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 <title>Tariq Ali | ukwatch.net</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/author/tariq_ali</link>
 <description>Recent articles by watch area on ukwatch.net</description>
 <language>en</language>
<item>
 <title>Goodbye to Grosvenor Square </title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/goodbye_to_grosvenor_square</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;The US embassy is withdrawing from its central London fortress. If only America would quit other parts of the world it occupies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Grosvenor Square is about to be liberated. Tidings that the US embassy is moving to an unspecified five-acre location in south London may be good news for local residents (some of whom were renting rooms for a proper view of the rioting in 1968), but bad news for the unhealthier sections of the north London left. Till now, we could all meet happily in central London. A long march to south London is far less enticing, unless the San Francisco model of demonstrating on bikes becomes fashionable here as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of course, we could be spared all this if the United States simply decided to stop bombing and occupying different parts of the world. Apart from anything else, they can&amp;#8217;t afford it any more, which also appears to be the reason for the move from Grosvenor Square. The city is owed £4m in rates – which might be the sale price of the building in these troubled times.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When it finally happens, Grosvenor Square veterans, particularly of the great demonstrations of 1968 calling for Victory to the &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;NLF&lt;/span&gt;,  should make sure there is a properly organized wake with proper music, etc. They should be sent off in style. Old memories must not be obliterated. This could happen if the fortress in the Square is sold off as apartments. Much better if the Imperial War Museum borrowed a few million from one of the Gulf states and purchased it as an adjunct devoted exclusively to US wars. The loan could be written off as a bad debt and Peter Mandelson, back in the cabinet, might help out here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A worry remains. Why south London? Surely, it would make much more sense to ask the British to dissolve the Foreign Office, abolish the post of foreign secretary (each new incumbent worse than the one before) and offer the King Charles Street building to the United States as their Embassy. The advantages to both sides are obvious. It could be on a 50-year basis since, by that time, a party might have emerged in England that  needed a Foreign Office.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It would certainly make it easier for some of us to have  both the US ambassador and the prime minister within striking distance of protesting  crowds that assemble in Trafalgar Square.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Tariq Ali has given many fiery speeches down  the years in front of the soon-to-be abandoned US Embassy in Grosvenor Square. His latest book is The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/goodbye_to_grosvenor_square#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/activism">Activism</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/foreign_policy">Foreign Policy</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/grosvenor_square">grosvenor square</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/us_embassy">US embassy</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/tariq_ali">Tariq Ali</category>
 <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2008 10:21:44 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Alex Doherty</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">6585 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Nato&#039;s lost cause</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/nato039s_lost_cause</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;In the latest clashes on the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4111277.ece&quot;&gt;Pakistan-Afghan border&lt;/a&gt;, Nato troops have killed 11 Pakistani soldiers and injured many more, creating a serious crisis in the country and angering the Pakistan military high command, already split on the question.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;US failure in Afghanistan is now evident and Nato desperation only too visible. Spreading the war to Pakistan would be a disaster for all sides. The Bush-Cheney era is drawing to a close, but it is unlikely that their replacements, despite the debacle in Iraq, will settle the American giant back to a digestive sleep.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The temporary cleavage that opened up between some EU states and Washington on Iraq was resolved after the occupation. They could all unite in Afghanistan and fight the good fight. This view has been strongly supported by every US presidential candidate in the run up to the 2008 elections, with Senator Barack Obama pressuring the White House to &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/01/AR2007080101233.html&quot;&gt;violate Pakistani sovereignty&lt;/a&gt; whenever necessary. He must be pleased.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That the &amp;#8220;good war&amp;#8221; has now turned bad is no longer disputed by a number of serious analysts in the US, even though there is no agreed prescription for dealing with the problems. Not least of which for some is the future of Nato, stranded far away from the Atlantic in a mountainous country, the majority of whose people, after offering a small window of opportunity to the occupiers, realised it was a mistake and became increasingly hostile.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &amp;#8220;neo-Taliban&amp;#8221; control at least 20 districts in the Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan provinces where Nato troops replaced US soldiers. It is hardly a secret that many officials in these zones are closet supporters of the guerrilla fighters. As western intelligence agencies active in the country are fully aware, the situation is out of control. The model envisaged for the occupation was Panama. The then US secretary of State, Colin Powell, explained that: &amp;#8220;The strategy has to be to take charge of the whole country by military force, police or other means&amp;#8221;. His knowledge of Afghanistan was limited. