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 <title>Let the Quartet Die</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/let_the_quartet_die</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;One of the great hopes and subsequent disappointments in modern Middle Eastern diplomacy has been the &amp;#8220;Quartet&amp;#8221; of four major international players that was supposed to monitor, shepherd and promote Palestinian-Israeli peace-making during the past five years. The group &amp;#8211; comprised of Russia, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations &amp;#8211; has not only failed to advance the peace process since its establishment in 2002; astoundingly, it has also whittled away the political credibility and impact of two of those parties &amp;#8211; the EU and UN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, not surprisingly, a coalition of 21 respected international aid agencies working on the ground in Palestine has openly criticized the shortcomings of the Quartet for failing in its mission and leaving the diplomatic arena dangerously leaderless.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The agencies &amp;#8211; including Oxfam, Save the Children, Care, Christian Aid and World Vision &amp;#8211; said that in five of the ten main areas the Quartet had identified to improve Palestinians&amp;#8217; daily life conditions, the situation has actually deteriorated. The situation also has worsened, rather than improved, for most Palestinians since the Annapolis peace process was launched last November. It added that the Quartet has not held Israel accountable for continuing to build settlements on occupied land, and that travel restrictions on Palestinians has also increased.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Christian Aid director Daleep Mukarji noted that nearly a year after the Annapolis process was launched, &amp;#8220;we are seeing exponential settlement growth, additional check-points and &amp;#8211; because of this &amp;#8211; further economic stagnation. The Quartet is losing its grip on the Middle East peace process.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Things could have been very different had the Quartet been a truly impartial and decisive instrument of peace-making. In retrospect, the Quartet was another fig leaf designed to hide American dominance of a diplomatic process that was driven primarily by Israeli interests. This was initially visible in the Quartet&amp;#8217;s habit of merely issuing verbal statements criticizing Israeli settlement expansion but doing nothing about it, while acting with more force against the Palestinians.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The epitome of that double standard was the Quartet&amp;#8217;s position supporting the Israeli response to the Hamas parliamentary elections victory in early 2006. It refused to deal with Hamas until the latter accepted the conditions Israel and the United States laid down. It did nothing of equal magnitude to demand that Israel, for its part, also respect international law and UN resolutions and stop using excessive violence against Palestinians.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In recent years, I raised the issue of the Quartet&amp;#8217;s ineffectiveness and pro-Israeli tilt several times with EU and UN officials, asking them why they did not simply withdraw from an institution that had proved ineffective. Their response was uniformly limp and unimpressive: They argued it was better to be inside the Quartet trying to influence and temper the ideological pro-Israel tilt of the United States. That goal has proven to be an illusion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Not surprisingly, a dishonest institution like the Quartet named as its special envoy former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Diplomatic Olympics Gold Medal Winner for Political Fraudulence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Quartet keeps on meeting, and doing nothing, while conditions deteriorate for most Palestinians, and Israel continues to expand its theft and colonization of Palestinian land. The EU and the UN were once trusted mediators and impartial actors who truly worked for the best interests of Israelis and Arabs alike. Today, they have lost that aura of fairness and confidence, leaving the Middle East dangerously lacking in powerful international actors who enjoy both credibility and impact.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The damning report by the 21 aid agencies should be taken seriously by the EU and the UN, who should consider the consequences of their continuing to provide cover for Israeli colonialism and its American guardian. The EU and the UN should quickly announce that the Quartet was a valiant attempt that failed, and they should withdraw immediately, to prevent any more damage to their own reputations and ability to play constructive roles in the region.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Their withdrawal would send powerful signals to all concerned that American-Israeli charades will not be allowed to define the diplomacy of all other potential actors in the region. The Quartet was a good idea in principle &amp;#8211; a powerful body of leading global powers that would push Israelis and Palestinians alike to adhere to their commitments and move to a negotiated peace agreement. In practice, it failed because it was not sincere, serious or impartial.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;International aid agencies at least have the self-respect and courage to say this out loud. The EU and the UN would do well to follow suit, and regain a modicum of their own dignity in the process. Truth and honesty still carry weight, and should be exercised now and then to counter the prevailing agents of dishonesty that try to bludgeon us with their brute force.&lt;/p&gt;


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 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/foreign_policy">Foreign Policy</category>
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 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/palestine">Palestine</category>
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 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/rami_khouri">Rami Khouri</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 10:57:22 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>JamieSW</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6553 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
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 <title>The Middle East Quartet: A Progress Report</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/the_middle_east_quartet_a_progress_report</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Editor&amp;#8217;s note: Below is the Executive Summary of the report, which was published on September 25. The full report is available &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.oxfam.org/files/middle-east-quartet-progress-report-25-sept08.pdf&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt; (.pdf).&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Executive Summary&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) continues (see ‘&lt;em&gt;The Gaza Strip: A Humanitarian Implosion&lt;/em&gt;’).&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref1_gblz7ks&quot; title=&quot;Available at www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/oxfam_gaza_lowres.pdf.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote1_gblz7ks&quot;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt; Its population of 3.7 million people, 52 per cent of whom are children, struggle for their basic needs.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref2_ejjg9ae&quot; title=&quot;See www.unicef.org/infobycountry/oPt_statistics.html.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote2_ejjg9ae&quot;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt; Palestinian women, children, and men are increasingly dependent on aid as their livelihoods are destroyed. The only sustainable solution to the crisis is a comprehensive peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians based on international law. As humanitarian and development and human rights organisations, we believe that immediate steps can and must be taken to relieve suffering, as well as to ensure that a peace agreement is eventually reached.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As this report demonstrates, the lack of progress on key goals calls the Quartet’s current approach into question. In its Berlin statement, the Quartet [comprising the U.S., EU, UN and Russia] expressed the,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;“urgent need for more visible progress on the ground in order to build confidence and support progress in the negotiations launched in Annapolis”.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This “visible progress” has not materialised. Analysis of the reality on the ground demonstrates that in five of the ten areas in which the Quartet has laid down clear recommendations, there has been either no progress or an actual deterioration in the situation. Clearly, a new approach is warranted. Moreover, the Quartet’s capacity to encourage positive developments has been weakest in the three areas where progress is now most urgent: settlements, lifting obstacles to movement and access, and bringing an end to the blockade of Gaza. The Middle East Quartet, comprising Russia, &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;USA&lt;/span&gt;, EU, and UN, identified 2008 as a crucial year for the Middle East Peace Process (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;MEPP&lt;/span&gt;) and the period in which to realise agreements made at the Annapolis Conference on 22 November 2007.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref3_f6zpbnu&quot; title=&quot;See Quartet Statements of 24 June 2008, 2 May 2008, and 17 December 2007 at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/106215.htm, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104319.htm, and www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/dec/97671.htm.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote3_f6zpbnu&quot;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt; Quartet members committed to assisting parties to meet their specific obligations and to promoting a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref4_4dyail1&quot; title=&quot;See Quartet Statement at Annapolis Conference on 27 November 2008 at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/nov/95667.htm and President Bush, ‘Joint Understanding read by President Bush at the Annapolis Conference’ 27 November 2007 and speech at www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2007/95695.htm.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote4_4dyail1&quot;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt; The deadline for an agreement by the end of 2008 is now looming and seems unlikely to be met. Indeed, the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, stated: ‘so far there has been no achievement in the negotiations… I cannot say that there has been an agreement on a single issue. The gap between the sides is very large.”&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref5_b85h9g8&quot; title=&quot;Mahmoud Abbas quoted in Haaretz, Sunday 14 September 2008 at www.haaretz.com.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote5_b85h9g8&quot;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Quartet’s meeting in New York [this took place on Sept. 26] comes at a critical moment for the Quartet to demonstrate that it can play an effective role in bringing peace to the Middle East. This report outlines the Quartet’s own recommendations across six areas that it considered to be of vital importance for the broader peace process. It assesses the impact that limited progress has had on the daily lives of Palestinians and Israelis. The Quartet’s Berlin statement provides a clear picture of the progress needed and, as the most recent declaration of the Quartet, will be used as a basis for this report.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref6_5rp031f&quot; title=&quot;See Quartet Statements of 24 June 2008, 2 May 2008, and 17 December 2007 at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/106215.htm, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104319.htm, and www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/dec/97671.htm.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote6_5rp031f&quot;&gt;6&lt;/a&gt; The statement, like this report, focuses on &lt;b&gt;settlements, access and movement, Gaza, Palestinian security sector reform, donor pledges, and the revival of private sector activity in the oPt&lt;/b&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Quartet has rightly emphasised that progress in key  areas is the only way to prevent further deterioration in the everyday lives of Palestinians and Israelis and in the overall political process itself. The Quartet’s meeting in New York provides an opportunity to re-group, recommit, and decide on additional steps that can be taken to ensure that parties comply with their obligations under the roadmap and international law. This report provides recommendations to Quartet members on how best to respond to ensure urgently needed progress. Unless there is a swift and dramatic improvement, it will be necessary to question what the future is for the Middle East Quartet.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Settlements:&lt;/b&gt; Despite efforts by Quartet members to signal strong opposition to continued settlement expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, there has been a marked acceleration in construction, and no serious attempts by the Israeli authorities to dismantle outposts. Settlements, outposts, and the infrastructure that serves them, illegal in international law, devastate the Palestinian economy and the daily lives of ordinary Palestinians. While the Quartet can be commended for raising the issue of settlements and outposts, there has been a marked failure to hold the Israeli authorities to their obligations under the roadmap and international law. This highlights the urgent need to go beyond rhetoric and adopt concrete measures to ensure that Israeli authorities comply with their obligations under international law. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Access and Movement:&lt;/b&gt; The Quartet has failed in its efforts to secure the removal of checkpoints and other obstacles to access and movement for people and goods that would enable Palestinians to see a tangible improvement in their daily lives. There is no ‘new reality’ in the West Bank; the economy continues to stagnate, and the blockade of Gaza continues. The failure of the Quartet in this area will lead to further impoverishment and economic decline. It may also constitute a fatal threat to the broader peace process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Gaza:&lt;/b&gt; Despite violations on both sides, the agreement on cessation of violence endures and there have been marked improvements in security for Israelis and Gazans alike.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref7_11k6w0k&quot; title=&quot;The terminology ‘cessation of violence’ is used in this report as the generally accepted wording of the agreement by the UN.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote7_11k6w0k&quot;&gt;7&lt;/a&gt; However, normal civilian life in Gaza has not resumed. The Quartet has been unable to end Gaza’s isolation and facilitate adequate flows of humanitarian and commercial goods (consistent with the Agreement on Movement and Access (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;AMA&lt;/span&gt;)). There have been increased supplies of fuel to Gaza, but these supplies are not yet steady or sufficient. Despite their efforts, the Quartet has failed to prompt the immediate resumption of stalled UN and other donor projects. Overall, progress in Gaza falls far short of the Quartet’s own stated recommendations. Despite its recognition of the urgency of the situation, the actions taken by the Quartet have been insufficient to kick-start meaningful changes on the ground. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Comprehensive Palestinian Security Sector Reform:&lt;/b&gt; The introduction of an EU-trained Palestinian police force across the West Bank is reported to be beginning to deliver tangible and much-needed improvements in the stability of life across the West Bank. Nonetheless, concerns among Palestinian civilians about their personal security are said to remain. The focus on the rule of law for Palestinians, while welcome, has paid inadequate attention to human rights in the reform process. