Milan Rai | ukwatch.net

We Nearly Won

Ellie Keen — Sun, 23 Mar 2008 21:54:37 +0000

The Extraordinary Achievements of the Anti-War Movement

Justice Not Vengeance Anti-War Briefing 112

BRITAIN NEARLY DISCONNECTED FROM THE WAR

The goal of the British anti-war movement in early 2003 was to stop the British government participating in the invasion of Iraq, hoping that this could delay or derail the US drive to war. We nearly succeeded.

The mass media and the party political system have never and will never acknowledge how close we came. The history books are and will remain silent on this topic, but it is vital for the anti-war movement to remember that it managed to exert such pressure on the British Government that a week before the war, it seriously considered withdrawing from the invasion of Iraq.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION

Throughout the crisis the US public was very concerned at the prospect of political isolation – polls in the US in June and Aug. 2002 found that while more than half of Americans would approve of military action against Iraq if the US won some allied support, that number shrank to a minority if the United States had to go it alone. (Christian Science Monitor, 17 July 2002; ‘Poll: Most Americans Back War Against Iraq’, Reuters, 12 Aug. 2002)

In March 2003, ‘research from the National Journal showed the importance of the UK in the Bush administration’s domestic political calculation: 77 per cent of people said “we absolutely need” to have British support in the event of war in Iraq.’ (FT, 14 Mar. 2003, p. 2) In other words, the US anti-war movement, while not strong enough to prevent the war, was strong enough to force Washington to seek international support – particularly from Britain.

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFUSES

The problem was that the British anti-war movement was so powerful that Tony Blair was forced to spend months seeking a UN Security Council Resolution which he could present as in some way “authorising” the invasion.

In Feb. 2003, a BBC poll found 40 per cent of people would support a war only if there was UN authorization and only 9 per cent would support it without authorization – which is what happened (45 per cent opposed the war whether or not the Security Council approved; BBC press release, 12 Feb 2003, http://tinyurl.com/ynu6rw)

Permanent members of the Security Council threatened to veto any US/UK war resolution, so Tony Blair moved to a fall-back position. He would regard the war as “UN-authorized” if a substantial majority in the Security Council – if 9 out of 15 members – voted in favour of a war resolution.

However, despite enormous pressure, the smaller “middle six” undecided countries – Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan – refused to support the US/UK Resolution, robbing Tony Blair of his majority and his crucial propaganda device. This was in large part because of the protests from the anti-war movements in these countries.

‘In varying degrees,’ it was reported at the time, ‘all six need money, trade and good will… Other than Pakistan, however, none has a direct stake in the outcome of the Iraq crisis. All have said they disapprove equally of what they see of the U.S. rush to war and the French willingness to allow open- ended U.N. weapons inspections. And each is dependent for its survival on public and political opinion that is overwhelmingly against a vote for war in Iraq.’ (Washington Post, 14 March 2003, p. A22)

The US anti-war movement forced Bush to keep Britain on board. The British anti-war movement forced Blair to spend months pleading with small countries at the UN. The global anti-war movement then denied Blair and Bush the political cover they needed at the UN.

THE TURKISH MIRACLE

What worried the British Government even more as it approached the 18 March war vote in the House of Commons was the fact that in Turkey, a country much more dependant financially, militarily and politically on the US than Britain, a similar Parliamentary vote had been lost.

On 1 March 2003, while the biggest demonstration in years was taking place outside Parliament, and MPs were being phoned by their constituents in the debating chamber, a resolution to allow the US to use Turkish territory and airspace to invade Iraq was lost by four votes. (BBC News Online, 1 March 2003, http://tinyurl.com/3yxs9e) The Financial Times suggested that the sheer scale of the grassroots opposition to war ‘may have been the deciding factor’. (6 June 2003, p. 19)

The vote meant that the British contribution became militarily significant, much to everyone’s surprise. Edward Luttwak, senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, pointed out that originally, with a light, fast invasion force, Britain would have made up a third of the entire force. Then, for various reasons, the US deployment was enlarged, and ‘the British role became smaller and smaller.’

When Turkey refused access to US ground forces, all the US northern invasion force units were ‘stuck on the wrong side of the Suez Canal’, and British forces in Kuwait, in the south, once more became ‘indispensable’: ‘Sandwiched together, with units under each other’s command, Yanks and Brits are more closely integrated than they have been since the Second World War – and that is why a last- minute withdrawal by Mr Blair has become simply unthinkable.’ (Sunday Telegraph, 16 March 2003, p. 6)

THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE: DISCONNECTION

It may have been unthinkable for Luttwak, but, the Sunday Telegraph and Sunday Mirror both reported that it wasn’t unthinkable in Whitehall. ‘By Tuesday [12 March], there were serious worries in the White House that Mr Blair, its staunchest ally, might not survive the political crisis at home. Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, tried to explain the problems to Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, in a telephone call which had meant to be devoted to the fine detail of the war plan.

‘As we reveal today, Mr Hoon’s department [the Ministry of Defence] was frantically preparing contingency plans to “disconnect” British troops entirely from the military invasion of Iraq, demoting their role to subsequent phases of the campaign and peacekeeping.

‘Mr Rumsfeld – who had always believed that the “UN route” was the road to perdition – was already deeply exasperated by Mr Blair’s insistence that a second resolution was necessary, and the delays that the horse-trading at the UN was causing. Mr Rumsfeld confided to one friend, “I am learning to hate the British.”

‘However, he decided to give them a way out. Later that day, at a press conference in Washington, Mr Rumsfeld suggested that US troops could go to war without the British if necessary. One Cabinet Minister said, in tones of desperation: “It is just Rumsfeld being Rumsfeld.” The British media was encouraged to believe that the US Defence Secretary had been speaking hypothetically.

‘The trouble was that he hadn’t been doing any such thing. As a senior Number 10 official said: “Rumsfeld was telling the truth.” ... In a second call on his secure telephone, Mr Hoon told Mr Rumsfeld in blunt terms that his remarks were causing pandaemonium. “Wobbly Tuesday” was the lowest point of the crisis for Mr Blair.’ (Sunday Telegraph, 16 Mar., p. 18; see also Sunday Mirror, 16 March 2003, p. 6)

DELAY AND DISCONNECTION

The global anti-war movements, and the British anti-war movement in particular, brought the war leaders to point where George Bush offered Tony Blair the option of withdrawal: ‘I told Tony, I said “rather than lose your government, withdraw from the coalition” – because I felt it was important for him to be the Prime Minister at this point in our relationship.’ (Observer, 23 Apr. 2006 ) Blair himself recently confirmed this offer – made days before the 18 March vote. (Times, 17 Nov. 2007 )

‘One confidant explained: “Having taken it so far, backing out seemed to him a rather pathetic thing to do.”’ (Independent, 31 Oct. 2007 )

The delays created by the global antiwar movements nearly derailed the drive to war. It is possible that even a few days’ more delay could have given the UN weapons inspectors the time they needed to institute a final and decisive phase of inspections that would have made war politically impossible. (See Milan Rai’s Regime Unchanged, Pluto 2003) We know that the British Government was forced to desperately draw up contingency plans only days before war.

These are significant achievements for popular movements with very limited resources. Governments prize the appearance of overwhelming strength and confidence. We now know that this war was avoidable and that the war leaders were not an irresistable force.

Our movement shook the Government to its core. Next time we will win.