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Panama, populated by 3.5 million people, could not have been more different to Afghanistan, which has a population approaching 30 million and is geographically quite dissimilar. To even attempt a military occupation of the entire country would require a minimum of 200,000 troops. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A total of 8000 US troops were dispatched to seal the victory. The 4000 &amp;#8220;peacekeepers&amp;#8221; sent by other countries never left Kabul. The Germans concentrated on creating a police force that could run a police state and the Italians, without any sense of irony, were busy &amp;#8220;training an Afghan judiciary&amp;#8221; to deal with the drugs mafia. The British were in Helmand amidst the poppy fields. As for the new satellite states involved – Czechs, Slovenes, Poles, Estonians, Slovakians and Romanians – it was useful training for the future.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Five years later, in September 2006, an attempted bombing of the US embassy came close to hitting its target. A &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;CIA&lt;/span&gt; assessment that same month painted a sombre picture, depicting Karzai and his regime as hopelessly corrupt and incapable of defending Afghanistan against the Taliban. Ronald E Neumann, the US Ambassador in Kabul supported this view and told an interviewer that the US faced &amp;#8220;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/05/world/asia/05afghan.html&quot;&gt;stark choices&lt;/a&gt;&amp;#8220; and defeat could only be avoided through &lt;br/&gt;&amp;#8220;multiple billions&amp;#8221; over &amp;#8220;multiple years&amp;#8221;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The repression, striking blindly, leaves people with no option but to back those trying to resist, especially in a part of the world where the culture of revenge is strong. When a whole community feels threatened it reinforces solidarity, regardless of the character or weakness of those who fight back.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Many Afghans who detest the Taliban are so angered by the failures of Nato and the behaviour of its troops that they are hostile to the occupation. Nato itself has stopped pretending that its occupation has anything to do with the needs of the Afghan people and acknowledge it as an open-ended American military thrust into the Middle East and Central Asia. As the Economist summarises, &amp;#8220;Defeat would be a body blow not only to the Afghans, but&amp;#8221; – and more importantly, of course – to the Nato alliance&amp;#8221;. As ever, geopolitics prevail over Afghan interests in the calculus of the big powers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The basing agreement signed by Washington with its appointee in Kabul in May 2005 gives the Pentagon the right to maintain a massive military presence in Afghanistan in perpetuity. That Washington is not seeking permanent bases in this fraught and inhospitable terrain simply for the sake of &amp;#8220;democratisation and good governance&amp;#8221; was made clear by Nato&amp;#8217;s secretary general &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0229_nato.aspx&quot;&gt;Jaap de Hoop Scheffer&lt;/a&gt; at the Brookings Institution in February this year: the opportunity to site military facilities, and potentially nuclear missiles, in a country that borders China, Iran and Central Asia was too good to miss.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;More strategically, Afghanistan has become a central theatre for uniting, and extending, the west&amp;#8217;s power-political grip on the world order. On the one hand, it is argued, it provides an opportunity for the US to shrug off its failures in imposing its will in Iraq and persuading its allies to play a broader role there. In contrast, as one &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf&quot;&gt;report (pdf) &lt;/a&gt; suggests, America and its allies &amp;#8220;have greater unity of purpose in Afghanistan. The ultimate outcome of Nato&amp;#8217;s effort to stabilise Afghanistan and US leadership of that effort may well affect the cohesiveness of the alliance and Washington&amp;#8217;s ability to shape Nato&amp;#8217;s future.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are at least two routes out of the Khyber impasse. The first and the worst would be to Balkanise the country. This appears to be the dominant pattern of imperial hegemony at the moment, but whereas the Kurds in Iraq and the Kosovans and others in the former Yugoslavia were willing client-nationalists, the likelihood of Tajiks or Hazaris playing this role effectively is more remote in Afghanistan.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second alternative would require a withdrawal of all US/Nato forces, either preceded or followed by a regional pact to guarantee Afghan stability for the next ten years. Pakistan, Iran, India and Russia could guarantee and support a functioning national government, pledged to preserving the ethnic and religious diversity of Afghanistan and creating a space in which all its citizens can breathe, think and eat every day. It would need a serious social and economic plan to rebuild the country and provide the basic necessities for its people.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nato&amp;#8217;s failure cannot be simply blamed on the Pakistani government. It is a traditional colonial ploy to blame &amp;#8220;outsiders&amp;#8221; for internal problems. If anything, the war in Afghanistan has created a critical situation in two Pakistani frontier provinces and the use of the Pakistan army by Centcom has resulted in suicide terrorism in Lahore with the federal intelligence agency and a naval training college targeted by supporters of the Afghan insurgents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.afghan-network.net/Ethnic-Groups/pashtuns.html&quot;&gt;Pashtun majority&lt;/a&gt; in Afghanistan has always had close links to its fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan. The present border was an imposition by the British empire, but it has always remained porous. It is virtually impossible to build a Texan fence or an Israeli wall across the mountainous and largely unmarked 2500km border that separates the two countries. The solution is political, not military. And it should be sought in the region not in Washington or Brussels.