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Donor Pledges:&lt;/b&gt; The Quartet Representative has been successful in securing substantial funding pledges. This impressive aptitude for fundraising has not yet led to the prompt delivery of projects, nor improved the lives of Palestinian women, children, and men for the better. The Quartet has not ensured that all donors make good on their pledges, in large part because the absence of demonstrable progress and real change in key areas – particularly settlements, access and movement, and Palestinian reconciliation – has made greater financial assistance ineffective. By adopting a twin-track approach, the Quartet has committed itself to achieving success in both promoting removal of obstacles to Palestinian economic development and increasing investment in  Palestinian growth. Failure on one track, particularly the first,seriously undermines prospects for the other. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Private Sector Progress:&lt;/b&gt; The Quartet Representative has had isolated successes in implementing a small number of the agreed projects aimed at boosting the private sector. Most notable are his efforts to enable the allocation of frequencies to the second Palestinian mobile telephone operator in the oPt. However, a holistic approach to private sector development is required. There has been almost no progress in alleviating obstacles to access and movement needed to stimulate private sector activity and invigorate the Palestinian economy. Without this, the Quartet Representative will continue to be frustrated in his efforts to improve the daily lives of Palestinians while de-development of the Palestinian economy will continue to increase.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Read the full report &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.oxfam.org/files/middle-east-quartet-progress-report-25-sept08.pdf&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt; (.pdf).&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;List of signatories:&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;CAFOD&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;CARE&lt;/span&gt; Deutschland-Luxemburg; &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;CARE&lt;/span&gt; France; &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;CARE&lt;/span&gt; Nederland; &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;CARE&lt;/span&gt; Norge; &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;CARE&lt;/span&gt; Ősterreich; &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;CARE&lt;/span&gt; International UK, Christian Aid, DanChurchAid, diakonia, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;EMHRN&lt;/span&gt;), medico international, Medicos del Mundo; Oxfam International, Save the Children UK; Save the Children Sweden, United Civilians for Peace (a coalition of Dutch organizations: Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ICCO&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;IKV&lt;/span&gt; Pax Christi), World Vision Jerusalem.&lt;/p&gt;


&lt;ol class=&quot;footnotes&quot;&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote1_gblz7ks&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref1_gblz7ks&quot;&gt;1.&lt;/a&gt; Available at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/oxfam_gaza_lowres.pdf&quot;&gt;www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/oxfam_gaza_lowres.pdf&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote2_ejjg9ae&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref2_ejjg9ae&quot;&gt;2.&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/oPt_statistics.html&quot;&gt;www.unicef.org/infobycountry/oPt_statistics.html&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote3_f6zpbnu&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref3_f6zpbnu&quot;&gt;3.&lt;/a&gt; See Quartet Statements of 24 June 2008, 2 May 2008, and 17 December 2007 at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/106215.htm&quot;&gt;www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/106215.htm&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104319.htm&quot;&gt;www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104319.htm&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/dec/97671.htm&quot;&gt;www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/dec/97671.htm&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote4_4dyail1&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref4_4dyail1&quot;&gt;4.&lt;/a&gt; See Quartet Statement at Annapolis Conference on 27 November 2008 at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/nov/95667.htm&quot;&gt;www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/nov/95667.htm&lt;/a&gt; and President Bush, ‘Joint Understanding read by President Bush at the Annapolis Conference’ 27 November&lt;br /&gt;
2007 and speech at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2007/95695.htm&quot;&gt;www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2007/95695.htm&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote5_b85h9g8&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref5_b85h9g8&quot;&gt;5.&lt;/a&gt; Mahmoud Abbas quoted in Haaretz, Sunday 14 September 2008 at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.haaretz.com&quot;&gt;www.haaretz.com&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote6_5rp031f&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref6_5rp031f&quot;&gt;6.&lt;/a&gt; See Quartet Statements of 24 June 2008, 2 May 2008, and 17 December 2007 at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/106215.htm&quot;&gt;www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/106215.htm&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104319.htm&quot;&gt;www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104319.htm&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/dec/97671.htm&quot;&gt;www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/dec/97671.htm&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote7_11k6w0k&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref7_11k6w0k&quot;&gt;7.&lt;/a&gt; The terminology ‘cessation of violence’ is used in this report as the generally accepted wording of the agreement by the UN.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/the_middle_east_quartet_a_progress_report#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/foreign_policy">Foreign Policy</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/international">International</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/gaza">Gaza</category>
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 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/oxfam">Oxfam</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 16:39:55 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>JamieSW</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6548 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Six Years In Guantanamo</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/six_years_in_guantanamo</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Sami al-Haj walks with pain on his steel crutch; almost six years in the nightmare of Guantanamo have taken their toll on the Al Jazeera journalist and, now in the safety of a hotel in the small Norwegian town of Lillehammer, he is a figure of both dignity and shame. The Americans told him they were sorry when they eventually freed him this year &amp;#8211; after the beatings he says he suffered, and the force-feeding, the humiliations and interrogations by British, American and Canadian intelligence officers &amp;#8211; and now he hopes one day he&amp;#8217;ll be able to walk without his stick.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The TV cameraman, 38, was never charged with any crime, nor was he put on trial; his testimony makes it clear that he was held in three prisons for six-and-a-half years &amp;#8211; repeatedly beaten and force-fed &amp;#8211; not because he was a suspected &amp;#8220;terrorist&amp;#8221; but because he refused to become an American spy. From the moment Sami al-Haj arrived at Guantanamo, flown there from the brutal US prison camp at Kandahar, his captors demanded that he work for them. The cruelty visited upon him &amp;#8211; constantly interrupted by American admissions of his innocence &amp;#8211; seemed designed to turnal-Haj into a US intelligence &amp;#8220;asset&amp;#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#8220;We know you are innocent, you are here by mistake,&amp;#8221; he says he was told in more than 200 interrogations. &amp;#8220;All they wanted was for me to be a spy for them. They said they would give me US citizenship, that my wife and child could live in America, that they would protect me. But I said: &amp;#8216;I will not do this &amp;#8211; first of all because I&amp;#8217;m a journalist and this is not my job and because I fear for myself and my family. In war, I can be wounded and I can die or survive. But if I work with you, al-Qa&amp;#8217;ida will eliminate me. And if I don&amp;#8217;t work with you, you will kill me&amp;#8217;.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The grotesque saga began for al-Haj on 15 December, 2001, when he was on his way from the Pakistani capital Islamabad to Kandahar in Afghanistan with Sadah al-Haq, a fellow correspondent from the Arab satellite TV channel, to cover the new regional government. At least 70 other journalists were on their way through the Pakistani border post at Chaman, but an officer stopped al-Haj. &amp;#8220;He told me there was a paper from the Pakistani intelligence service for my arrest. My name was misspelled, my passport number was incorrect, it said I was born in 1964 &amp;#8211; the right date is 1969. I said I had renewed my visa in Islamabad and asked why, if I was wanted, they had not arrested me there?&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sami al-Haj speaks slowly and with care, each detail of his suffering and of others&amp;#8217; suffering of equal importance to him. He still cannot believe that he is free, able to attend a conference in Norway, to return to his new job as news producer at Al Jazeera, to live once more with his Azeri wife Asma and their eight-year old son Mohamed; when Sami al-Haj disappeared down the black hole of America&amp;#8217;s secret prisons the boy was only 14 months&amp;#8217; old.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Al-Haj&amp;#8217;s story has a familiar ring to anyone who has investigated the rendition of prisoners from Pakistan to US bases in Afghanistan and Guantanamo. His aircraft flew for an hour and a half and then landed to collect more captives &amp;#8211; this may have been in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital &amp;#8211; before flying on to the big American base at Bagram.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#8220;We arrived in the early hours of the morning and they took the shackles off our feet and pushed us out of the plane. They hit me and pushed me down on the asphalt. We heard screams and dogs barking. I collapsed with my right leg under me, and I felt the ligaments tearing. When I fell, the soldiers started treading on me. First, they walked on my back, then &amp;#8211; when they saw me looking at my leg &amp;#8211; they started kicking my leg. One soldier shouted at me: &amp;#8216;Why did you come to fight Americans?&amp;#8217; I had a number &amp;#8211; I was No 35 and this is how they addressed me, as a number &amp;#8211; and the first American shouted at me: &amp;#8216;You filmed Bin Laden.&amp;#8217; I said I did not film Bin Laden but that I was a journalist. I again gave my name, my age, my nationality.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After 16 days at Bagram, another aircraft took him to the US base at Kandahar where on arrival the prisoners were again made to lie on the ground. &amp;#8220;We were cursed &amp;#8211; they said &amp;#8216;fuck your mother&amp;#8217; &amp;#8211; and again the Americans walked on our backs. Why? Why did they do this? I was taken to a tent and stripped and they pulled hairs out of my beard. They photographed the pupils of my eyes. A doctor found blood on my back and asked me why it was there. I asked him how he thought it was there?&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same dreary round of interrogations recommenced &amp;#8211; he was now &amp;#8220;Prisoner No 448&amp;#8221; &amp;#8211; and yet again, al-Haj says he was told he was being held by mistake. &amp;#8220;Then another man &amp;#8211; he was in civilian clothes and I think he was from Egyptian intelligence &amp;#8211; wanted to know who was the &amp;#8220;leader&amp;#8221; of the detainees who was with me. The Americans asked: &amp;#8216;Who is the most respected of the prisoners? Who killed [Ahmed Shah] Massoud ([the leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance Afghan militia]?&amp;#8217; I said this was not my business and an American soldier said: &amp;#8216;Co-operate with us, and you will be released.&amp;#8217; They meant I had to work for them. There was another man who spoke perfect English. I thought he was British. He was young, good-looking, about 35-years-old, no moustache, blond hair, very polite in a white shirt, no tie. He brought me chocolate &amp;#8211; it was Kit Kat—and I was so hungry I could have eaten the wrapping.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 13 June, al-Haj was put on board a jet aircraft. He was given yet another prison number &amp;#8211; No 345 &amp;#8211; and once more his head was covered with a black bag. He was forced to take two tablets before he was gagged and his bag replaced by goggles with the eye-pieces painted black. The flight to Guantanamo took 12 to 14 hours.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#8220;They took us on a boat from the Guantanamo runways to the prison, a journey that took an hour.&amp;#8221; Al-Haj was escorted to a medical clinic and then at once to another interrogation. &amp;#8220;They said they&amp;#8217;d compared my answers with my original statement and one of them said: &amp;#8216;You are here by mistake. You will be released. You will be the first to be released.&amp;#8217; They gave me a picture of my son, which had been taken from my wallet. They asked me if I needed anything. I asked for books. One said he had a copy of One Thousand and One Nights in Arabic. He copied it for me. During this interview, they asked me: &amp;#8216;Why did you talk to the British intelligence man so much in Kandahar?&amp;#8217; I said I didn&amp;#8217;t know if he was from British intelligence. They said he was.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#8220;Then after two months, two more British men came to see me. They said they were from UK intelligence. They wanted to know who I knew, who I&amp;#8217;d met. I said I couldn&amp;#8217;t help them.&amp;#8221; The Americans later referred to one of them as &amp;#8220;Martin&amp;#8221; and they did not impress al-Haj&amp;#8217;s senior interrogator at Guantanamo, Stephen Rodriguez, who wanted again to seek al-Haj&amp;#8217;s help. &amp;#8220;He said to me: &amp;#8216;Our job is to prevent &amp;#8220;things&amp;#8221; happening. I&amp;#8217;ll give you a chance to think about this. You can have US citizenship, your family will be looked after, you&amp;#8217;ll have a villa in the US, we&amp;#8217;ll look after your son&amp;#8217;s education, you&amp;#8217;ll have a bank account&amp;#8217;. He had brought with him some Arabic magazines and told me I could read them. In those 10 minutes, I felt I had gone back to being a human being again. Then soldiers came to take me back to my cell &amp;#8211; and the magazines were taken away.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;By the summer of 2003, al-Haj was receiving other strange visitors. &amp;#8220;Two Canadian intelligence officers came and they showed me lots of photos of people and wanted to know if I recognised them. I knew none of them.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In more than 200 interrogations, al-Haj was asked about his employers the Al Jazeera television channel in Qatar. In one session, he says another American said to him: &amp;#8220;After you get out of here, al-Qa&amp;#8217;ida will recruit you and we want to know who you meet. You could become an analyst, we can train you to store information, to sketch people. There is a link between Al Jazeera and al-Qa&amp;#8217;ida. How much does al-Qa&amp;#8217;ida pay Al Jazeera?&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#8220;I said: &amp;#8216;I will not do this &amp;#8211; first of all because I&amp;#8217;m a journalist and this is not my job. Also because I fear for my life and my family.