Reflections on the March

Ellie Keen — Tue, 18 Mar 2008 20:26:17 +0000

The power of anti-war movements

As I stood by the side of the road in Whitehall, a woman came up and bought a copy of Peace News from me, saying: I’m buying this for sentimental reasons. I used to be a Peace News seller. (In fact, she used to sell Peace News in Charing Cross Road outside Foyles, when the regular seller was off sick.)

I wonder how many of us on the march were also there for sentimental reasons. There were thousands of us to be sure. There was genuine anger over Palestine, many more young people than I was expecting, and some controversy over Iran (George Galloway was heckled over his recent remarks over gay rights in Iran) but otherwise, in my view, are somewhat flat tone to the demonstration.

It is nothing in comparison to the agony of the people of Iraq, but I think it is worth saying that we, that is the anti-war movement, are still traumatised by the invasion of Iraq.

The invasion, in the face of global opposition, was a huge blow to the confidence of what the New York Times called the world’s second superpower. It was a huge blow to democracy. (The blow to the stability and security of the people of Iraq hardly needs mentioning.)

What is hidden from us, what is hidden from history, is the story of how we nearly derailed the war.

When we go back and look at what happened in 2002 and 2003, what we see is that the North American anti-war movement was strong enough to force President Bush to need Tony Blair; the British anti-war movement was strong enough to force Tony Blair to need a UN Security Council resolution; and the global anti-war movement – particularly in Mexico and Chile – was strong enough to deny Washington and London the resolution that they could craved.

The invasion was delayed for months. This delay nearly gave the UN weapons inspectors the time they needed to deal with Iraq’s weapons issues nonviolently (I wrote about this in my book Regime Unchanged). It gave the anti-war movement in Britain the chance to shake the government to its core. Just days before the invasion, the Ministry of Defence was having to draw up contingency plans for not taking part in the invasion, in case the government lost the vote in the House of Commons on the 18th of March. The Defence Secretary was phoning Donald Rumsfeld to warn him of this dire possibility. Tony Blair was telling his children he might be losing his job.

The British government was no doubt frightened by the precedent in Turkey, where on the first of March the government had lost a vote on a resolution to allow the US to use Turkish land and air corridors for the invasion of Iraq. Democracy worked in Turkey, but unfortunately it didn’t work in Britain.

The movement that was successful in Turkey was made up of people like us, those of us standing by the side of the road – and marching in it – in Whitehall yesterday.

(For more on all of this see the latest JNV briefing.)

Iraq/Iran Interview

Alex Doherty — Fri, 09 Mar 2007 18:30:08 +0000

Exclusively to ukwatch.net an interview with Milan Rai, activist and author on the continuing disaster in Iraq and the likelihood of an anglo/american assault on Iran.

What is the significance of the partial withdrawal of British troops from southern Iraq. Why has this occurred? what are the future implications if any?

The partial withdrawal is part of the strategy Britain has had from the beginning of the occupation: to exert maximum political, strategic and economic control over Iraq and its resources with the least political, financial, economic and military cost.

The partial withdrawal is designed to shift the burden of controlling Iraq in the interests of the West to Iraqi collaborators, as elsewhere in the world, and as so often in Britain’s imperial history. British troops are being reassigned to the protection of the US logistical chain running up from Kuwait to central Iraq.

Paul Reynolds, World Affairs Correspondent of the BBC, points out that three of the roles that British forces will still have to carry out are:‘securing supply routes’, maintaining ‘the ability to conduct operations against extremist groups’ and to ‘be there in support of the Iraq Army when called upon’ (quoting Blair himself).

Reynolds comments: ‘These are by no means minimalist tasks. The border watch will involve long range patrols, the supply route monitoring is vital to protect the huge convoys from Kuwait that supply the US army and the “extremist groups” – notably the Shia Mehdi army that opposes a British presence – could be hard to deal with.’

Why has the withdrawal occurred? Because it was always the plan. Why has it occurred now? Because the British military are impatient to withdraw combat troops from Iraq, which they regard as a dead end, and to transfer
them to Afghanistan, where they believe (probably wrongly) that they can win the war against the Taliban and other insurgents.

What are the future implications? Well, some of those implications will be felt in Afghanistan, unless public protests here (and there’s the possibility of opposition from across the political spectrum) derails these re-deployments. Other implications are political, in the sense that the ‘withdrawal’/‘exit strategy’/‘cut and run’ mythology may undermine the mobilization of the anti-war movement against the occupation, such as it is.

The British and the Americans have surely little cedibility regarding WMD claims but is there any truth to the accusations that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon?

There’s no evidence that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon today. What is at issue is Iran’s capability in the future (many years in the future, according to credible observers). Uranium enrichment technology, the focus of international concern, may give Iran the capacity to create weapons-grade uranium suitable for use in a nuclear bomb. Nuclear reprocessing may give Iran the capacity to produce plutonium for use in a
nuclear bomb.

While the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains in Iran monitoring the Iranian nuclear industry, the chances of Iran producing a nuclear arsenal in a clandestine fashion seem slight, particularly if Tehran agrees to the more intrusive regime of inspections that the IAEA has been seeking. The problem is that Iran has the right, under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), at any time to withdraw from the Treaty and to expel the inspectors.

It is a legitimate diplomatic goal to seek an end to Iran’s nuclear programme, or to seek a binding commitment to the NPT, but if Iran is to give up its legal rights under this treaty, it should be offered something equally substantial. Tehran’s main goal is to secure a security guarantee from the US, ensuring that the abandonment of the nuclear power programme
will bring an end to US military threats.

It hardly needs saying that an even more legitimate diplomatic goal is to seek an end to Israel’s nuclear programme, or those of India and Pakistan, which have already produced nuclear weapons – or to halt new steps in the nuclear arms race by Britain (Trident replacement) and the US (Star Wars).

In what sense can Iran be considered a threat to the British and the Americans?

Iran is a threat because it is an independent nationalist force. If the mullahs in Tehran and Qom were obedient, then Iran could be another Saudi
Arabia – a somewhat more democratic version of the brutal fundamentalist Muslim state propped up by Washington.

Iran is particularly a threat because it controls massive oil and gas reserves, and is joining these capacities to the economies of Russia, China and perhaps even India in a massive Asian Energy Security Grid. The US nightmare.

The “coalition” have stepped up there accusations against Tehran by claiming that Tehran is arming insurgents in Iraq – specifically in the manufacture of Improvised Explosive Devices. What is your view?

I suggested in the summer of 2003 in my book Regime Unchanged that Iran was likely to play in Iraq after the invaasion the role played by the USSR in Western Europe after WWII. That is to say, undermining and constricting local resistance forces, and strengthening the hand of the US-dominated establishment, in return for expected benefits for Iranian interests.

I think this prediction has been borne out. I see no evidence that the Iranian government has supported the armed insurgency against the US (though it might well be supporting sectarian warfare against the Sunni
paramilitaries).

There’s no evidence that the Iranian government is manufacturing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs or ‘roadside bombs’) and supplying them to Shia militants. Iranian weapons are making their way into Iraq, but it’s not at all clear who’s doing the supplying. It may well be criminal groups and lower-level sympathisers in the Iranian military.

Is the united states really planning an attack on Iran? Were it to occurr what would be the likely outcome?

