghastly political outcome in Saudi Arabia- and the $300 oil that would come with it.”

The Telegraph’s executive foreign editor Con Coughlin argued that the country is working to capacity (20 June 2008): “…the Saudis announced their intention to increase production by another 500,000 barrels per day, which will bring total production to 9.7 million barrels – the kingdom’s highest ever level. And that is about the upper limit of what the Saudis can produce for any sustained period.” However, “the Saudis will only produce more oil if they believe it is in their interests to do so,” Coughlin added, somewhat contradictorily.

An Increase in Production Won’t Help

Independent columnist Dominic Lawson exonerated Saudi Arabia (and Opec) from blame in the current price crisis, writing that “far from operating as a restrictive cartel…12 of the 13 members of Opec are pumping out oil at maximum capacity” (23 May 2008).

The Saudis, being the 13th member, “are already producing well in excess of their official Opec quota.” He also noted that an announced production increase by 300,000 barrels per day “had no effect in halting the upward rush of the market price.” In another article (17 June 2008), Lawson stated that “oil makes hypocrites of us all,” noting the overarching presence of politics in the recent high-level visits to Saudi Arabia by George Bush, Ban Ki-Moon and Gordon Brown. “The strange thing is that there isn’t an absolute shortage of oil in the markets,” he added. “There’s already a sufficient amount of the black stuff to go round to meet current levels of demand, as the Saudis have wearily insisted often enough over the past few months.”

Therefore, Lawson concluded, King Abdullah’s pledge to raise output “is the purest politics, simply to get the weight of the world’s opprobrium off his kaffiyeh. I don’t blame the King, however.”

An editorial in the Independent (16 June 2008) suggested a few reasons for the oil price crisis: “There is little doubt that speculation is playing some part in pushing up the price of oil to an unprecedented $140 a barrel. Yet the fact that inventories have been at normal levels suggests this is not the driving force behind price rises. Growing demand is the far more likely culprit.” However, there was some suspicion felt about the Saudi role: “It is often asserted that Saudis still have vast oil reserves. But there is no independently verified proof of this. We have no choice but to rely on what they choose to tell us.”

Nonetheless, the editorial cast doubt on the possibility of bringing the oil price down by increasing Saudi production. “How long before our political leaders return to Saudi and its Opec allies to plead for more? And what will be the political price extracted for this?” asked the Independent, adding that “it is ridiculous for Western governments to tell Saudi Arabia and other oil producers how much they ought to pump out of the ground. The debate ought to be about how best to break our economic dependence on oil.”

An editorial in the same newspaper the following week (23 June 2008) likewise detected the overarching presence of politics in Brown’s attendance of the oil summit in Jeddah: “In attending the Saudi King’s energy summit at the weekend, the Prime Minister colluded in a publicity stunt of the first order…The clear intention was to convince hard-pressed British consumers that he feels our pain on energy prices and is doing his level best to bring them down.” The editorial apportioned blame to several factors: “The sky-rocketing price of energy in Britain stems at least as much from his own government’s tax take and the energy companies’ profits as it does from the vagaries of the Saudi oil flow. If production is an issue, then the Iraq war is at least as much to blame. A prime ministerial call for national belt-tightening would be a more honest and dignified approach.”

Independent columnist Michael Savage cast doubt on increased production as the solution to the oil price crisis (21 May 2008). “Recent events have shown that there are problems with the assumption that Opec could ease the oil price by turning on the taps,” he wrote, noting the “little impact” of an announced production increase. The Evening Standard’s business and financial commentator Anthony Hilton agreed (23 May 2008): “It is years since any new oil field was found which could deliver more than one million barrels a day and currently the world consumes more than 85 million barrels a day. Put like that, the increase in production of 300,000 barrels which President Bush got out of the Saudis last week was hardly worth the paper used for the press release.”

The Times’ international business editor Carl Mortishead had a different reason for doubting the effectiveness of an increase in Saudi oil production (23 June 2008): “The truth is that the world doesn’t need the extra Saudi crude. It’s the wrong sort of oil – too sulphurous and viscous for refiners trying to produce more petrol, diesel and jet fuel.”