&amp;#8217;&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Many beatings followed &amp;#8211; not from the interrogators but from other US guards. &amp;#8220;They would slam my head into the ground, cut off all my hair. They put me into the isolation block &amp;#8211; we called it the &amp;#8216;November Block&amp;#8217; &amp;#8211; for two years. They made my life torture. I wanted to bring it to an end. There were continual punishments without reason. In interrogations, they would tighten the shackles so it hurt. They hadn&amp;#8217;t allowed me to receive letters for 10 months &amp;#8211; even then, they erased words in them, even from my son. Again, Rodriguez demanded I work for the Americans.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In January of last year, Sami al-Haj started a hunger strike &amp;#8211; and began the worst months of his imprisonment. &amp;#8220;I wanted my rights in the civil courts. The US Supreme Court said I should have my rights. I wanted the right to worship properly. They let me go 30 days without food &amp;#8211; then I was tied to a chair with metal shackles and they force-fed me. They would insert a tube through my nose into my stomach. They chose large tubes so that it hurt and sometimes it went into the lung. They used the same tube they had used on other prisoners with muck still on it and then they pumped more food into me than it was possible to absorb. They told us the people administering this were doctors &amp;#8211; but they were torturers, not doctors. They forced 24 cans of food into us so we threw up and then gave us laxatives to defecate. My pancreas was affected and I had stomach problems. Then they would forbid us from drinking water.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Al-Haj says he completed 480 days of hunger strike by which time his medical condition had deteriorated and he was bleeding from his anus. That was the moment his interrogators decided to release him.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#8220;There were new interrogators now, but they tried once more with me. &amp;#8216;Will you work with us?&amp;#8217; they asked me again. I said &amp;#8216;no&amp;#8217; again &amp;#8211; but I thanked them for their years of hospitality and for giving me the chance to live among them as a journalist. I said this way I could get the truth to the outside world, that I was not in a hurry to get out because there were a lot more reporters&amp;#8217; stories in there.&amp;#8221; They said: &amp;#8216;You think we did you a favour?&amp;#8217; I said: &amp;#8216;You turned me from zero into a hero.&amp;#8217; They said: &amp;#8216;We are 100 per cent sure that Bin Laden will be in touch with you&amp;#8230;&amp;#8217; That night, I was taken to the plane. The interrogators were watching me, hiding behind a tennis net. I waved at them, those four pairs of eyes.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The British authorities have never admitted talking to Sami al-Haj. Nor have the Canadians. Al Jazeera, whose headquarters George Bush wanted to bomb after the invasion of Iraq, kept a job open for Sami al-Haj. But Prisoner No 345 never received an official apology from the Americans. He says he does not expect one.&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/six_years_in_guantanamo#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/international">International</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/torture_guantanamo_bay">torture. Guantanamo Bay</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/robert_fisk">Robert Fisk</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 10:17:06 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Tim Holmes</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6545 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Nato and Russia: Georgia on their minds</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/nato_and_russia_georgia_on_their_minds</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;The British media coverage of the war that erupted in the Caucasus last month almost universally portrayed a fragile little democracy terrorised by its big Russian neighbour. But a closer look at what happened reveals something different &amp;#8211; a frightening escalation of the &amp;#8220;war on terror&amp;#8221; that masks the US drive for markets, oil and influence around the globe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Georgian government led by Mikheil Saakashvili is one of George Bush&amp;#8217;s closest military allies and has aligned itself fully with US economic and political ambitions. The relationship is summed up by the chief Moscow correspondent of the &lt;em&gt;New York Times&lt;/em&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;#8220;The United States&amp;#8230; helped militarise the weak Georgian state. In his wooing of Washington as he came to power, Mr Saakashvili firmly embraced the missions of the US in Afghanistan and Iraq.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Saakashvili&amp;#8217;s rise, the paper says, &amp;#8220;coincided neatly with a swelling American need for political support and foreign soldiers in Iraq. His offer of troops was matched with a Pentagon effort to overhaul Georgia&amp;#8217;s forces from bottom to top. At senior levels, the US helped rewrite Georgian military doctrine and train its commanders and staff officers. At the squad level, American marines and soldiers trained Georgian soldiers in the fundamentals of battle.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Georgia began re-equipping its forces with Israeli and US firearms, reconnaissance drones, communications and battlefield-management equipment, convoys of vehicles and new ammunition. According to the respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Georgia has the fastest growing military in the world. Since the 2003 &amp;#8220;rose revolution&amp;#8221; that brought Saakashvili to power, Georgian defence spending has increased by over 40 times. The country had 2,000 troops in Iraq and had offered to send hundreds more to Afghanistan.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At home Saakashvili&amp;#8217;s free market reforms neglected the poor, while rampant fraud and corruption led to mass demonstrations last November, which were ruthlessly put down by the security forces. This was the background to a major US military exercise in Georgia on the eve of last month&amp;#8217;s fighting. Operation &amp;#8220;Immediate Response 2008&amp;#8221; involved 1,000 US military personnel and over 600 Georgian troops from 15 to 31 July. It was the first time that Georgia had hosted these annual war games, which are normally conducted in Poland and Bulgaria.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 1 August, just a day after the exercises ended, skirmishes erupted between Georgian forces and those from the breakaway region of South Ossetia, leaving several dead. It was the worst violence during long years of standoff in this conflict zone. The chronology of events makes a mockery of claims by US diplomats that they tried to calm the situation. The area was a tinderbox into which the US had poured guns, men and warcraft.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A week later, on the night of 7 August, the Georgian army stepped up the violence when it began an artillery assault on the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, backed up with ground troops the next day.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Larisa Sotieva, an Ossetian humanitarian worker, gave the following description of what happened to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, which is renowned for eyewitness reports from trained and trusted sources: &amp;#8220;A massed Georgian assault began on the town. For 14 hours we were fired on without pause by every conceivable type of heavy weaponry, supported by the Georgian air force. The city was fought over in hand to hand fighting and in a night of hellish metallic hail it turned into ruins.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The US-based organisation Human Rights Watch, which usually errs on the side of sympathy for the US and its allies, entered Tskhinvali on 13 August. Its researchers reported that they &amp;#8220;saw numerous apartment buildings and houses damaged by shelling. Some of them had been hit by rockets most likely fired from Grad launchers, weapons that should not be used in areas populated by civilians, as they cannot be directed at only military targets and are therefore inherently indiscriminate&amp;#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Human Rights Watch said it &amp;#8220;saw several buildings that bore traces of heavy ammunition as if fired from tanks at close range. There was some evidence of firing being directed into basements, locations which civilians frequently choose as a place of shelter.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The researchers interviewed 30 civilians about the fighting in the town. They concluded that &amp;#8220;witness accounts and the timing of the damage would point to Georgian fire accounting for much of the damage&amp;#8221;. The organisation recorded 44 dead and 273 wounded in Tskhinvali alone. At the time of writing Russia is claiming that at least 133 civilians died in South Ossetia during the fighting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Control&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So why did Georgian troops launch this bloody assault? What were they hoping to achieve? And why did Russia itself respond so brutally, shelling Georgian homes and setting paramilitaries loose on civilians?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a seismic shift in the balance of power between the US and Russia, the global tremors from which are still making themselves felt. With the Soviet regime gone and the Japanese economy in crisis, the US found itself the world&amp;#8217;s sole superpower.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It set about reaping the benefits. Through its control of major financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;IMF&lt;/span&gt;), the US prised open the weaker economies of the former Soviet bloc, securing dominant positions for its firms in these new markets. Countries such as Georgia took out massive loans from the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;IMF&lt;/span&gt;, in return it had to accept &amp;#8220;structural adjustment programmes&amp;#8221; which let the market rip.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the same time, the US sought to use fear of Russia to bind former Soviet bloc countries into a military alliance, further isolating its former Cold War adversary. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic became Nato members in 1999, while Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic states joined in 2004.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The US built up networks of non-governmental organisations backed by multibillionaires such as George Soros to strengthen Western influence among young, educated elites in these countries. When political crises broke out, organisations set up or co-opted by the US such as Otpor in Serbia, Kmara in Georgia and Pora in Ukraine helped to lead huge but largely passive opposition movements that brought pro-US politicians to power under the banner of democracy. With dizzying speed these regimes turned out to be just as greedy and corrupt as the ones they replaced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And finally, when some nations still held out against the West, the US looked for opportunities to wield its stupendous military arsenal to bring them into line. The first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein in 1991 was the earliest such campaign. The aerial bombardment of Serbian factories, bridges and television stations by Nato forces in 1999 was principally about Western dominance of the Balkans, rather than protecting Kosovans from Serb paramilitaries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The 9/11 attacks on New York presented the US with an opportunity to step up the military wing of its campaign in the name of fighting &amp;#8220;terror&amp;#8221;. The Afghanistan campaign allowed the US to establish military bases in oil-rich Central Asia, surrounding its new economic rival &amp;#8211; China &amp;#8211; and further hemming in Russia. The invasion of Iraq was part of a far broader plan to &amp;#8220;democratise&amp;#8221; the Middle East &amp;#8211; in other words, to apply the methods that had worked so well in Eastern Europe to the Arab states and Iran.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This strategy was the heart of the recent events in Georgia. Military cooperation between the US and Georgia was billed as the pursuit of Al Qaida in Georgia&amp;#8217;s Pankisi Gorge, on the border with Chechnya. Georgia was also a key access point to the oil and gas wealth of the Caspian and Central Asia, with two major pipelines running through its territory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But moving Georgia closer to Nato and integrating it with the US military machine inevitably meant stoking Georgia&amp;#8217;s own ambitions to wrest back control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia &amp;#8211; breakaway regions backed by Russia. Friction between the enclaves and Tbilisi had festered since the early 1990s.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In August these tensions exploded into a war that for the first time threatened to pit the US against another major power.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Russian troops poured into South Ossetia, ostensibly to protect civilians from the Georgian onslaught. But, like Nato&amp;#8217;s attack on Serbia nine years ago, the Kremlin had other goals. Russia is guilty of savage reprisals against Georgian civilians, while its clients in South Ossetia played a clear role in provoking an escalation of the conflict.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ever since the Soviet Empire was broken apart by mass movements in 1990-1, Russia&amp;#8217;s rulers have attempted to win back control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;North Ossetia &amp;#8211; the tiny Russian republic that borders on its linguistic partner to the south &amp;#8211; was the scene of one of the first such moves. In 1992 Russia chose to back the local regime in driving 70,000 ethnic Ingushis from their homes in the area near the capital, Vladikavkaz, that had been annexed from Ingushetia by Stalin in 1944. Russian &amp;#8220;peacekeepers&amp;#8221; stood by as Ossetian militias systematically torched Ingush homes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;North Ossetia was then turned into a military outpost for Russia in the Caucasus, with a quantity of arms per head of population that was the highest in the world. It was from its North Ossetian bases that Russia launched its first bloody invasion of Chechnya in December 1994.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Chechen resistance fought off the Russian troops who were demoralised and disorganised. But in 1999 the new president, Vladimir Putin, exploited a wave of nationalism in the wake of Nato&amp;#8217;s attack on Serbia to reinvade. This time the resistance was crushed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As Russia emerged from the slump of the early 1990s, soaring oil and gas prices gave Putin the means to rebuild the military. And Georgia, with its key strategic importance in terms of Caspian oil, was a primary target.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Last year Russia imposed an economic blockade and severed all transport and postal links with the republic. It deported hundreds of Georgian migrants and harassed Georgian businesses across the country, while the state-controlled media waged a racist anti-Georgian propaganda campaign.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For years Georgia had been accustomed to Russian weakness, but it became increasingly clear that the Kremlin was prepared to resort to force.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The rebel regime in South Ossetia was well aware of the potential for Russia to be drawn into a major firefight on its side. The enclave conducted its own military manoeuvres simultaneously with the US-Georgian ones in July. Within hours of the first casualties from skirmishes with Georgian troops on 1 August, South Ossetia had evacuated over 1,000 women and children, while hundreds of volunteers rushed from North Ossetia to take up arms. Within days 10,000 volunteers had been registered in Vladikavkaz to fight in Tskhinvali.