I think the US Government is leaning toward a military confrontation, though there are powerful reasons why it might not in the end take place. There’s no question of an invasion – the US is not going to put ground troops into a situation where they have to fight a real army. It’s a question of air attacks of unknown scope and duration. There’s planning
going on, that’s pretty clear. (See Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker.) There’s provocations going on, that’s pretty clear. (See the kidnapping of Iranian diplomats in Iraq, the raids on Iranian offices in Irbil and
Baghdad and the seizure of papers and computers, the flying of Predator drones into Iranian territory, the Presidential order authorising the capture or killing of suspected Iranian ‘agents’ in Iraqi territory, the
massive US-UK naval build up in the Gulf, and so on.)

The likely outcome of a massive aerial assault on Iran would be a huge upsurge in violence across the region, and quite possibly in the West also.

What will Britain’s role be in a conflict with Iran?

If there is an assault, the UK will be involved, whatever the rhetorical stance of the Government of the day, by providing facilities at Fairford in Gloucestershire (one of only five B-2 bomber bases in the world) and at Diego Garcia in the Middle East.

The British naval build-up suggests a naval role in protecting shipping, the use of British minesweepers, and so on, as happened 19 years ago, in the final stages of the Iraq-Iran war, when the Wester intervened against Iran, as now.

How do you view Britain’s increased presence in Afghanistan?

It’s a disaster for the people in the areas the troops are being dispatched to.

What can concerned people do to end the Iraq occupation and avert war with Iran?

On Iran, there’s a lot of propaganda to try to tackle – the myth that Ahmadinejad is in charge of foreign and nuclear policy, which he clearly isn’t (it’s in the hands of the much more reasonable Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei); the myth that Ahmadinejad has genocidal designs on Israel, and so on. If we can expose some of the lies, we can help to push the British government back towards the position of Jack ‘inconcievable’ Straw.

On Iraq, I’ve long believed that the best way to unlock people’s confusion and mixed feelings about the occupation is to press for a rapid unconditional military, political and economic withdrawal by the US and UK, accompanied by efforts to get a UN General Assembly-sponsored peace enforcement or possibly peace keeping force into the country.

Milan Rai is, as of April, co-editor of Peace News, as well as being a coordinator of Justice Not Vengeance, the anti-war group. His last book was ’7/7: The London Bombings, Islam and the Iraq War’.

IED Lies

Tim Holmes — Wed, 14 Feb 2007 16:36:56 +0000

The US claims that Iran supplies Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS) to Iraqi insurgents. No serious evidence has been provided.

SUMMARY

On Sunday 11 February, anonymous US officials presented roadside bombs, and components and fragments of bombs, and other weapons used by Iraqi insurgents, claiming that they had been manufactured in Iran and smuggled into Iraq on the orders of the highest levels of the Iranian Government. The language used by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, and by the briefers themselves, however, was tentative rather than conclusive. Dramatic ‘evidence’ that had been promised failed to materialize. Claims that the serial numbers and quality of machining of weapons and components could only have originated in Iran were not substantiated with any detail. No evidence was produced that the weapons and components had come via government channels rather than through criminal markets or informal and irregular contacts with Iranian military units. The Iraqi party and militia closest to Iran has actually been recognized for its support for the US occupation. One previous claim as to the Iranian provenance of insurgent technology actually traces back to the IRA, who apparently acquired the bomb-triggering capability with the knowledge and facilitation of the British Government. Curiously, none of the British national ‘quality’ dailies reports the admission of one of the US briefers that there was ‘no “smoking gun” linking Tehran and Iraqi militants’.

INTRODUCTION

On Sunday 11 February, after days of press leaks, US military officials in Baghdad made allegations of high-level Iranian Government involvement in the supply of weapons and training to Iraqi insurgents. Most of these allegations centred on the increasing sophistication of ‘improvised explosive devices’ (IEDs) used as roadside bombs by Iraqi insurgents targeting US military convoys. The ‘evidence’ produced to support these claims in fact amounted to little more than assertion. Perhaps the most interesting aspect is the gap between what we had been promised and what was actually unveiled. Months earlier, it has been excitedly reported that there was ‘smoking-gun evidence of Iranian support for terrorists in Iraq: brand-new weapons fresh from Iranian factories.’[1]

When it came to it, on 11 February, the ‘senior US defence analyst’ presenting the ‘evidence’ said (in an apparently little-reported admission – see end of briefing) that there was ‘no “smoking gun” linking Tehran and Iraqi militants’.[2]

WHAT WAS PROMISED

A number of dramatic claims were made before the press conference. The Associated Press reported the day before that evidence to be presented included ‘documents captured when U.S.-led forces raided an Iranian office Jan. 11 in Irbil in northern Iraq’. According to this advance briefing, the materials to be displayed included ‘2 inches of documents’ demonstrating Iran’s role in supplying Iraqi militants with highly sophisticated and lethal improvised explosive devices and other weaponry.[3]

The New York Times reported on 10 February that the presentation would include ‘information gleaned from Iranians and Iraqis captured in recent American raids on an Iranian office in Erbil and another site in Baghdad.’[4]

A few days earlier, a senior US military intelligence official told reporters that ‘shaped charges’ had been discovered ‘in the presence of Iranians captured in the country.’ He declined to elaborate but noted that US operators who raided an Iranian office in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Arbil in January 2007 captured documents and computer drives he called a ‘treasure trove’ on Iran’s ‘networks, supply lines, sourcing and funding.’[5]

Documents, possibly interviews, computer files, even ‘shaped charge’ explosives. Much was promised.

WHAT WAS DELIVERED

According to the BBC account of the Baghdad press conference, none of this materialized. There were no documents from the US raids in Arbil or Baghdad, certainly no ‘two-inch’ stack of documents. No massive intelligence-based ‘dossier’ was offered. US officials said at the press conference that incriminating documents had been discovered in these raids (including ‘inventory sheets of weaponry and equipment that had been brought into Iraq’), but none were produced for journalists to assess. There was no mention of any other evidence ‘gleaned’ from the Iranians or Iraqis kidnapped by the US in these raids. No ‘shaped charges’ captured with these alleged operators were presented or even referred to.[6]

What was on display, according to Reuters⁷:

a) Fragments of an allegedly Iranian-made roadside bomb.
b) Fragments of fins from 81-mm and 60-mm mortar bombs. One grenade from a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.
c) Slides showing other weapons, including a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile.
d) Slides showing a complete mortar bomb, with serial and manufacturing number.

THE GENERAL ARGUMENT

There are two ways in which the US has attempted to link Iran to these weapons. The first is a general argument. US concern centres on a new form of roadside bomb, described in Western military terminology as a ‘explosively formed projectile’ (EFP). The EFP is a tube of explosives with a concave lid of metal capping one end. The explosives fire and re-shape the lid into a high-speed, super-hot projectile that can punch its way through heavy armour.[8]

It was claimed in the New York Times that: ‘The manufacture of the key metal components required sophisticated machinery, raw material and expertise that American intelligence agencies do not believe can be found in Iraq.’[9] In the Guardian, this gloss was offered: ‘The briefers claimed the deadliest of the roadside bombs being used in Iraq were from Iran: the machine-tooling was so sophisticated that the only place it could have been done in that part of the region was Iran.’[10]

In the June 2006 Daily Telegraph report that first revealed the use of EFPs in Iraq, however, it says only that: ‘this newspaper understands that Government scientists have established that the mines are precision-made weapons which have been turned on a lathe by craftsmen trained in the manufacture of munitions’.[11]