An editorial in the same newspaper also cast doubt, citing global decline in supplies as the reason (20 April 2008): “Even Saudi Arabia, the desert kingdom that sits on 25 per cent of the world’s known hydrocarbon reserves, can no longer be relied on to turn on the taps, even if it wanted to. Oil is also becoming progressively harder to find and more expensive to refine.” Sun columnist Kelvin MacKenzie had little interest in production quotas, instead noting the reduction in traffic on British roads due to “the Shell tanker strike plus the staggering cost of petrol” (19 June 2008). He added that “we do have something to thank the Saudis for – we can get to work quicker.”

Statements & Predictions

Other commentators went less into the mechanisms of global oil markets and production, and instead made broader, gloomier statements and predictions about the future of oil, with particular regard to Saudi Arabia. However, a few commentators still saw a boom time for the country.

Cause for Concern

“Oil does terrible things to a nation, breaking the link between taxation and revenue, and so encouraging corruption,” wrote Daily Telegraph leader writer and Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan (30 April 2008). “Look at the Gulf States…unfortunate enough to be sitting on the stuff.”

The Guardian’s industrial correspondent Terry Macalister also sounded a note of alarm for Saudi Arabia, whose economy “and political stability” are “tied heavily to crude revenue” (20 June 2008). Despite the billions in extra revenue, Saudi leaders are “worried the long-term impact of high prices will be to cause conflict with western countries that militarily and politically support the House of Saud,” he added. “The kingdom’s rulers are also fearful that high prices will lead to lower demand as users switch to other fuels.” Similarly, the Independent’s diplomatic editor Anne Penketh wrote that “it appears the Saudis are just as worried that record prices…could dampen growth in the industrialised West and lower demand, which would in turn hurt the kingdom” (16 June 2008).

“Saudi Arabia is keenly aware of the political and economic effect of the oil market on the upwards spiral of food prices, and contributed $500m to the World Food Programme,” she added. The Times’ international business editor Carl Mortishead described a situation in which having oil is not enough, writing that “the price of natural gas in the Gulf has soared amid shortages and increased global demand” (19 May 2008). This is to blame for “the oil-rich Gulf states…planning to import coal…because, for the first time, the Gulf states are beginning to feel the burden of the soaring cost of fossil fuels.”

Cashing In

A couple of commentators saw a more positive side to Saudi Arabia’s current state, if only for its own national interest. Patrick Bishop in the Daily Mail focused on the wealth already accrued by the country (16 May 2008): “Despite their mind-boggling extravagance, they remain monstrously minted thanks to a 70-year oil boom that has sometimes faltered but never collapsed. Those who have succeeded in getting close to them have done pretty well, too.” The Times’ City columnist Edward Fennell agreed, writing that “whatever else may be happening in the rest of the world, the Gulf states are riding high on global demand for their oil,” thanks to “profits sky-high and confidence that this will continue for the foreseeable future” (12 June 2008).

Cast off the Cloak

Ellie Keen — Sat, 12 Apr 2008 01:05:56 +0000

When Tony Blair intervened to get the Serious Fraud Office investigation into BAE’s alleged corruption in Saudi Arabia stopped on grounds of national security, few people believed a legal challenge could succeed. When it comes to protecting the lives and security of the nation, the courts allow the executive “an especially wide margin of discretion”, noted the judges in this case. Yesterday’s judgment that the SFO director acted unlawfully in dropping the inquiry is therefore a major blow to the government – and its ability to sweep controversial issues under the carpet.

The ruling has seriously constrained the government’s ability to invoke national security without scrutiny. The courts have increasingly been standing up to the government in relation to terrorism cases and slowly staking out the limits to its powers. But a challenge to a decision to quash a prosecution on national security grounds through a judicial review is unprecedented.

The high court has made clear that national security arguments cannot be used to override the rule of law. “It is obvious,” it says, “that the decision to halt the investigation suited the objectives of the executive. Stopping the investigation avoided uncomfortable consequences, both commercial and diplomatic.” The judges in effect accused the government of abusing national security arguments as a cloak for other more cynical motives.

Just two weeks before the judgment was delivered, the government mounted an attempt to preserve its powers. In a breathtakingly cynical move, it introduced draft legislation creating a power for the attorney general to halt prosecutions on national security. The bill concentrates power for making such decisions in the hands of the executive and makes a judicial review of a decision virtually impossible.

Under the proposed law, the attorney general will not have to provide information to parliament that impacts on national security or international relations. If anyone questions that decision, the attorney general will merely have to get a minister to provide a certificate stating it is to be considered “conclusive evidence of act”.