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The authoritative Russian weekly Independent Military Review therefore concluded that the Georgian side responded to Ossetian provocations. However, in an interview with the Financial Times, Batu Kutelia, the deputy defence minister of Georgia &amp;#8211; sitting in his office in front of the flags of Georgia and Nato &amp;#8211; admitted that Georgia decided to seize the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali in the mistaken belief that Russia would not retaliate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In any case, Saakashvili backed the Georgian assault, and Russia seized the opportunity to stamp its authority on its former colony and thumb its nose at the West &amp;#8211; slaughtering countless Georgian civilians in the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Earthquake&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After a major earthquake, it is never certain whether new tremors are merely aftershocks or the warning signs of a new quake. The seismic geopolitical events surrounding the 9/11 attacks have scattered aftershocks across the world, but they are also fraught with new upheavals as the tectonic plates of the major powers continue to grind against each other.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Last month&amp;#8217;s conflict was a clash of imperialisms, represented on one side by a client state of the US. Had Georgia been a Nato member, however, there would have been a real possibility of war between two nuclear powers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The US &amp;#8220;war on terror&amp;#8221;, backed slavishly by the Labour government in Britain, is bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan just as an economic downturn is beginning to hit. US vulnerability in these circumstances means that the rulers of other states may feel emboldened to test the limits of US power, just as Russia has done.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What is certain is that ordinary people will pay the price. There is an urgent need to break the imperialist logic that pits countries against each other in the pursuit of power and profit. We too must test the limits of US power &amp;#8211; with our resistance to the system that breeds war. &lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/nato_and_russia_georgia_on_their_minds#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/europe">Europe</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/foreign_policy">Foreign Policy</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/international">International</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/terror/war">Terror/War</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/dave_crouch">Dave Crouch</category>
 <pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 10:32:59 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>JamieSW</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6529 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>US-EU Relations</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/useu_relations</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PRIMC:&lt;/strong&gt; What is the political relationship between the EU and the US? How does US influence show itself in domestic and foreign policy within the EU? Are there any areas of policy which exibit sharp breaks between US and EU policy?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CHOMSKY:&lt;/strong&gt; During World War II, the US laid plans for global hegemony, assigning each region of the world its »function« within the system that was designed. Europe of course was the region of greatest importance. The US (with British support) therefore devoted considerable effort to ensuring that Western Europe would be reconstructed in ways that conformed to US interests. That entailed such actions as undermining the anti-fascist resistance, restoring much of the traditional order including Fascist and Nazi collaborators, re-establishing the Mafia (and with it, the international narcotics industry), and much more. But there was also concern from the earliest days that Europe might pursue an independent path and become a »third force« &amp;#8212; perhaps something like De Gaulle&amp;#8217;s vision of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The US therefore always had an ambivalent attitude towards European unification. It offered US corporations enormous advantages because of their scale and depth, and it could be a supporter of US global designs. But on the other hand, it was potentially powerful enough to pursue an independent course.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;US attitudes towards the EU conform to these long-lasting concerns. They were made quite explicit in Donald Rumsfeld&amp;#8217;s distinction between »Old Europe« (bad) and »New Europe« (good) when the US was trying to drum up support for the Iraq war. The criterion distinguishing them was very clear: Old Europe consisted of the countries where the government took the position of the large majority of the population, and opposed the war. New Europe consisted of the countries where the government opposed even larger majorities of the population and followed orders from Washington. The leaders of New Europe were Italy&amp;#8217;s Berlusconi and Spain&amp;#8217;s Aznar, who was even invited to the Azores summit where Bush and Blair declared war. Aznar joined with the support of 2% of the population, and was therefore hailed as a leader in bringing democracy to the world.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All of this passed without comment, at the same time that Western intellectuals were lauding themselves for their profound dedication to Bush&amp;#8217;s democracy crusade. The events reveal,, once again, that there are few limits to conformism to power on the part of the educated classes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But there was more to the Old-New Europe distinction than that. Old Europe was the industrial and commercial heartland, and the center of potential European independence: Germany and France. The US wants to reduce their influence and increase its own. Therefore it has strongly favored admission into the EU of former Soviet satellites, which it assumes will be easily controlled, and will bring Europe into closer conformity to US global ambitions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;By and large, Europe has gone along with US demands, even while strongly disagreeing with Washington&amp;#8217;s positions. That has happened all over the world. It might not persist into the future, however.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PRIMC:&lt;/strong&gt; The foreign policies of the US and Slovenia seem to be very similar. Despite very large public oposition (only 3.6% supported military action at the time the troops were sent) Slovenian army is both in Afghanistan as well as Iraq, Slovenia supported the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state and yet does not support recognition of South Ossetia. What do you beleive is the reason for this similarity?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CHOMSKY:&lt;/strong&gt; That is for people who know about Slovenia to answer. And, in my opinion at least, to change, at least if Slovenians hope to live in an independent and democratic society.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PRIMC:&lt;/strong&gt; We hear pledges about promoting democracy, reducing poverty and fostering developement both from the EU and the US. Are these pledges genuine and how do they present themselves in foreign policy actions?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CHOMSKY:&lt;/strong&gt; Everyone speaks about these goals, even Stalin. Accordingly, they carry no information, even in the technical sense: they are the predictable oratory of leaders. In the case of the US, the matter has been carefully studied, right in the mainstream. The leading scholar/advocate of Democracy Promotion is Thomas Carothers, a highly respected figure, who describes himself as a neo-Reaganite. He has written several books on the topic, reaching right to the present. He concludes, ruefully, that US administrations support democracy if and only if that conforms to their strategic and economic objectives. Every president, he says, is oddly »schizophrenic« in that regard. In simple language, it is sheer fraud, like most pronouncements of noble intent on the part of the powerful.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On poverty and development, unfortunately, it is much the same, also a well-studied matter. I have not looked into scholarship on the EU with comparable care, but from what I know, I think the picture is much the same, with scattered exceptions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is interesting to compare policy with public attitudes. Take foreign aid. Americans consistently object that foreign aid is too high: we are giving away our hard-earned money to worthless foreigners. However, when asked what they think the right level should be, they consistently give a figure far higher than what it is. That suggests that people are quite decent, but have been victimized by incessant propaganda. I do not know of similar studies in Europe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PRIMC:&lt;/strong&gt; Why do you beleive &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;NATO&lt;/span&gt; keeps expanding given the fact that it was created to defend Europe against the Soviet Union which ofcourse does not exist anymore?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CHOMSKY:&lt;/strong&gt; The rational conclusion is that it was not created to defend Europe against the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;USSR&lt;/span&gt;, even though that might have been one purpose. Another rational conclusion, also supported by its earlier history, is that from the US perspective, a primary goal – maybe the primary goal – was to ensure that Europe would be subject to US control. There is no space to review the matter here, but there is ample documentary and historical evidence supporting such conclusions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PRIMC:&lt;/strong&gt; How do you perceive the recent conflict in Georgia? What are the global implications of it?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CHOMSKY:&lt;/strong&gt; Afraid I can&amp;#8217;t answer this briefly. I&amp;#8217;ll attach a &lt;a href=&quot;http://chomsky.info/articles/200809--2.htm&quot;&gt;current article&lt;/a&gt; about it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PRIMC:&lt;/strong&gt; What role did the US and EU play in the breakup of former Yugoslavia? Was it an engineered dissolution of a country or was it merely helped along and made sure to develop along the wishes of the »west«?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CHOMSKY:&lt;/strong&gt; Putting aside Slovenia, which is a special case, public opinion in Yugoslavia seemed to be in favor of maintaining the federation. The US at first took the same position. Under German initiative, the EU quickly recognized Croatia without taking into account the rights of the substantial Serb minority. That was a recipe for civil conflict, which soon ensued. As Yugoslavia fractured, the US entered in support of the Bosnian Muslims, mostly for great power reasons. Clinton convinced Izetgebovic to reject the Vance-Owen plan, thereby undermining the best hope for a peaceful settlement and laying the basis for vicious conflict, which ended with a settlement not very different from that plan, except that hopes for peaceful reconstruction are far more remote. A great deal of self-serving mythology has been concocted by Western intellectuals about all of this, impossible to unravel here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PRIMC:&lt;/strong&gt; It seems there is a trend in the world of countries reducing their social support networks which is very unpopular. It has been happening in Slovenia as well. We hear that this is necessary in order to foster economic developement and that we are forced to do this because of globalization. It seems though that some areas of the world seem to be developing quite well even though they are radically increasing social spending. What part does globalisation play in this process if any and is it really unavoidable?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CHOMSKY:&lt;/strong&gt; Many words of political discourse have two meanings: a literal meaning, and a doctrinal meaning that is used for political warfare. The term »globalization« is no exception.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In its literal meaning, »globalization« refers to international integration. Virtually everyone is in favor of globalization in this sense. Its most active and committed proponents are those who meet in the annual World Social Forum, and the associated regional and local social forums all over the world. They are called »anti-globalization,« which means that they oppose globalization in the doctrinal sense: a specific form of international economic integration designed by multinational corporations and the powerful states that cater to them, and of course designed in the interests of the designers. This form of »globalization« involves a mixture of liberalization and protectionism, and many measures that have little to do with trade in any meaningful sense, though the term »trade« is often introduced to allow them to fall under World Trade Organization rules. Naturally, this form of »globalization« and the neoliberal doctrines in which it is couched call for weakening social support systems while increasing the power of what has properly been called »the conservative nanny state« that serves the interests of concentrations of economic power. Perhaps some ideologues actually delude themselves into believing that this has to do with economic development. It doesn&amp;#8217;t. For most it is probably just a device to increase their power and influence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PRIMC:&lt;/strong&gt; Nonetheless of all the influence the US has exerted on the world, that influence seems to be declining globally, partly due to the weakening of the US economy and also due to loss of whatever moral luster it seemed to have in the past. Is this perception correct? Will the decline be reversed and if not is the american empire likely to go as quietly as the soviet empire did?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CHOMSKY:&lt;/strong&gt; The Bush administration, demonstrably, succeeded in greatly increasing dislike and fear of the United States throughout the world. Nevertheless, the US remains by far the most powerful state in the world, and has enormous advantages in just about every dimension. There is no reasonable comparison to the old Soviet Union. There is little reason to doubt that it will continue to be the major actor in the world scene for some time to come. There is much talk about the rising power of China and India, and their return to the position of global prominence they maintained before European colonization. But they have enormous internal problems. Merely to illustrate, in the UN Human Development Index China ranks 81 and India 128 (actually below its ranking before the partial neoliberal reforms). Europe could, as before, follow an independent path, but there seems to be little sign of that at present.&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/useu_relations#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/europe">Europe</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/foreign_policy">Foreign Policy</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/international">International</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/eu">EU</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/nato">nato</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/matic_primc">Matic Primc</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/noam_chomsky">Noam Chomsky</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 12:18:27 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Tim Holmes</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6512 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>The Art of Balance</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/the_art_of_balance</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;The long-established Middle East conflict polarises opinion. It is difficult to have a dispassionate viewpoint. Most people would like to see a reduction in tension leading to a peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. However, depending on their experiences individuals understand, and therefore prefer, one version of events which they believe to be more truthful and accurate. Journalists are not free from these forms of influence, and unsurprisingly, this polarisation is often reflected in the British media&amp;#8217;s coverage of Israel and its relationship with the Palestinians.