No evidence has been produced that out of all the countries in the region, only Iran possesses ‘lathes’ and ‘operators trained in the manufacture of munitions’. No evidence has been produced that Iraq lacks these ingredients for the production of EFPs. As for the ‘raw materials’, there is no lack of metal tubes or explosives in Iraq. An independent assessment of IEDs in Iraq, obtained by Defense News in 2006 and based on British military intelligence, said, ‘Based on current usage, there are enough stocks of illegal explosives to continue the same level of attack for 274 years without re-supply.’[12]

Anthony Cordesman, the respected US military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, responded to an earlier version of this claim by observing that Iraq’s insurgents are probably just tapping a pool of common bomb-making technology, none of which requires special expertise: ‘There’s no evidence that these are supplied by Iran. A lot of this is just technology that is leaked into an informal network. What works in one country gets known elsewhere.’[13]

THE 2006 MARKINGS

Specifically, it was said that some of the bombs and fragments on display were said to have Iranian factory markings – from 2006, no less: ‘U.S. officials say they have found smoking-gun evidence of Iranian support for terrorists in Iraq: brand-new weapons fresh from Iranian factories. According to a senior defense official, coalition forces have recently seized Iranian-made weapons and munitions that bear manufacturing dates in 2006. This suggests, say the sources, that the material is going directly from Iranian factories to Shia militias, rather than taking a roundabout path through the black market. “There is no way this could be done without (Iranian) government approval,” says a senior official.’[14]

As Gareth Porter of IPS pointed out in the Asian Times, this story was based on the claim that ‘a private market for weapons or, more likely, components, could not move them from Iran across the porous border to Iraq in a few months’.[15]

BLAMING TEHRAN

At the 11 February Baghdad press conference, a US official said: ‘We assess that these activities are coming from the senior levels of the Iranian government,’ pointing the finger at Iran’s elite al-Quds brigade, a unit of the Revolutionary Guards, noting also that this unit reports directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei.[16] However, this ‘assessment’ does not have any basis in the evidence produced, apart from unsupported allegations that Iranians seized in Arbil and Baghdad have included members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the al-Quds brigade.

In mid-2005, at a more honest phase of the war, US Lieutenant General John R. Vines, Commander of the ‘Multinational Corps’ in Iraq, conceded that the Iraqi insurgents were ‘certainly getting some outside advice’, but he pointed out that there was ‘some technical expertise that was resident in the Iraqi army, probably from their explosive ordnance personnel.’ He concluded: ‘So, in terms of technical support, I don’t see it from a government, I don’t see support by other governments.’[17]

A few months later, in November 2005 (after a high-level decision had been taken to blame Iran), there was still a relatively honest briefing from British Army Major General J.B. Dutton, the commander of the US-led forces in southeastern Iraq. General Dutton said the smuggling of the deadlier weapons had been difficult to stop because of the long, open border between Iraq and Iran. He added: ‘I think we don’t know whether this is Iranian government policy or if this is splinter groups who are using Iran for their own purposes and not being controlled.’ Dutton also conceded: ‘We’re not completely certain where the manufacture takes place. We know where the technological know-how comes from, and we suspect where the parts come from.’ The bombs were of varying grades of sophistication, with some requiring a simple workshop to build and others ‘a reasonably sophisticated factory,” he said: ‘Some are probably put together in country [in Iraq]. Others may not be.’[18]

At the Baghdad press conference, a US official asserted that the ‘machining’ on the bomb components was traceable to Iran – without elaborating further.[19] Earlier, the new Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, had made the public claim that the serial numbers on the bomb components provided a link to Iran. As a wire report pointed out, ‘Gates’ remarks left unclear how the U.S. knows the numbers are traceable to Iran.’[20]

Even if we accept these unsubstantiated claims, they fail to demonstrate that the Iranian Government is authorizing or organizing these supplies. A number of press reports support the notion that arms are being smuggled into Iraq across the border with Iran.

To take only one example, Ghaith Abdul-Ahad reported on this topic in the Guardian on 27 January 2007:‘Fadhel and other Mahdi army officers also describe a complex relationship with Iraq’s Shia neighbour. Iran, which backs a rival Shia faction to the Mahdi Army, secured a PR success when Mr Sadr upon his arrival in Tehran last year announced that the Mahdi Army would defend Iran if attacked by the US. One Mahdi Army commander told me: “The Iranians are helping us not because they like us, but because they hate the US.” The help comes in different forms. “We get weapons from them, mortar shells, RPG rounds, sometimes they give us weapons for free sometimes we have to buy. Depends on who is doing the deal,” said the same commander.’[21]

This is evidence against a coordinated high-level Iranian government initiative. The variety of prices and weapons, and the dependence on the particular Iranian broker or donor all argue for an informal market place, with a mixture of criminals and sympathisers supplying weapons, rather than a ‘high-technology’ ideologically-driven programme being run through an elite military force on the instruction of the head of state.

IRAN, SCIRI AND THE OCCUPATION

There are other reasons to be sceptical. ‘Few doubt that Iran is seeking to extend its influence in Iraq. But the groups in Iraq that have received the most Iranian support are not those that have led attacks against U.S. forces. Instead, they are nominal U.S. allies.’[22]

The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is one of the two largest parties in the Iraqi parliament. It was based in Iran during Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, and it is believed to be the largest beneficiary of Iranian support. This has not led it into militant opposition or insurgency, however. Quite the reverse. Since SCIRI returned to Iraq, it has effectively collaborated with the US occupation. President Bush played host to the head of SCIRI, Abdelaziz Hakim, at the White House in December 2006, and, as the Los Angeles Times points out, ‘administration officials have frequently cited Adel Abdul Mehdi, another party leader, as a person they would like to see as Iraq’s prime minister.’[23]

Patrick Cockburn, Baghdad reporter for the Independent, points out that the Shia group which is taking a confrontational approach, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army, is not a natural ally of Tehran: ‘the most powerful Shia militia, the Mehdi Army, is traditionally anti-Iranian. It is the [SCIRI] Badr Organisation, now co-operating with US forces, which was formed and trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.’[24]

THE IRA CONNECTION

From a narrower perspective, when we are confronted with strong claims such as these, it is salutary to reflect on similar recent propaganda initiatives. Not long ago, it was being asserted confidently that Iraqi insurgents must be receiving technical assistance from Iran and its clients in Lebanon, the Hezbollah guerrillas, because roadside bombs were beginning to use sophisticated infra-red triggering devices (which could not be blocked by Western technology). This story abruptly disappeared from the media after the Independent on Sunday revealed that this technology actually originated from the IRA rather than Hezbollah, and that the IRA had been facilitated in developing it by the British Government itself.

A British intelligence source told the newspaper that the Army ‘Force Research Unit’ and officers from MI5 learned in the early 1990s that a senior IRA member in south Armagh was working to develop bombs triggered by light beams. It was decided that the risks would be diminished if British intelligence knew what technology was being used, and therefore the IRA was permitted to purchase the required items in New York. ‘The thinking of the security forces was that if they were intimate with the technology, then they could develop counter-measures, thereby staying one step ahead of the IRA.