One of Gordon Brown’s first acts on taking over from Blair was to launch a major series of consultations on constitutional renewal. It was seen as an attempt to distance himself from what were regarded as the worst excesses of Blair’s rule. By letting these new powers for the attorney slip into the draft bill, Gordon Brown has shown himself to be no different to his predecessor.

Giving in to Saudi demands to drop the SFO inquiry looks grubby and self-serving, and has damaged Britain’s reputation irreparably. The decision can only have given succour to those corrupt regimes whom Britain repeatedly lectures on cleaning up their act.

Last week the OECD visited the UK, in a form of visit reserved for those countries deemed not to be complying with its anti-bribery convention. That is a damning reflection on the government. But yesterday’s judgment also offers an opportunity: it could decide it is serious about standing up for the integrity of the justice system and the independence of its prosecutors. It could decide to accept proper scrutiny of its national security decisions. It could decide that it means business on enforcing its corruption laws regardless of threats, regardless of who is accused, and regardless of who it upsets. Let us hope so.

Lord Avebury, a Liberal Democrat spokesman on foreign affairs, is vice-chair of the parliamentary human rights group; Susan Hawley is an analyst for The Corner House, an anti-corruption campaign group

Arms and the Man

Ellie Keen — Thu, 10 Apr 2008 23:12:54 +0000

The British government was desperate to sell a batch of Eurofighter/Typhoon warplanes to bolster its special relationship with Saudi Arabia – a relationship built on fantastically lucrative arms deals. To justify dropping the investigation into Britain’s biggest arms company and a prominent Saudi prince over allegations of bribery and corruption, Tony Blair cited “national security”, the last refuge of an arrogant, frustrated executive.

Yesterday, Lord Justice Moses, a judge who has more experience than most of Whitehall deception, saw through it. One may have some sympathy with Robert Wardle, the hapless director of the Serious Fraud Office, for surrendering to Blair and Lord Goldsmith, his attorney general, who passed on the extraordinary claims from Downing Street.

These claims were that the heads of MI5 and MI6 feared Saudi Arabia would deprive them of vital intelligence that could save the lives of scores of people on London’s streets if the investigation into BAE Systems and Prince Bandar, went ahead. Indeed, we were told, the Saudis had already privately threatened to do so.

Riyadh has consistently exaggerated the significance of the intelligence it has on terrorist groups. But let us just imagine that it did come up with genuine and credible information about a planned terrorist plot in Britain. Would it really withhold that information? Would any foreign regime, however brutal, do that?

In a devastating passage in their long judgment, Moses and Mr Justice Sullivan, say:

“No one suggested to those uttering the threat that it was futile, that the United Kingdom’s system of democracy forbad presure being exerted on an independent prosecutor whether by the domestic executive or by anyone else; no-one even hinted that the courts would strive to protect the rule of law…

“If, as we are asked to accept, the Saudis would not be interested in our internal domestic constitutional arrangements, it is plausible they would understand the enormity of the interference with the United Kingdom’s sovereignty, when a foreign power seeks to interfere with the iternal adminstration of the criminal law”.

Driving the point home, they continue: “It is not difficult to imagine what they would think if we attempted to interfere with their criminal justice system”. There is no fear of that. The British government did not interfere when its citizens were tortured when wrongly accused of bomb attacks. The furthest the UK government goes is to allude in annual Foreign Office human rights reports to Saudi practices of torture and beheadings.

With characterstic wit and irony, Moses concludes the judgment by referring to Blair’s claim when the then-PM announced that the Serious Fraud Office had dropped the investigation. The judges note that Blair had said “this was the clearest intervention in the public interest he had seen”. They add: “We agree”.

Blair set the pattern, and ministers have since demonstrated they are prepared to play fast and loose with torture, whether it is colluding with the US practice of rendition or deporting suspects to such places as Jordan and Libya. On Wednesday, the courts stopped the deportation of the Jordanian, Abu Qatada, and two Libyans, regarded as threats to Britain’s national security.

This case has all the exotic ingredients – arms deals, alleged corruption, and claims that our national security is at stake. Ministers are now hatching a plot to introduce a law whereby the courts will not be able to intervene whenever the attorney general hoists the flag of “national security”. I wonder what Moses and his peers will think of that.