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Israeli Ambassador, Ron Prosor, pointed out that Israeli affairs are more widely covered than most other countries with a similar population. There are complex reasons why this is so. Firstly, my PhD research indicated that the British media often reflects the interests of the US; in this context, Israel could be viewed as more newsworthy than countries that do not enjoy such a close relationship with America. Secondly, the media cannot be divorced from its commercial interests &amp;#8211; it operates in a competitive space, and media outlets publish what sells newspapers and broadcast items that attract audiences. This conflict is one such story.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another issue is location; the Middle East has more than its fair share of drama. Most news organisations have a considerable number of journalists posted to the region at any time, making it easier to follow interesting stories arising there. Associated with this is Israel&amp;#8217;s success in attracting media organisations to base their Middle East operations in Jerusalem. This was explained by a &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; executive, who stated: &amp;#8220;Israel is an easy place to work in journalistic terms; it is accessible.&amp;#8221; He compared this with the complex bureaucracy found in some Arab countries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Interestingly, Israel&amp;#8217;s pole position is being challenged by Dubai, which has recently put a great deal of effort into creating an attractive working environment for the international media as part of its own commercial development. My own opinion is that since developing its media hub, Dubai gets far wider coverage in the British media than neighbouring Emirates such as Sharjah and Abu Dhabi, and indeed, often more than other Arab states. If this trend continues, international coverage of Israeli matters could decline, but this may not suit Palestinian or Israeli interests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Israeli ambassador cited a recent study claiming that more newspaper commentaries give a negative view of Israel than a positive one. These statistics are only relevant if compared to other national and international coverage showing that Israel is the only country depicted in this manner, but that is unlikely. Bad news often takes precedence as it is seen as more interesting. Recent topics such as corruption scandals and the siege of Gaza have been widely and sometimes negatively reported in the Israeli media; it is not surprising to find these high-profile stories in Britain. News stories may be negative or reflect different versions of &amp;#8216;truth,&amp;#8217; but that does not in itself imply inaccuracy, nor breach of the Editors&amp;#8217; Code or Ofcom regulations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Many Israeli supporters claim that the British media ignores &amp;#8216;terror&amp;#8217; attacks on Israel citizens. All military attacks cause &amp;#8216;terror&amp;#8217; amongst local populations, but with no international definition of this word, it is meaningless terminology. From an alternative perspective, organisations that reflect Arab opinion believe there is more media emphasis on rocket attacks on Israel than on Israeli attacks on Palestinians. This has some credibility. For example, I read in the Israeli press that last year there were 92 Palestinian children killed by Israeli forces, but no Israeli child was killed by Palestinians during the same period. These tragic statistics were ignored by the British media. Downplaying Palestinian deaths is not a new trend. Research in 2006 found that more words were used to describe the kidnapping of one Israeli soldier than were used when reporting 20+ Palestinians killed by Israel, most of them civilians. For example, the &lt;em&gt;Daily Mail&lt;/em&gt; devoted 661 words for the kidnapping, and 167 to the deaths, and the &lt;em&gt;Guardian&lt;/em&gt; used 826 for the kidnapping, and 393 for the deaths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;My own research shows that when 15 Palestinian children were killed by Israelis during one month in 2002, 107 words were printed per child death. During this same period, seven Israeli children were killed by Palestinians, with an average of 1,070 words each. Israelis were described as innocent victims of hatred, whereas Palestinian children were frequently made to appear culpable for their own deaths; for example, a reporter might associate a death with stone-throwing. Reports often cited Israeli views of events but ignored Palestinian versions. Palestinian children were rarely named or personalised, whereas Israeli children often were.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Similar findings were made in an extensive study of &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ITV&lt;/span&gt; and &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; output by Glasgow University. As many people use TV as their main source of news, the study demonstrated that the lack of context, the style of language and the spokespersons used often confused audiences rather than informing them. Respondents in their audience studies did not understand fundamental issues such as refugees, military occupation and settlement building, but instead saw the conflict as a tit-for-tat border dispute.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; is particularly vulnerable to lobbying, as the public views it as more reliable than commercial broadcasters; the corporation claims &amp;#8220;accurate, robust and impartial journalism.&amp;#8221; The &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; commissioned an independent report from Loughborough University in 2005 to evaluate its coverage of the conflict; the findings correlated with the Glasgow study, describing coverage as incomplete and misleading. An important finding was that &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; reports did not show that one side is in control whilst the other side lives under occupation. They also described a disparity in favour of Israel that existed in talk time and media appearances. This was also confirmed by an extensive Arab Media Watch study of &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; news output, which showed similar disparities in terminology, talk time, historical context, and the tendency to play down Palestinian suffering. For example, after Israeli attacks resulting in many civilian deaths, there was one Palestinian attack on Jewish settlers and one suicide attack, but the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;BBC&lt;/span&gt; repeatedly described these as &amp;#8220;ending a period of relative calm.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The terminology and context issues particularly concern refugee issues. The Glasgow study found that only 8% of people knew that Palestinian refugees were displaced from their homes when Israel was formed. The media had an opportunity to debate this after the 2007 Arab Summit. Their peace initiative was re-launched, promising Israel full peace in return for withdrawing from occupied lands and finding a just settlement for refugees. This was not mentioned in tabloid newspapers, and although a dozen broadsheet editorials at the time referred to the Arab offer, none focused on the refugee issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The British broadcasting media are required to provide balanced coverage, but the press has no such restrictions and can provide a partisan view, hence there are likely to be articles that reflect opposing versions of &amp;#8216;truth.&amp;#8217; However, newspapers still have a duty to provide accurate information, but that does not stop them from omitting items that do not suit their editorial line. It is notable that there has been little comment on the siege of Gaza, which conforms to the legal definition of collective punishment of 1.5 million civilians. When the siege intensified at the beginning of February 2008, the only commentary in the &lt;em&gt;Times&lt;/em&gt; was entitled &amp;#8220;A barrage against Israel,&amp;#8221; and the siege was blamed on the Palestinians. It went on; &amp;#8220;…the frenzied, rhetorical onslaught of the Jewish state is at best intellectually lazy…&amp;#8221; However, there was little sign of this onslaught; out of 10 daily newspapers, only the &lt;em&gt;Telegraph&lt;/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;Independent&lt;/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;Financial Times&lt;/em&gt; and &lt;em&gt;Guardian&lt;/em&gt; each published one leader, and in addition there were only nine commentaries, five of them in the &lt;em&gt;Independent&lt;/em&gt;. Only the &lt;em&gt;Independent&lt;/em&gt; reacted directly to Israel&amp;#8217;s intensification of the siege, whilst the others reacted to the breach in the Gaza-Egypt border.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;AMW&lt;/span&gt; terminology study in March 2008 compared the newsprint coverage of 120 Palestinians killed by Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip, and eight Israelis killed by a Palestinian in Jerusalem days later, noting the selection of words used to describe the incidents. Five journalists balanced their choice of descriptive words in each tragedy, whereas nine others used terms such as &amp;#8220;massacre&amp;#8221;, &amp;#8220;bloodbath&amp;#8221; and &amp;#8220;slaughter&amp;#8221; when describing the Palestinian attack, but used sanitised terms such as &amp;#8220;offensive&amp;#8221;, &amp;#8220;incursion&amp;#8221; and &amp;#8220;strikes&amp;#8221; to describe the Israeli attacks. When asked to explain his use of terminology, one journalist stated that he avoided the use of inflammatory words, but his copy had been changed by his editorial team without his knowledge or permission.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The British media has a responsibility in its reporting of the conflict, as inciting hatred of either Israelis or Palestinians, or hiding the historical obstacles that need to be understood and overcome, can only prolong suffering. In order to guide the media, there should be more empirical research that covers issues such as historical context, story selection, terminology, types of discourses followed, spokespersons used, accessibility and prominence. Independent academic studies so far have shown that the British media tends to follow discourses that do not create understanding of the Palestinian case. There are many complex reasons why this occurs, but in itself this can foster anti-Israeli sentiment, as a largely one-sided perspective can mislead some audiences into thinking that Israel controls everything, and hence creates an environment in which radicalism can grow. That worries many people &amp;#8211; including most Palestinians.&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/the_art_of_balance#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/international">International</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/media">Media</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/israel_palestine">Israel-Palestine</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/taxonomy/term/3205">Judith Brown</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 02 Sep 2008 14:31:03 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Tim Holmes</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6403 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Sierra Leone and the &#039;Humanitarian Intervention&#039;</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/node/6336</link>
 <description>&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Today conflicts rarely stay within national boundaries. Today a tremor in one financial market is repeated in the markets of the world. Today confidence is global; either its presence or its absence”. (Tony Blair, Labour Party Conference 2001)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The prospects for world peace have always been somewhat grim, but the advent of corporate globalization has provided those intent on using violence to secure their interests with an extra source of justification. Through the markets, ‘their’ interests become ‘our’ interests – a threat to the economic growth of a country thousands of miles away has suddenly become our problem (presuming, that is, that we have strategic interests there). In short, wherever a ‘threat’ to unbridled capitalism is perceived, taking action against it can now be justified using the rhetoric of market stability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a speech to his Sedgefield constituency in 2004, Blair justified the British military intervention in Sierra Leone (and the bombing of Kosovo) along the same lines: ‘In an increasingly inter-dependent world, our self-interest was allied to the interests of others.’ Indeed it was. What Blair failed to mention, however, was that, as in Iraq, ‘our self interest’ does not refer to the interests of the people of Britain. The people of Britain were never directly threatened by the conflict in Sierra Leone, just as they were never directly threatened by the situation in Iraq. What were directly threatened, however, were the interests of a handful of corporations and their allies in government, and, as in Iraq, it was to protect these interests that a military operation into Sierra Leone was launched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Background to the British Intervention&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The conflict in Sierra Leone was ostensibly a fight for control of the country’s extensive mineral wealth. The ‘rebel’ force who invaded the country in 1991 were originally a group of well-educated university students opposing the imperial and corporate plunder of their country. Radicalised and eventually militarised by Liberia’s Charles Taylor, they quickly realised that the only way to finance their operations was through control of the diamond mines. The violence which ensued disrupted mining production all across the country; much of the fighting was between the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;RUF&lt;/span&gt; and private military companies closely linked with the foreign mining firms. The Sierra Leonean government was mostly dependent for its security on a South African mercenary outfit, Executive Outcomes, who won back mining areas from &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;RUF&lt;/span&gt; control in return for mining concessions awarded to a closely linked mining company Branch Energy, (in which the government had a 30% stake).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Five years into the conflict the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;RUF&lt;/span&gt; had sustained heavy losses. Eager to get business moving again, the US and the UK swiftly started peace negotiations and exerted heavy pressure for elections, a process over which they had almost complete control. The candidate who won the election, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former UN diplomat, was the candidate backed by Britain and the US. Unsurprisingly, his mandate was governed by the needs of multinationals with interests and investments in Sierra Leone – in a desperately poor and unstable country, one of the first pieces of legislation he passed was the deregulation of petroleum products, which benefited rich industry but resulted in a 20% fuel price hike for the rest of the population. His control over the country was weak, however, and in May 1997 he was deposed by one of his soldiers, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, whose focus was on regaining control of the mining areas.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This move considerably upset Britain and the US, and multinationals operating in Sierra Leone. A number of mining companies, and mercenary outfits with links to mining companies, stepped up and offered to finance Kabbah’s re-institution, in return for mining concessions. They included Chief Executive of American Mineral Fields (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;AMF&lt;/span&gt;) Jean-Raymond Boulle, whose company had played a key role in financing the successful rebellion against Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaïre earlier in 1997. &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;AMF&lt;/span&gt; has a majority stake in Nord Resources, a major mining house in Sierra Leone. Among the companies offering security services to Kabbah were Defence Systems Limited and Sandline, both based in London and with strong links to the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With full knowledge of the Foreign Office, in December 1997 the British High Commissioner for Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, arranged a meeting between Kabbah and Sandline International, a mercenary company whose chairman, Tim Spicer, is a major shareholder in DiamondWorks. The plan was for Sandline to supply arms to Kabbah (despite a UN arms embargo), and to provide his brutal militia, the Kamajors, with the military equipment and personnel necessary to restore Kabbah to power. In return Spicer expected mining concessions for DiamondWorks. In the event, the dispatch of arms came to the attention of British Customs and Excise, and Sandline was investigated, causing considerable embarrassment for the Foreign Office and Robin Cook’s ‘Ethical Foreign Policy’.Koroma was eventually brought down in February 1998 by Nigerian troops, under the auspices of the West African peacekeeping force &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ECOMOG&lt;/span&gt;, with the US and Britain operating behind the scenes, and Sandline providing invaluable personnel, logistical support and equipment. Kabbah was re-instated.&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/node/6336#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/international">International</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/jessica_pasteiner">Jessica Pasteiner</category>