It may seem absurd that the security services were supplying technology to the IRA, but the strategy was sound,’ said an official source. ‘Unfortunately, no one could see back then that this technology would be used to kill British soldiers thousands of miles away in a different war.’ A former British agent who infiltrated the IRA told the Independent on Sunday that the light-trigger technology reached the Middle East through the IRA’s co-operation with Palestinian groups. In turn, some of these groups used to be sponsored by Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath party.[25]

We cited Anthony Cordesman earlier on this point: ‘A lot of this is just technology that is leaked into an informal network. What works in one country gets known elsewhere.’[26]

A TIMID EFFORT

A classified US intelligence report from 2006 cited in the New York Times said: ‘All source reporting since 2004 indicates that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Corps-Quds Force is providing professionally-built EFPs and components to Iraqi Shia militants. Based on forensic analysis of materials recovered in Iraq. Iran is assessed as the producer of these items.’[27] Speaking before the Baghdad press conference, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said: ‘Well, I think that Iran is very much involved in providing either the technology or the weapons themselves for these explosively formed projectiles.’[28] Gates said that the markings on the explosives provided ‘pretty good’ evidence that Iranians are supplying either weapons or technology for Iraqi extremists: ‘I think there’s some serial numbers, there may be some markings on some of the projectile fragments that we found.’[29]

Also speaking before the press conference, a US intelligence official ‘said the U.S. is “fairly comfortable” it knows the source of the explosives.’[30] During the press conference, a US official said: ‘We assess that these activities are coming from the senior levels of the Iranian government.’[31]

Also during the presentation, the ‘senior US defence analyst’ present said that there was ‘no “smoking gun” linking Tehran and Iraqi militants’.[32]

What do we have? ‘Assessments’, ‘indications’, ‘thoughts’, ‘pretty good’ evidence that the US is ‘fairly comfortable’ with. No smoking gun. No real evidence.

THE BRITISH MEDIA REACTION

The British national ‘quality’ dailies have sharply differing treatments of the Baghdad presentation, with one curious feature in common, however.

The Times puts the story on page 31, with no front page trail, and highlights in paragraph 3 the ‘caution’ and ‘suspicion’ of journalists because of the timing of the presentation ‘coinciding with Washington intensifying the pressure on Tehran over its nuclear programme’. Nevertheless, the claims are reported without qualification,[33] and an accompany editorial is uncompromisingly hard-line, accepting the claims without a murmur.[34]

After a straightforward no-questions-asked ‘reporting the claims’ front-page trail, the Telegraph (the newspaper of the armed forces) has the most technically detailed report of all the newspapers on page 16. It also sounds a cautious note amidst the technicalities: ‘This level of sophistication may point to Iran, as only a state arms company would have the ability to manufacture weapons of this kind.’[35]

The Guardian has a front-page trail to a page 15 story. Rather than question the claims itself or seek out a Western (and more credible) sceptic, the paper puts criticisms in the mouth of the Iranian Government: ‘Iran will dismiss the claims, saying it is hardly surprising there are Iranian weapons in Iraq given that the two countries fought between 1980 and 1988, and that Tehran had armed militia groups fighting Saddam Hussein.’[36]

The Independent on the other hand (after devoting the entire front page to the story), leads with a sceptical analysis by Patrick Cockburn filling most of page 2. Among other points, Cockburn writes: ‘The US stance on the military capabilities of Iraqis today is the exact opposite of its position in four years ago. Then President Bush and Tony Blair claimed that Iraqis were technically advanced enough to produce long-range missiles and to be close to producing a nuclear device. Washington is now saying that Iraqis are too backward to produce an effective roadside bomb and must seek Iranian help.’[37]

The Financial Times relegates the entire production to three short agency paragraphs at the end of an unrelated story on page 6, indicating the lack of credibility and substance of the Baghdad presentation. The shell and component markings are not mentioned at all:

‘US-led forces in Iraq have presented what officials said was “a growing body” of evidence of Iranian weapons being used to kill their soldiers, as US anger rises at Tehran’s alleged involvement in the war, Reuters reports from Baghdad. A US defence official in Baghdad said 170 coalition troops had been killed by Iranian-made roadside bombs he said had been smuggled into Iraq. Tehran denies the charge and blames US soldiers for the violence and for inflaming tensions between Shia and once-dominant Sunni.’[38]

One striking common feature to all of these stories is that none of them mentions the key admission made by the US ‘senior defence analyst’, reported by Reuters, that there was ‘no “smoking gun” linking Tehran and Iraqi militants’.[39]

QUESTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT

1) How are the serial numbers on the components and bombs retrieved in Iraq linked to Iran?

2) What is the evidence that components or weapons smuggled into Iraq from Iran are authorized by the Iranian Government, as opposed to criminal gangs or individuals within the Iranian armed forces? In other words, what new evidence has emerged since the press conference held by Major General J.B. Dutton in November 2005, in which he said: ‘I think we don’t know whether this is Iranian government policy or if this is splinter groups who are using Iran for their own purposes and not being controlled’?

3) What is the evidence that components or weapons smuggled into Iraq that bear 2006 manufacturing dates could not have circulated via the informal arms market rather than via an official government channel?

4) What has happened to the documents allegedly captured when US-led forces raided Iranian offices in Arbil and Baghdad? In particular, what has happened to the documents and computer drives described as a ‘treasure trove’ on Iran’s ‘networks, supply lines, sourcing and funding’? Did these documents ever exist, and if so what has happened to them?

5) What relevant information, if any, was ‘gleaned’ from Iranians and Iraqis captured in these US raids?

6) Were any explosives – in particular, ‘shaped charges’ – discovered in the presence of Iranians seized in Iraq?

7) What is the evidence that political groups and militias supported by Iran are engaging in an armed campaign against the occupation?

8) What is the evidence that the Mehdi Army is receiving support of any kind from the Iranian Government?

9) Is it true that light trigger technologies being used by Iraqi insurgents can be traced back to technology that British intelligence allowed the IRA to acquire in the late 1990s?

10) Why, in January 2006, did the British Government withdraw its similar claims as to Iran’s role in Iraq’s insurgency?[40]

NOTES

[1] Jonathan Karl and Martin Clancy, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Iranian Weapons Arm Iraqi Militia: Hezbollah training also linked to Iraq violence’, ABC News Online, 30 November 2006 http://tinyurl.com/yxfftc.

[2] Reuters Factbox – ‘Evidence shown of Iran’s involvement in Iraq chaos’, 11 February 2007, 17:47:37 GMT “http://tinyurl.com/3yhfem“http://tinyurl.com/3yhfem.

[3] Lolita C. Baldor, ‘Official says U.S. commanders in Iraq showed lawmakers explosives that came from Iran’, Associated Press, 10 February 2007, 3:23 PM EST http://tinyurl.com/2n8eo.

[4] Michael R. Gordon, ‘Deadliest Bomb in Iraq Is Made by Iran, U.S. Says’, New York Times, 10 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/3dvu5m.

[5] Alexandra Zavis and Greg Miller, ‘Scant evidence found of Iran-Iraq arms link’ Los Angeles Times, 23 January 2007 http://tinyurl.com/364vme.

[6] ‘US accuses Iran over Iraq bombs’, BBC News Online, 11 February 2007, 20:26 GMT http://tinyurl.com/3yv4q7.

[7] Reuters Factbox – ‘Evidence shown of Iran’s involvement in Iraq chaos’, 11 February 2007, 17:47:37 GMT http://tinyurl.com/3yhfem.

[8] The EFP differs from the ‘shaped charge’ (SC) in that it fires a solid object, whereas the SC fires a blast of superheated metal ‘gas’ (plasma) that can burn through heavy armour. Despite being more slow moving, the EFP has one key advantage over the SC. Modern tank armour has explosive panels which detonate when then SC gas starts to burn through the outer layers of armour. This counter-explosion (known as ‘Explosive Reactive Armour’) disrupts the SC attack and renders it much less efficient, allowing the armoured vehicle to survive. The advantage of the EFP is that because its metal projectile is at a lower temperature than an SC plasma it can break through ‘Explosive Reactive Armour’ without triggering the counter-explosion, and therefore achieve its full destructive effect. ‘INFANTRY 1, TANK 0: Hand-Held Anti-Tank Weapons’, SoldierTech, Military.Com 2004 http://tinyurl.com/3bxmbp.

[9] Michael R. Gordon, ‘Deadliest Bomb in Iraq Is Made by Iran, U.S. Says’, New York Times, 10 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/3dvu5m.

[10] Ewen MacAskill, Ian Traynor and Robert Tait, ‘US accuses highest levels in Iran of supplying deadly weapons to Iraqi insurgents’, Guardian, 12 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/2tgbex.

[11] Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent, ‘The precision-made mine that has “killed 17 British troops” ’, Telegraph, 25 June 2006 http://tinyurl.com/gqadg.

[12] Greg Grant, ‘U.S. Shifts Focus On IED Problem’, Defense News, 11 September 2006 http://tinyurl.com/37lplr.

[13] ‘Bombs in Iraq Getting More Sophisticated’, AP, 10 November 2005 http://tinyurl.com/36fzq4.

[14] Jonathan Karl and Martin Clancy, ‘EXCLUSIVE: Iranian Weapons Arm Iraqi Militia: Hezbollah training also linked to Iraq violence’, ABC News Online, 30 November 2006 http://tinyurl.com/yxfftc.

[15] Gareth Porter, ‘US lacks “explosive” evidence against Iran’, Asian Times, 18 January 2007 http://tinyurl.com/2zve96.

[16] ‘US accuses Iran over Iraq bombs’, BBC News Online, 11 February 2007, 20:26 GMT http://tinyurl.com/3yv4q7.

[17] Presenter: Lieutenant General John R. Vines, Commander, Multinational Corps Iraq, ‘Briefing on Security Operations in Iraq’, 21 June 2005 http://tinyurl.com/2jd4dl.

[18] ‘Britain: IED expertise in Iraq comes from Iran’, AFP, 3 November 2005 http://tinyurl.com/2lyrqr.

[19] Steven R. Hurst, ‘U.S. Officer: Iran Sends Iraq Bomb Parts’, Associated Press, 11 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/2o27kh.

[20] ‘Gates says markings tie bombs to Iran’, Los Angeles Times, 10 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/3296kw.

[21] Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, ‘ “If they pay we kill them anyway” – the kidnapper’s story’, Guardian, 27 January 2007 http://tinyurl.com/322rx6.

[22] Alexandra Zavis and Greg Miller, ‘Scant evidence found of Iran-Iraq arms link’, Los Angeles Times, 23 January 2007 http://tinyurl.com/364vme.

[23] Alexandra Zavis and Greg Miller, ‘Scant evidence found of Iran-Iraq arms link’, Los Angeles Times, 23 January 2007 http://tinyurl.com/364vme.

[24] Patrick Cockburn, ‘Inside Baghdad: A city paralysed by fear’, Independent, 25 January 2007 http://tinyurl.com/ysv9ud.

[25] Greg Harkin, Francis Elliott and Raymond Whitaker, ‘Revealed: IRA bombs killed eight British soldiers in Iraq’, Independent on Sunday, 16 October 2005 http://tinyurl.com/bltkd.

[26] ‘Bombs in Iraq Getting More Sophisticated’, AP, 10 November 2005 http://tinyurl.com/36fzq4.

[27] Michael R. Gordon, ‘Deadliest Bomb in Iraq Is Made by Iran, U.S. Says’, New York Times, 10 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/3dvu5m.

[28] ‘Intelligence Links Iran to Weapons Used by Iraqi Insurgents’, 11 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/2ly583.

[29] Lolita C. Baldor, ‘Official says U.S. commanders in Iraq showed lawmakers explosives that came from Iran’, Associated Press, 10 February 2007, 3:23 PM EST http://tinyurl.com/2n8eo.

[30] Lolita C. Baldor, ‘Official says U.S. commanders in Iraq showed lawmakers explosives that came from Iran’, Associated Press, 10 February 2007, 3:23 PM EST http://tinyurl.com/2n8eo.

[31] ‘US accuses Iran over Iraq bombs’, BBC News Online, 11 February 2007, 20:26 GMT http://tinyurl.com/3yv4q7.

[32] Reuters Factbox – ‘Evidence shown of Iran’s involvement in Iraq chaos’, 11 February 2007, 17:47:37 GMT http://tinyurl.com/3yhfem.

[33] Stephen Farrell and Richard Beeston, ‘US blames Tehran agents for troop deaths’, The Times, 12 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/252lse.

[34] Editorial, ‘Persian Pariah? Naivety is the surest way to guarantee a showdown with Iran’, The Times, 12 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/2jm3ce.

[35] David Blair, Diplomatic Correspondent and Ben Rooney, ‘US presents “evidence” that weapons from Iran are being used in Iraq’, Telegraph, 12 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/2kgf2h, emphasis added.

[36] Ewen MacAskill, Ian Traynor and Robert Tait, ‘US accuses highest levels in Iran of supplying deadly weapons to Iraqi insurgents’, Guardian, 12 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/2tgbex.

[37] Patrick Cockburn, ‘Target Tehran: Washington sets stage for a new confrontation’, Independent, 12 February 2007 http://tinyurl.com/2xoe4s.

[38] Emphases added. These paragraphs are not present on the web. Appended in the print edition to Demetri Sevastopulo and Stephen Fidler, ‘Gates plays down Putin attack on US policy’, Financial Times, 12 February 2007, p. 6.

[39] Reuters Factbox – ‘Evidence shown of Iran’s involvement in Iraq chaos’, 11 February 2007, 17:47:37 GMT http://tinyurl.com/3yhfem.

[40] In January 2006, The Times and the Independent both reported that British officials in Iraq had withdrawn this claim, and in particular the assertion that Iran was supplying a new and more deadly design of roadside bomb with infrared triggers which cannot be disrupted by US/UK technology. BBC News Online, 10 January 2006 http://tinyurl.com/2wgxca. A year later, ‘Senior British officials, citing mistakes over Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction, are voicing scepticism about US efforts to build an intelligence-based case against Iran… Amid signs of a concerted American operation to prove that Iran is threatening US troops in the region, British officials say that they are “not aware of a smoking gun” that would justify taking military action against Tehran.’ Times, 1 February 2007, http://tinyurl.com/ypl5kx.

Turning the World Upside Down

jeppe — Tue, 14 Nov 2006 17:41:59 +0000

The present world order is based on immense inequalities in wealth and power. In opposition to the present order are various popular movements – which are for the most part tending to converge in their thinking and their goals.

The question before us at ZSVS is what the international order might look like, and how we might get there, if the values which we who are gathering together share were to be expressed in both our ends and our means.

The dimensions of the global crisis are many. Three overarching human crises are problems of survival: the challenge of surviving human-induced environmental rupture; the challenge of surviving suicidal militarism; and the challenge of global poverty and hunger.

It is easy to say that the end-state we desire is a world in which we enjoy a sustainable planetary economy, a world of peaceful relations between co-operative societies, a world in which hunger and avoidable disease have been abolished.

It is no less easy to say that the primary obstacle to achieving this desired end-state is the system of transnational corporations, and the powerful states which defend and extend the control of these corporations; and furthermore that these corporations and states must be abolished.