 <pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Ellie Keen</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6336 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>EU-Latin America Trade Negotiations</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/node/6315</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Since 1993, representatives from the member countries of the Andean Community of Nations (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt;) and the European Union (EU) have met periodically to strengthen their commercial and political ties. From the European side, the eventual goal of these meetings was to allow for the Andean countries to find an alternative development model to the one proposed by Washington. This would allow for the EU to assist in creating development programmes and offer the Andean nations opportunities for economic integration with the European body. As part of this assistance, the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; and the EU would negotiate a treaty to enhance their political dialogue and cooperation. Though negotiations have been stalled for quite some time, the potential Association Agreement resulting from the meetings would include pursuing common political and economic goals, such as a free trade agreement (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTA&lt;/span&gt;) between the two blocs and for further support for development within the Andean region.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Analysing the Association Agreement&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;European politicians would like their Latin American counterparts to believe that the above are the goals of the Agreement. In reality, the actions of EU leaders do not begin to address the complex political-economic situation found within the Andean region. Furthermore, it would be naïve to underestimate the possibility of special interests pressuring Andean politicians to sign an &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTA&lt;/span&gt; and equally as far-fetched to assume that Europe intends to help the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; out of pure altruism. The proposed &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTA&lt;/span&gt; is based on previous agreements negotiated by Peru and Colombia (the latter ones, yet to be ratified) with the U.S. and must be closely scrutinized in order to ensure that it is both efficient and rejection proof.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What is the EU&amp;#8217;s real interest?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The growing commodities crisis is transforming Latin America into a crucial region because of its abundant natural resources. Therefore, Europe developed a heightened interest in improving its commercial relations with the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt;. Other countries, such as the U.S., have already been doing so for some time. It is not a coincidence that both the EU and the U.S. started negotiating with the Andean countries in 1993, and that they compete in similar export markets such as machinery and other capital goods, in addition to both importing huge amounts of raw resources from the region. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTAA&lt;/span&gt;) was the U.S. attempt at pulling the region into its sphere of influence, though it utterly failed at this due to tough-minded opposition from populist and anti-imperialist presidents in South America. With the Western powers displaying a sobering interest in trading with South America, it became clear that it would be beneficial for the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; to pursue an Association Agreement with the EU.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Taking into consideration that the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; already is under the jurisdiction of the Generalised System of Preferences (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GSP&lt;/span&gt;), and that the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GSP&lt;/span&gt; allows the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; to export to the EU under a relatively low tariff regime without having to lower its import tariffs, the intrinsic importance of a new &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTA&lt;/span&gt; to the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; could easily be overestimated. The &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; wants the bargaining process to start with the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GSP&lt;/span&gt; as a reference point, but the EU demands that negotiations must start from scratch. If talks fail, the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GSP&lt;/span&gt; will be able to ensure that Andean imports still have some commercial preferences in entering the EU market. Again, in order for any potential &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTA&lt;/span&gt; to be acceptable to the Andean trade association, it must be considered just as beneficial to its commercial interests as the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GSP&lt;/span&gt; is today.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Furthermore, while the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTA&lt;/span&gt; is supposed to include mechanisms that protect its members against artificially low-priced imports, such as subsidized agricultural goods, it is evident from the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;NAFTA&lt;/span&gt; experience that, in practice, these mechanisms usually are insufficient. An &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTA&lt;/span&gt;, in comparison to the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GSP&lt;/span&gt;, may be less advantageous for the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; if subsidized agricultural goods end up potentially bankrupting many more already impoverished Andean farmers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are even more reasons to be sceptical of an Association Agreement. Despite a pledge at the Lima summit by EU leaders to protect human rights and the right of migration, a July 18th &amp;#8220;return directive&amp;#8221; calls the EU&amp;#8217;s motivations into question. The return directive standardizes procedures for dealing with illegal immigrants hoping to migrate to a European Union country, of which an estimated three million have come from Latin America. While Europeans argue that they favour legal migration and a strong human rights code, Latin American leaders are concerned over the treatment of illegal immigrants in the region. For example, under the new EU directive, minors can be detained and extradited to their home countries without their parents, cruelly separating families. In defence of the law, Francesca Mosca, the ambassador of the EU to Panama, said that the law seeks to unite families and establishes the voluntary return of illegal immigrants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Reactions to a Shameful Law&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In response to the EU&amp;#8217;s approval of its directive, President Evo Morales of Bolivia dispatched a letter to European leaders, reminding them of the pledge to protect human rights made at the Lima summit. He stressed that the Americas have always welcomed poor European immigrants to their member countries and that it would be impossible to continue trade negotiations if the EU did not modify its new regulations. Morales threatened to require visas for Europeans desiring to enter Bolivia, following the diplomatic principle of reciprocity. The other Andean presidents have joined Morales in condemning the new EU directive. A total of nine Latin American presidents have expressed their disapproval for the directive to date. Bolivia and Venezuela have gone so far as to threaten cutting off oil and natural gas supplies to Europe, while Ecuador has announced the suspension of the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;EU-ACN&lt;/span&gt; negotiation because of the immigration issue. In addition, the Organization of American States (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;OAS&lt;/span&gt;) has organized a multinational commission to discuss the issue with European delegates. Colombia and Peru have not abandoned trade negotiations altogether, but in order to successfully influence European politicians to create a more humanitarian law, all Latin American nations must unite.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The already slow trade negotiations have now stalled completely, arguably for good reason. If the EU cannot fulfil its pledge on immigration, the Andean countries have some logic on their side to be suspicious of EU intentions regarding other outstanding issues, including free trade. Will the Association Agreement include some sort of protection against subsidized European farm goods? Will the new trade deal be more beneficial for the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; than the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GSP&lt;/span&gt; has been? Most importantly, is European influence preferable to U.S. influence? Or will it be less benign? Andean leaders are likely to be asking themselves at least some of these very questions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Divide and conquer, the U.S. strategy&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The U.S. seems to be fully aware of the EU&amp;#8217;s competition for political and economic influence in South America. For this reason, when the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTAA&lt;/span&gt; failed, Washington threw itself into pursuing individual bilateral agreements, a strategy that worked in Peru and may yet be successful in Colombia. Thus far, the U.S. has a negative trade balance with both of these countries, and signing the FTAs will probably serve to only increase the U.S. trade deficit. Such sacrifice can only be explained by the belief that a larger long-term benefit, such as the securing of Andean natural resources, would be in the offering.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;By signing individual FTAs, the U.S. has been able to slow the negotiation process between the EU and the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt;. These FTAs have divided the members of the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt;. Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia have lower import tariffs among themselves in order to promote commercial integration. If the U.S. implements an &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTA&lt;/span&gt; with one of these countries, subsidized imports from the U.S. may be resold to any of the other three using the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTA&lt;/span&gt; signer as a middle man. The result is that cheaper, subsidized American products compete unfairly against poor farmers from the entire &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; bloc. To prevent this, tariffs between &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; members would need to be raised, effectively defeating the purpose of forming the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; to begin with.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Individual FTAs have contributed substantially to the undermining of the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt;. Venezuela left the pact in part because it disagreed with Peru and Colombia&amp;#8217;s FTAs with the U.S. The former two have also attempted to sign trade agreements with the EU before Ecuador and Bolivia, which could further accelerate the disintegration of the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt;. The inability of the Andean group to establish a common foreign trade policy has led to the failure of the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;EU-ACN&lt;/span&gt; negotiations, which were postponed by the EU on June 30th. It remains unclear whether the application of U.S. influence was intentional or not, but the recent mobilization of the Fourth Fleet in regional waters is undeniable proof that Latin America is once again on the minds of U.S. policymakers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;South American Economic Alternatives&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given the clear geopolitical and economic interests that both the U.S. and EU have in the Andean region, the reaction of area left-leaning governments, like that of Chavez&amp;#8217;s, is not surprising. The creation of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ALBA&lt;/span&gt;), an alternative to the American &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;FTAA&lt;/span&gt;, was based on a mutual regional cooperation formula instead of neoliberal trade procedures. Up to this point, it has been signed by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Bolivia and Dominica. &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ALBA&lt;/span&gt; member countries do not have to fear for the livelihood of their impoverished farmers since they can still use tariff barriers to protect themselves from artificially inexpensive agricultural products coming from the subsidized farms of Europe or the U.S. Though the potential trade among member countries is quite limited in comparison to trade with the Western powers, &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ALBA&lt;/span&gt; brings on a commitment to economic modernization. For example, Cuba sent doctors and teachers to aid Venezuela in exchange for favourable oil prices, marrying social justice to hardcore economics. &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ALBA&lt;/span&gt; may represent what other regional economic agreements are failing to do: trade designed to benefit the poor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While Venezuela leads &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ALBA&lt;/span&gt;, the Union of South American Nations (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt;) has strong ties to Brazil. In years to come, &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt; may represent a significantly greater potential for South American interests in terms of economic trade, defence and political influence than &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ALBA&lt;/span&gt;. The &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GDP&lt;/span&gt; and population of &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ALBA&lt;/span&gt; nations is only one-eighth that of &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt;. Founded in May of 2008, &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt; seeks to eventually unite the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; and Mercosur in an effort to create a single free market for South America and to promote further integration among member countries. &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt; may be able to project increased negotiation power and an obvious ability to stand up for Latin America when it comes to formulating free trade agreements. However, different national interests may cause conflicts and delay the whole-hearted implementation of &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt;. In any case, Brazil could use the treaty as a wedge to expand its growing influence in the region.