In one formula, this would mean that the productive resources of each society should be under the direct control of those who carry out productive work. Economic and other relations between societies would, we expect, become less violent and confrontational, and less threatening to human survival.

It is more challenging and perhaps more humanly significant to try to define some of the major staging posts on the way to this utopia.

In the terms of another piece, it is more difficult – and may be more useful in making strategy – to define what world society might look like on the political horizon, rather than beyond it.

In one widely-discussed and thoughtful contribution to these kinds of debates (The Age of Consent), George Monbiot suggested that the key issue was democracy (in the mainstream sense of ‘representative democracy in the civil but not the economic sphere’). The key intermediate goal he suggested we should aim towards was a world parliament.

This would make sense if the end state we were aiming for was a globalization of the Western model of capitalist democracy.

If, however, we are convinced that transnational corporations are a key obstacle to needed changes, and their abolition is necessary to secure a just and sustainable world, then some other medium-term goal is going to be more useful to us, and another definition of the kind of ‘global democracy’ we are aiming for.

What restraints on transnational capitalism can we imagine being imposed within basically the present structure of power? Where might these restraints come from?

On the political horizon, it seems clear that there are only three possible sources of restraint: grassroots movements; nation-states; and transnational authorities deriving their power and authority from both states and grassroots movements.

By ‘grassroots movements’ I mean here all sorts of popular associations, trade unions and other forms of ‘civil society’. It is likely that the restraining influence exerted by nation-states, and by global authorities created by nation-states, will be initiated by, and proportional to the combined strength of, grassroots movements and those states which are either oppressed by the present order or willing to challenge it for other reasons.

What kinds of restraint are we talking about?

We are talking about restraints on war, state terrorism, nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, military production and exports.

We are talking about restraints on the use of economic sanctions, international debt, monopoly power over economic markets, aid, unfair trade rules, restrictive patent laws and other forms of intimidation and exploitation.

We are talking about restraints on the destructive flight of capital through financial markets and national industries, and the dumping of environmental and social costs on powerless communities.

How could these kinds of restraints be exercised? By international institutions supported by the collective strength of the more pacific and poorer countries, and by grassroots mobilization both inside and outside the ‘great powers’.

What we need are international organizations, at both the state level and at the popular level, that are committed to combat domination whether by regional bullies, superpower hegemons, or transnational corporations.

These international organisations need to be as democratic as possible, perhaps based on some international economic/financial burden-sharing according to ability to pay, with the greatest degree possible of popular communication, oversight and accountability across national boundaries.

There are old traditions that may be useful here. The election of delegates who do not ‘represent’, but who are faithful conduits for information and opinion between their electors and the discussion/decision-making forums they attend on behalf of their communities. The right to recall delegates at will; fixed terms of office; requirements for rotation of office-holders; and so on.

To these we might add new ideas, which are often elaborations of older principles, familiar from the ‘parecon’ literature.

International grassroots organisations can only be as strong and democratic as the national and local organisations they are built on. (I mean here something fairly loose – organisations spanning a recognised grouping (self-)defined by geography, ethnicity, language or other marker of (self-defined) significance.)

One major goal on the horizon therefore is to build grassroots organisations that are strong and democratic internally (free from sexism, racism, homophobia, classism and other forms of division); free of ‘vanguardism’ and authoritarian control; able to cooperate effectively across language and national boundaries; committed to the radical reform (or abolition) of institutions such as the transnational corporation and the imperial state; and willing and able to make sacrifices in the battle to restrain these disruptive and destructive entities.

At the international level, there is something like the kind of coalition described above regarding trade justice (though not to the same degree in relation to war or environmental crisis, as far as I am aware). Currently, as I understand it, NGOs, foundations and trade unions all play a leading and vitally important role in these coalitions.

Going by the above analysis, two goals for the future would be, on the one hand, to reform these institutions (NGOs, foundations, trade unions and so on) to make them more transparent, democratic and empowering, and, on the other, to build up other independent national and international grassroots organisations that can complement them and perhaps eventually replace them or merge with them.

I think it is also safe to propose strong roots in the organized labour movements, made up of revitalised and militant labour organizations, will be critical to the success of our movements for radical social change.

It goes without saying (I assume) that, from the point of view of workers’ rights at least, the power of transnational corporations can only be countered effectively by transnational unions or coalitions of unions.

So the broad brush picture here would be of a basket of particular restrictive measures which we might describe as ‘Tobin Plus’ or ‘UN Charter Plus), which can exert a restraining influence on the major corporations and on violent states; and international institutions, increasingly grassroots-influenced and -dominated, which are committed to justice and survival and therefore to the reform (and eventual replacement) of the
transnational corporation and the imperial state.

In the absence of real equality, the global majority can check the excesses of the powerful, institutionalize those restraints, and form watchdog institutions that pose a significant countervailing influence.

These new organizations and institutions – whether at the state level, the NGO/trade union level or the grassroots level must increasingly embody the values of the future world society we are building.

Don't Attack Iran

eddie — Wed, 31 May 2006 16:04:52 +0000

The Avoidable Crisis

Airstrikes on Iran would kill considerable
numbers of people; would be illegal and counterproductive; would
undermine international treaties and encourage nuclear weapons
proliferation; and would boost al-Qaeda and other forms of terrorism.
There is a safer, less costly alternative.

Negotiations: A Path Away From Disaster

After North Korea announced that it had
nuclear weapons, the US participated in direct talks (which started
in Aug. 2003 and which have not yet ended). North Korea has not
been referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC). (See this BBC
report on an abortive agreement, and linked documents).

With Iran, the US refuses direct talks,
and is calling for sanctions and a UNSC resolution that can be
taken as authorization for military action. But no one is alleging
that Iran has acquired nuclear weapons, the allegation is only
that Iran may one day be able to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran’s Nuclear Rights

By signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), Iran agreed not to develop nuclear weapons (Article
2), but also gained the right to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination
(Article 4). (NPT text)

International concern centres on two issues.
Firstly, Iran hid part of its nuclear power programme from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until this was exposed
in Dec. 2002.

Secondly, the technology for uranium enrichment
that Iran is using to produce nuclear fuel (3% enriched uranium)
can also be used to produce material for nuclear weapons (90%
enriched uranium).

Worrying as these facts are, it remains
the case that Iran has the legal right to uranium enrichment technology
under Article 4 of the NPT.

Iran’s Nuclear Status

Since Feb. 2003, IAEA inspectors in Iran
have operated with greater freedom under a new agreement with
Tehran. On 27 Feb. 2006, the IAEA again confirmed that all
the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for,
and that the Agency has
not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices. (Report,
para 53)

Questions remain, but as yet there is no
proven weapons programme in Iran.

In Sept. 2005, the International Institute
for Strategic Studies said
that Irans nuclear option is not imminent:

On purely technical grounds, Iran
appears to be at least several
years away from producing enough fissile material for
a nuclear weapon, and whether Iran has the expertise to fabricate
a nuclear weapon from this material is unknown.

This is the worst-case scenario in terms
of how soon Iran could produce a nuclear weapon. It would take
several years only if Iran prioritized speed over
secrecy, and did not try to conceal its programme from the outside
world.

Iran’s Nuclear Policy

On 14 Jan. 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad said: The
countries which seek nuclear weapons are those which want to solve
all problems by the use of force. Our nation does not need such
weapons.

More significantly, Irans Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is said to have issued a fatwa
or legal ruling that: the production, stockpiling and use
of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic
Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons. (Announced
in Aug. 2005)

No one takes such declarations of policy
at face value, whoever is making them. However, it is at least
interesting that the Iranian leadership has such a strong stand
against the development of nuclear weapons.

Threatening Genocide?

President Ahmadinejad has been reported
as calling for Israel to be wiped off the map.

In fact, a better translation (by Israeli
monitoring group MEMRI)
is eliminated from the pages of history. He quite
clearly meant the political state of Israel, not the people of
Israel; one of his examples of apparently invincible regimes which
had been eliminated was Iranthe dictatorship
of the Shah of Iran. (See this
transcript.)

Ahmadinejads influence over foreign
policy is actually quite limited. In Iran, it is the Supreme Leader
(currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) who controls foreign and military
policy. (See this BBC Online
explanation of the constitutional arrangements.)

Ayatollah Khamenei responded
to Ahmadinejad’s remarks by saying: We will not commit
aggression towards any nations.

As we have seen, he is also said to have
forbidden the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Preventive War – Illegal

Under the standard view of international
law, pre-emptive self-defence can only be justified when the threat
is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation. (See this BBC
article explaining the origins of this terminology.)

According to its National
Security Strategy, the US will attack enemies before
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction.

This is not pre-emptive,
this is preventive war,
before the enemy is even able to attack.

A US attack on Iran would be totally illegal.

When Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw accepted
this: We could not justify it under Article 51 of the UN
charter which permits self-defence.

Counterproductive airstrikes

IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei says:
I do not believe that military strikes can solve this problem.
They can delay development at best. Following an attack, the Iranians
would most certainly go underground to produce a weapon as quickly
and deliberately as possible.

If there are airstrikes, civilians will
be killed (see the Paul
Rogers report), Iran will refuse UN inspections and leave
the NPT, anti-Western terrorism will rocket, and we will be no
nearer knowing the truth about Irans ambitions. Iranian
missile attacks could reach every oilfield in the Gulf.

Airstrikes would also undermine the IAEA,
and the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. An NPT signatory nation
would have been attacked simply for exercising its rights under
Article 4 of the NPT.

Regime Change And Nuclear Threats

US reporter Seymour Hersh was told
by a former US defence official, who still deals with sensitive
issues for the Bush Administration, that the military planning
was premised on a belief that a sustained bombing campaign
in Iran will humiliate the religious leadership and lead the public
to rise up and overthrow the government.

According to Hersh, Pentagon officials have
concluded that the only way to destroy deeply-buried Iranian facilities
would be to use nuclear weapons, which they did not recommend.
But when the US Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to remove the nuclear
option from evolving war plans for Iran, the White House vetoed
this move. Senior US officers are apparently considering resigning
over this issue, Hersh reports.

Security Assurances

Hershs source, a Pentagon adviser
on the war on terror, says:
The problem is that the Iranians realize that only by becoming
a nuclear state can they defend themselves against the US.

The alternative is for the US to offer Iran
cast-iron security assurances. (This has been missing from the
EU proposals so far.) With North Korea, the US participated in
direct talks, and signed an
agreement in which Washington made exactly this kind of security
assurance, promising not to attack North Korea with either nuclear
or conventional weapons.

Grand Bargains

Senior Republican Senator Chuck Hagel urges:
Ultimately, any resolution will most likely require security
assurances for Iran. (FT,
8 May 2006, p. 17)

The Financial
Times warns that
attacking Iran would be a catastrophe, and proposes
this bargain:

Iran would have to halt uranium
enrichment and stop work on its heavy water reactor as well
as fully account for past and current nuclear activity. The
US would have to complement European trade and investment carrots
with security guarantees
(including not to invade) and by facilitating regional security
arrangements. This is an opportunity that must be seized.
(15 May, p. 16)

The Israeli Nuclear Monopoly And Counter-Threats

A grand bargain could also
include Israels nuclear weapons as part of a deal to rid
the region of all weapons of mass destruction. The biggest incentive
to proliferation is Israels nuclear monopoly in the region.

Note that the new Israeli vice prime minister
Shimon Peres has also used unacceptable language: Now when
it comes to destruction, Iran too can be destroyed [but] I am
not suggesting an eye for an eye. (Telegraph,
9 May 2006)

Inspections, Guarantees, Disarmament

If Iran wants to acquire nuclear weapons,
no one can now prevent thisby airstrikes or otherwise.

We can restrain
Irans nuclear ambitions by UN
inspections on the ground, monitoring and reporting.

We can remove the
incentive to proliferate by meeting Irans genuine
security needs, with cast-iron security
guarantees from the US, and a regional
WMD disarmament process that includes Israels
nuclear arsenal.

The alternative may be a catastrophe.

Milan Rai is a writer and anti-war activist. His latest book is 7/7: The London Bombings, Islam and the Iraq War. He is an adviser to UK Watch

Letters From Prison - 4

Wed, 30 Nov 2005 20:13:59 +0000

No.16. Untitled

(Wednesday 23 November 2005)

Today I received a card from Suffolk asking “What is it we can do for the best result to stop all the madness?” While only a fool would attempt to answer such a question (see below for first attempt), I have to admit that it is much more fun to be challenged than congratulated.

In the 1980s, I was certain that the most pressing issue in the world was the threat of nuclear weapons. I could not understand why anyone could put energy into any other cause when the United States was about to deploy radically destabilising nuclear weapons bringing nuclear war much closer. Today similar arguments could be be put forward for climate change, or bird flu (which has political dimensions not yet explored in the mainstream media). But today there ismuch greater awareness of the need for autonomous movements operating with common values on parallel (and sometimes overlapping) agendas. (I’m not quite sure of the agendas there.) There is much greater mutual respect between movements than there used to be – and much greater interchange in so many ways between activists in different movements.

Just as there are tensions between “hairdresser” and “architect” modes of action, so there are tensions between single-issue politics, often international in scope, and local or community workplace organising which must arise out of, and be directed by, the attitudes and perceived interests of communities or workforces.

There is no way of prioritising between these various issues + poles – all are necessary for successful social change. But each individual and each group must make her / its own priorities. What is essential for effective action is to have a clear and honest understanding of the contribution you can make as an individual on a sustainable basis, in terms of time, energy, risk, and money, and to contribute wholeheartedly in the group setting. As individuals, we are not only powerless, we are at risk of becoming psychically unbalanced in a world dominated by state propaganda. As members of a group, we can support each other, and we can multiply the power of our efforts.

As activists, we need to have the facts to support our arguments; we need the organisation to focus and channel our energies; and we need the courage to take actions that can persuade and challenge others. We need to educate ourselves and others; we need to be part of information communities. We need to form and support organisations that can mobilise our energies into politically-effective action, and that can develop out skills and confidence across a broad range of competences. We need to get out into the world and engage with the people we seek to persuade. On the street, at work, amongst family and friends, online, in our social circles. And we need to encourage each other. Amazingly, people respond better to encouragement than to criticism, however “constructive”.

What’s the best form of encouragement? Descriptive praise. Not giving a judgement, but a description of the things you like, and how they made you feel, or someone else feel, as a result.

Making a group work is really hard work. But it is laying the foundations for a better society. The bonds we make between us are the bonds that our future will be built on. There are no Special People out there waiting to be discovered, Chosen Ones who will step out and make change. Change will be made by the people around us, but not as they are; they and we will be transformed in the process of making change.

Worker’s control of industry will be exercised by the workers we see around us. Community control by the neighbours around us. But we will all be different. Another World Is Possible.