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Whatever their motives, these countries have the theoretical opportunity to improve their socio-economic situation through &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt; membership. With the full participation of all South American countries, the combined &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GDP&lt;/span&gt; of &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt; would be approximately $2 trillion, making it one of the largest markets in the world and irresistibly attractive for investors. Infrastructure projects connecting the different countries would greatly benefit their local economies, whose competitiveness and size are limited because the market for their products is relatively small. Also, new trade routes are likely to open, creating additional opportunities and helping to solve local supply problems. An example of such integration is the Transatlantic Highway between Brazil and Peru, currently under construction. The free movement of people will allow for greater flexibility in accessing the membership&amp;#8217;s labour market, while the full advent of the South American Defence Council might render &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt; as an international power once it is fully implemented. However, international disputes like the conflict between Peru and Chile over Pacific ocean borders and fishing rights may slow a much-needed integration process. Despite the favourable economic conditions that much of South America enjoys, it seems likely that &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt; could remain a distant dream due to ideological differences and the sometime conflicting interests of its member nations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Other concerns over free trade&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to neoliberal economic theory, liberalization of trade should benefit Latin American economies through increasing competitiveness and foreign investment. Two instances that nurture this idea are the experiences of the Asian Tigers and Chile. It must be noted that when the Asian economies started implementing neoliberal policies, they did not suffer the degree of inequality found in &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; economies today. In the case of Chile, neoliberal policies in the 1973 &amp;#8211; 1986 period, under the Pinochet dictatorship, did not bring substantial per capita &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GDP&lt;/span&gt; growth rates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although in the long term Chilean neoliberal economics brought sustained &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GDP&lt;/span&gt; growth, the stringent controls affecting structural adjustment process led to repeated human rights violations under the Pinochet regime. It is questionable whether neoliberal policies can be implemented in &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; democracies, given the possibility that the adjustment process involved will result in popular dissatisfaction with the government. This in turn may lead to the election of populist leaders pledged to reverse neoliberal policies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Discrimination lessens the benefits to certain sectors of society, especially the indigenous and those of African descent. Will free markets be plausible in countries like Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia, where these often have excluded groups that represent sizeable segments of the population? It remains to be seen if the Andean countries will be able to meet the conditions for free trade to succeed, and it will be interesting to compare the future economic stability of Colombia and Peru with that of their neighbours Ecuador and Bolivia.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Whether or not the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN-EU&lt;/span&gt; trade agreement is signed, it can be comprehended that the Andean countries are each following disparate trends, from trade liberalization to statism, which has led the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;ACN&lt;/span&gt; into disarray. One school of thought believes that if some of these countries insist on pursuing conflicting interests, they will never be able to establish the unity that would give the group the leverage needed to achieve more favourable deals, like the final form of the Association Agreement proposed by the EU. If properly bargained, this agreement would be more beneficial than previous accords such as the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;GSP&lt;/span&gt;. While the lack of unity has slowed the creation of &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;UNASUR&lt;/span&gt;, it also has prevented the possibility for an unfair negotiation that would further impoverish the already neglected farmers of the Andes. Either way, no sign of major change is likely to be seen in the near future in Latin America if increased cooperation is not promoted between the Western and Eastern hemispheres.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;This analysis was prepared by &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.coha.org/&quot;&gt;COHA&lt;/a&gt;. Guillermo Cornejo is a Research Associate of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/node/6315#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/business/economy">Business/Economy</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/europe">Europe</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/international">International</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/latin_america">Latin America</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/taxonomy/term/3185">Guillermo Cornejo</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 21:55:57 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Tim Holmes</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6315 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Trained in Terror</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/node/6313</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Phyllis Kipteo still does not know why Kenyan paratroopers dragged her husband from their home in the middle of the night four months ago. The following morning she went to the military camp at Chepkube in Kenya&amp;#8217;s Mount Elgon district close to the border with Uganda, but the soldiers there could tell her nothing. She last saw him through the barbed wire fence of the camp; he was naked, bruised and couldn&amp;#8217;t walk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Her story might sound an ordinary tale of military brutality except that the soldiers who tortured her husband and may have killed him are the first graduates of a new British counter-terrorism training programme for foreign forces.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#8220;Operation Monogram&amp;#8221; provides counter-terrorism training and equipment to foreign security forces in parts of the world the British government believes are hotbeds of violent extremism that could threaten the UK. Kenya is one of the first beneficiaries of the programme because it shares a border with war-torn Somalia and because of its own experience of terrorist attacks, in particular the US embassy bombing in 1998.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Among its graduates are 20 Para, a parachute regiment in the Kenyan army. But rather than being deployed along the Somali border, units from 20 Para were sent into the district of Mount Elgon, Kenya&amp;#8217;s second highest peak on the border with Uganda. Mount Elgon is a national park and protected forest where a little-known insurgent group, the Sabaot land defence force (&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;SLDF&lt;/span&gt;), has terrorised the population and claimed the lives of at least 600 people since 2006.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Kenyan approach to counter-insurgency in Mount Elgon district was strikingly reminiscent of the British in their brutal suppression of the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s. Soldiers went from village to village rounding up nearly all of the male population of the district and taking them to military camps for &amp;#8220;screening&amp;#8221;. On the way and upon arrival in the camps the men were beaten severely; some died. Then the survivors were forced to line up and bite the back of the man in front of them. Informers in a Land Rover with blacked-out windows decided who was a member of the militia and those deemed innocent were then set free.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Human Rights Watch interviewed dozens of victims of the military screening who complained of problems breathing, urinating, walking, and sleeping after severe beatings. Prison officials say they treated dozens for severe injuries who were delivered to the jail after being detained in the military camp. Some 800 suspects were remanded in jail and between March and May 4,000 were screened in total.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After an outcry, mass detentions are no longer the strategy of the Kenyan military and the authorities say an internal investigation is under way into the allegations of abuse. However, spokesmen simultaneously deny that their forces are capable of torture.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initially the British military appeared to accept the assurances from the Kenyans. Britain has important strategic interests in Kenya. Besides being an important ally in counter-terrorism Kenya is the hub for a UK programme to train African forces for peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the UK uses Kenyan territory for training British infantry in jungle and desert warfare.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This week, however, Human Rights Watch provided hard evidence suggesting that the Kenyan assurances given to the British are worthless. An off-duty prison guard who was on leave in Mount Elgon said he was arrested by a group from 20 Para and beaten to within an inch of his life, apparently because it suspected his brother of involvement with the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;SLDF&lt;/span&gt;. He identified the unit and the officers who beat him. They later apologised.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Presented with the facts, prominently reported on Channel 4 News on Monday, the UK government has now threatened to suspended military training of Kenyan forces and has encouraged the Kenyan authorities get to the bottom of the abuses in Mount Elgon.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the right thing to do. But rather than waiting for human rights organisations like Human Rights Watch to point out the shortcomings of its counter-terrorism collaboration with African and Middle Eastern security forces, the British government should be working proactively to ensure that these security forces act according to the law. The US, which is involved in the same places for the same reasons, should follow suit.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another recipient of UK and US assistance and diplomatic support is Ethiopia, whose security forces have committed war crimes and serious human rights abuses in the course of their counter-insurgency operations in Somalia and in the Ogaden in eastern Ethiopia. Both London and Washington have failed to speak out against those abuses let alone reviewed their assistance to Addis Ababa.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Back in Mount Elgon district, Phyllis has filed a habeas corpus case against the Kenyan government. She wants to know what happened to her husband – and so do the families of other &amp;#8220;disappeared&amp;#8221; – but many cannot afford lawyers. More than 40 people are still missing, last seen by their relatives being bundled into military trucks in the early hours. &amp;#8220;This is how counter-insurgency is done,&amp;#8221; senior police and military officials told me. If this is how it is done in Kenya, or any other front in the fight against terrorism, then Britain should have no part in it.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Ben Rawlence is Kenya researcher for Human Rights Watch &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/node/6313#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/international">International</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/terror/war">Terror/War</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/kenya">Kenya</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/military">military</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/war_on_terror">war on terror</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/taxonomy/term/3183">Ben Rawlence</category>
 <pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Ellie Keen</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6313 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Supporting occupation - Gordon Brown in Israel</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/supporting_occupation_gordon_brown_in_israel</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Whoever scheduled &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/21/israelandthepalestinians.iran1&quot;&gt;Gordon Brown’s recent visit to Israel&lt;/a&gt; is surely out of a job. Brown’s dreary, etiolated performance – appropriate for a &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ukwatch.net/article/stick_a_fork_in_him&quot;&gt;political corpse&lt;/a&gt; – was rendered even flatter by its proximity to Barack Obama’s headline-hogging whirlwind &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/us_elections/article4354045.ece&quot;&gt;tour&lt;/a&gt; of Europe and the Middle East. Despite the differences in style, however, both politicians took to the podium in Israel with a similar message: one of support for the latter’s rejectionist expansionism.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The political background to Brown’s trip was almost without exception one of misery and despair. The Israeli government, despite its flowery rhetoric, has continued to pursue long-held policies designed to fragment the West Bank and prevent the emergence of anything resembling a coherent Palestinian state. The West Bank today consists of a series of isolated cantons, surrounded on all sides by Israeli infrastructure and security forces, between which movement and economic activity is extremely difficult. The UN last year estimated that Israeli military and settlement infrastructure together make nearly 40% of the West Bank inaccessible to Palestinians. Freedom of movement is drastically curtailed through a vast network of checkpoints, roadblocks and Israeli-only roads that serve, to quote &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L08675346.htm&quot;&gt;the World Bank&lt;/a&gt;, “to expand and protect settlement activity and the relatively unhindered movement of settlers and other Israelis in and out of the West Bank”&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref1_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn1_7999&quot;&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; The humanitarian, social and economic consequences of this &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/TheHumanitarianImpactOfIsraeliInfrastructureTheWestBank_full.pdf&quot;&gt;enforced cantonisation&lt;/a&gt; (.pdf), “intimately linked to maintaining settler access and … quality of life”, are “profound” – indeed, it is “at the root of the West Bank’s declining economy.” Unemployment in the West Bank between July and December 2007 &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1006282.html&quot;&gt;reached 25%&lt;/a&gt;, double the average regional rate. Overall, levels of employment in the occupied territories were &amp;#8220;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=79430&quot;&gt;amongst the highest in the world&lt;/a&gt;&amp;#8220;, with refugees being hit even harder. The Palestinians &amp;#8220;continued to have the worst performing economy in the Middle East-North Africa sub-region&amp;#8221; – a state of affairs that, as discussed below, has been engineered deliberately by Israel and its international backers, including Britain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gaza, meanwhile, is undergoing a humanitarian crisis of “&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_18301.pdf&quot;&gt;unprecedented&lt;/a&gt;” (.pdf) proportions. The Gazan economy has “collapsed”, its population intentionally reduced to a state of “abject destitution” through sustained economic and military siege. Although the Israeli blockade has &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=79399&quot;&gt;eased&lt;/a&gt; somewhat since the ceasefire agreement with Hamas, conditions in Gaza remain &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Weekly_Briefing_Notes_269_New.pdf&quot;&gt;grim&lt;/a&gt; (.pdf). &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1006282.html&quot;&gt;45% of the population is unemployed&lt;/a&gt;, 95% of factories have shut down and entire industries have been &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.paltrade.org/cms/images/enpublications/Gaza-Trade-Terminals%20_2007-Annual_Report-%20EnglishVersion.pdf&quot;&gt;decimated&lt;/a&gt; (.pdf). Over half of Gazan households now subsist below the poverty line, while 35% of Gazans are surviving below the ‘deep poverty’ line of $457 a month for a family of six.&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref2_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn2_7999&quot;&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; In December 2007 the World Bank &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/881324.html&quot;&gt;warned&lt;/a&gt; of an “irreversible” economic collapse in Gaza, outlining a worst-case scenario of 44% unemployment – a scenario that, as noted, has already been exceeded. &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given the gravity of this situation, one might have expected Gordon Brown to confront the Israeli government with some harsh truths. If he did so, he certainly didn’t do it in public. His “historic” &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0807/S00632.htm&quot;&gt;speech&lt;/a&gt; before the Knesset made no mention of the occupation, or indeed of Palestinian suffering at all. Instead Brown produced an unqualified paean to Israel’s magnificence, lauding it as the very embodiment of “democracy”, “liberty”, “justice”, “idealism”, “bravery” and “perseverance”. At times he reached for New-Age mysticism in the struggle to fully evoke his passion for the Israeli state, babbling to a no-doubt baffled Knesset of “liberty&amp;#8217;s torch”, “justice’s mighty stream” and “tolerance&amp;#8217;s foundation of equality”, before proceeding to outline a vast “conflict of ideas” in which Britain and Israel “stand together” on “the side of openness”. Brown referred to “the achievement of 1948: the centuries of exile ended”, failing to mention that the same year saw the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who, along with their descendants, continue to live in exile today. He spoke of “the age-long dream realised, the ancient promise redeemed &amp;#8211; the promise that even amidst suffering, you will find your way home to the fields and shorelines where your ancestors walked”, apparently unaware of same yearning possessed by Palestinians living in squalid refugee camps just a few hours away.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Brown pledged to Israel Britain’s “true friend[ship]”, the two states sharing “an unbreakable partnership based on shared values of liberty, democracy and justice”. Leaving aside the absurdity of attributing these “values” to either the British or Israeli state, it is unclear who exactly Brown was speaking for. Surely not the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/325.php?nid=&amp;amp;id=&amp;amp;pnt=325&amp;amp;lb=hmpg1&quot;&gt;65% of Britons&lt;/a&gt; who view Israel’s influence in the world as “mainly negative”, or the 79% who want the UK to &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/503.php?nid=&amp;amp;id=&amp;amp;pnt=503&amp;amp;lb=&quot;&gt;avoid taking sides&lt;/a&gt; in the conflict. Whereas Brown has &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page15457.asp&quot;&gt;praised&lt;/a&gt; Israel for bearing “burdens for peace in every generation”, 57% of the British public think that Israel is failing to do its part to resolve the conflict, thereby placing Britain’s population – though not its leadership – in line with world public opinion, the UN, the International Court of Justice and numerous independent, respected human rights organisations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Virtually the only allusion Brown made throughout his whole trip to the horrific injustices being inflicted on the Palestinians was &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page16010.asp&quot;&gt;a reference to the wall&lt;/a&gt; following his meeting with Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, describing it as “graphic evidence” of the need for justice for the Palestinians, a “secure” Israel and a viable Palestinian state. In fact the wall, declared &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&amp;amp;p2=4&amp;amp;k=5a&amp;amp;case=131&amp;amp;code=mwp&amp;amp;p3=4&quot;&gt;illegal&lt;/a&gt; by the International Court of Justice in 2004, is “graphic evidence” principally of Israel’s intention to annex a large portion of the West Bank, making a “viable and economically sustainable Palestinian state” an impossibility. Its route, which “&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/TheHumanitarianImpactOfIsraeliInfrastructureTheWestBank_conclusion.pdf&quot;&gt;cuts deep into the West Bank&lt;/a&gt;” (.pdf) to encircle the major settlement blocs, “was not based on security considerations, but to &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.btselem.org/English/Press_Releases/20080709.asp&quot;&gt;perpetuate and expand the settlements&lt;/a&gt;”.&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref3_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn3_7999&quot;&gt;[3]&lt;/a&gt; It is difficult to see how Brown can reconcile this clear rejection of a two-state settlement with his praise for the Israeli government’s “vision of peace and reconciliation”.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&amp;#8216;Economic roadmap&amp;#8217;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But enough with the fluff. What actual, concrete policy proposals did Brown suggest? Apart from repeating Britain’s official position on a final settlement, which is in accord with the international consensus&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref4_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn4_7999&quot;&gt;[4]&lt;/a&gt;, and making a vanishingly brief &lt;em&gt;pro forma &lt;/em&gt;request for Israel to freeze construction in and begin withdrawing from the settlements, Brown’s main theme was his “&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page16001.asp&quot;&gt;economic roadmap&lt;/a&gt;”, which looks to be nearly as redundant as its political counterpart. The plan essentially appears to be to throw lots of money at the Palestinian Authority, encourage the reforms being carried out by Fayyad and stimulate investment in the West Bank by organising conferences, constructing business parks, and so forth. This is all fine as far as it goes. Improving the economic situation in the West Bank is both a humanitarian imperative and a necessary measure to increase the stability and effectiveness of Palestinian institutions. However, as the International Crisis Group &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/79_ruling_palestine_ii___the_west_bank_model.pdf&quot;&gt;points out&lt;/a&gt; (.pdf), there is “a natural ceiling” to potential economic and security development while the territory remains under occupation. Indeed, Fayyad may “already be bumping” against this ceiling, since the “political context” has failed to keep up with his economic reforms. Despite the large amount of donor aid and other measures that have been pursued in the past year to stimulate the Palestinian economy, the World Bank &lt;a href=&quot;http://go.worldbank.org/UJ40Y2FHM0&quot;&gt;reports&lt;/a&gt; that economic indicators “have not changed considerably”, failing to reverse “the impacts of the aid boycott in 2006 and 2007”. “The contributing effects of the closures and movement restrictions” to the stifling of the Palestinian economy “cannot be overestimated”, with the result that PA reforms and international aid “remain necessary but insufficient preconditions for economic recovery”. This analysis is shared by the House of Commons International Development Committee, which &lt;a href=&quot;http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/24_07_08_gaza.pdf&quot;&gt;concludes&lt;/a&gt; (.pdf) that,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;“Increased donor assistance, while welcome, will not be sufficient to turn around the economic downturn which has pervaded the Palestinian economy since 2000 without significant and long-term removal of such restrictions.”&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref5_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn5_7999&quot;&gt;[5]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
In this light, it is noteworthy that Brown’s economic proposals were not accompanied by anything similar on the political front. He had nothing to say, for example, about the disastrous political division between Hamas, the &lt;em&gt;de facto&lt;/em&gt; authority in Gaza, and Fatah, the &lt;em&gt;de facto&lt;/em&gt; authority in the West Bank.&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref6_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn6_7999&quot;&gt;[6]&lt;/a&gt; This apparent oversight can be understood in the context of Britain’s far from insignificant role in engineering the internal Palestinian conflict. After Hamas was elected in January 2006, Britain, along with the U.S. and the rest of the EU, subjected Palestinians to what the UN special rapporteur for human rights &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=11&amp;amp;ar=543&quot;&gt;described as&lt;/a&gt; “possibly the most rigorous form of international sanctions imposed in modern times” – the “first time”, he noted, “that an occupied people has been so treated.”&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref7_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn7_7999&quot;&gt;[7]&lt;/a&gt; This “collective punishment”, a clear attempt to “compel Hamas to change its ideological stance, or to bring about regime change”, had catastrophic &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.indcatholicnews.com/malnutr321.html&quot;&gt;social&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/830389.html&quot;&gt;economic&lt;/a&gt; consequences. The number of Palestinians living in ‘deep poverty’ &lt;a href=&quot;http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/721c49a01e2d512285257233004af4b4!OpenDocument&quot;&gt;soared by 64%&lt;/a&gt; in the first half of 2006, while by early 2007 &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/half-of-palestinians-in-west-bank-and-gaza-malnourished-437343.html&quot;&gt;nearly half&lt;/a&gt; of Palestinian households were malnourished, to give just two representative examples of the shocking suffering the British government helped to inflict on an occupied, civilian population.&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref8_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn8_7999&quot;&gt;[8]&lt;/a&gt; The blockade helped &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/79_ruling_palestine_ii___the_west_bank_model.pdf&quot;&gt;drive&lt;/a&gt; (.pdf) the PA to “the edge of collapse”, reducing it to “an utterly broken pseudo-government” that had “&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6a069b66-1a4a-11dc-8bf0-000b5df10621.html?nclick_check=1&quot;&gt;virtually ceased to function&lt;/a&gt;”. This was all carried out &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/781482.html&quot;&gt;with the expectation&lt;/a&gt; that it would &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/14/international/middleeast/14mideast.html?ex=1297573200&amp;amp;en=957986e4a40ff0c2&amp;amp;ei=5088&amp;amp;partner=rssn&quot;&gt;increase the risk of internal Palestinian violence&lt;/a&gt;. When, despite the international sanctions and a brutal Israeli military assault,&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref9_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn9_7999&quot;&gt;[9]&lt;/a&gt; Abbas formed a government of national unity with Hamas in a desperate attempt to end the slaughter, the Quartet, including Britain, moved quickly to avert the threat. The diplomatic and economic boycott was maintained and, inevitably, the government collapsed.&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref10_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn10_7999&quot;&gt;[10]&lt;/a&gt; In parallel the U.S., and to a lesser extent &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n13/croo01_.html&quot;&gt;Britain&lt;/a&gt;, were busy &lt;a href=&quot;http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/862673.html&quot;&gt;arming&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0525/p07s02-wome.html&quot;&gt;financing&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/12/14/MNGIPMV3N61.DTL&quot;&gt;training&lt;/a&gt; an elite Fatah militia&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref11_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn11_7999&quot;&gt;[11]&lt;/a&gt; with the goal of destroying Hamas. This &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804?printable=true&amp;amp;currentPage=all&quot;&gt;attempted coup&lt;/a&gt; against the elected Hamas government was a principal cause of the internecine Palestinian violence that ultimately led to the forcible takeover of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007, in what the International Institute for Strategic Studies describes as “&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-13---2007/volume-13--issue-5--june-2007/hamas-coup-in-gaza/&quot;&gt;a pre-emptive coup&lt;/a&gt;”.&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref12_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn12_7999&quot;&gt;[12]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Today, the British government continues to insist that Hamas be isolated until it satisfies the specious Quartet “principles”&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref13_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn13_7999&quot;&gt;[13]&lt;/a&gt;, accurately described by a former chief of Israeli military intelligence as “&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.forward.com/articles/experts-question-wisdom-of-boycotting-hamas/&quot;&gt;ridiculous, or an excuse not to negotiate&lt;/a&gt;”, despite the fact that “a new Fatah-Hamas power-sharing arrangement is &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4975&amp;amp;l=1&quot;&gt;a prerequisite&lt;/a&gt; for a sustainable” attempt at peace. The International Crisis Group expresses a near consensus among serious analysts of the conflict when it concludes that the “imperative of Palestinian national reconciliation remains as urgent as ever.”&lt;a name=&quot;_ftnref14_7999&quot; href=&quot;#_ftn14_7999&quot;&gt;[14]&lt;/a&gt; British parliamentarians &lt;a href=&quot;http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/7523113.stm&quot;&gt;appear to agree&lt;/a&gt;, with the relevant select committees repeatedly urging the government to engage with Hamas and encourage Palestinian reconciliation. The Foreign Affairs Committee &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/363/363.pdf&quot;&gt;argues&lt;/a&gt; (.pdf) that “the decision not to speak to Hamas in 2007 following the Mecca agreement has been counterproductive”, recommending that the government “urgently consider ways of engaging politically with moderate elements within Hamas” and promoting efforts to reach “a negotiated settlement with Hamas with a view to re-establishing a national unity Government”. The International Development Committee similarly concludes that “it remains important to bring Hamas into dialogue and into the peace process”, since “without some kind of reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, and without international engagement of all stakeholders, the peace process will not succeed.” The Committee makes the obvious point that while Hamas’ acceptance of the Quartet conditions will plainly have to be part of any final settlement, to insist that they be met as &lt;em&gt;preconditions&lt;/em&gt; to negotiations simply presents “an unnecessary obstacle to practical progress”.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rather than promote Palestinian unity and engage constructively with the Palestinian leadership, the British government has, quoting &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/533/8043003.htm&quot;&gt;Human Rights Watch&lt;/a&gt;, remained “tacitly or openly” complicit in “a policy of protracted collective punishment” instituted in response to Hamas’ electoral victory in early 2006 and intensified following the movement’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007. The siege of Gaza, officially condemned by the British government as a violation of international law, has caused “a marked and clear deterioration” (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cms