&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/nato039s_lost_cause#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/terror/war">Terror/War</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/afghanistan">Afghanistan</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/nato">nato</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/pakistan">Pakistan</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/war">war</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/tariq_ali">Tariq Ali</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 11 Jun 2008 15:44:13 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Ellie Keen</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">5967 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>1968: Tariq Ali Looks Back</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/1968_tariq_ali_looks_back</link>
 <description>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;em&gt;Listen to the interview&lt;/em&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://play.rbn.com/?url=demnow/demnow/demand/2008/may/audio/dn20080529.ra&amp;amp;proto=rtsp&amp;amp;start=25:05&quot;&gt;As streamed audio&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://media.switchpod.com/users/democracynow/ftp/dn2008-0529-1.mp3&quot;&gt;Download MP3 file&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Guest:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;em&gt;Tariq Ali, acclaimed British Pakistani historian, activist and commentator. He is one of the editors of the New Left Review and the author of a dozen books, including Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties. His forthcoming book is The Duel: Pakistan on the Flightpath of American Power.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;We turn now to the latest part of our series &amp;#8220;1968: Forty Years Later.&amp;#8221; For a discussion on the legacy of 1968, I’m joined by the political activist, novelist and historian, Tariq Ali. Back in the 1960s, with the Vietnam War at its height, Tariq Ali earned a national reputation through debates with figures like Henry Kissinger and then-British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart. He protested against the Vietnam War, led the now-infamous march on the American embassy in London in 1968, and edited the revolutionary paper &lt;i&gt;Black Dwarf&lt;/i&gt;, where he became friends with numerous influential figures, such as Stokely Carmichael, Malcolm X, John Lennon and Yoko Ono.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Forty years later, Tariq Ali continues his lifelong struggle against US foreign policy across the globe. He has written more than a dozen books on world history and politics, as well as five novels and scripts for both stage and screen. He is currently one of the editors of &lt;i&gt;New Left Review&lt;/i&gt;. His memoir is titled &lt;i&gt;Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties&lt;/i&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tariq Ali, welcome to &lt;i&gt;Democracy Now!&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;Good to be with you. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;There&amp;#8217;s so many things that happened in 1968, and obviously you&amp;#8217;ve had time to reflect on all of them. Talk to us first about what was going on in England at the time and your involvement in the social movements that developed at that time. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;What we had in Britain in the ’60s, late ’60s, was a Labour government, which had been elected. This Labour government, despite all its promises, had decided to carry on backing US foreign policy, and the war in Vietnam was at its height. And the government, to our anger, decided to support the war in Vietnam. So there was a wave of anger amongst Labour supporters, who said this is not on. And w then set up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, though it has to be said, Juan, in retrospect, that that Labour government resisted heavy US pressure to send troops to Vietnam. They backed it verbally, but neither Britain nor any other Western European state sent troops to Vietnam, unlike Iraq. So even though they backed it, it was very different. And the United States embassy&amp;#8212;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;The only troops, I think, that were sent by other countries were South Korea, Australia, some of the&amp;#8212;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;South Korea and Australia, always there. But no European country sent troops to fight in Vietnam. Very interesting when you think back on that. It was the height of the Cold War. You would have thought they would, but they didn’t. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And so, a big movement grew, demanding dissociation from the war in Vietnam and for Britain to withdraw political support. And this became a very large movement and backed by virtually every serious political figure in Britain at the time, apart from the government. We had lots of Labour members of Parliament who were opposed to the war, rock singers coming on demonstrations, Mick Jagger writing &amp;#8220;Street Fighting Man,&amp;#8221; numerous other people involved in it. And the fact that this was Britain&amp;#8217;s closest ally in Europe made it a problem. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And I remember Senator Eugene McCarthy, the Democrat peace candidate, saying publicly, “What is our country coming to, when our embassy in the friendliest country we have in the world is permanently under siege?&amp;quot; That cheered us up enormously, because it meant that we were having an impact. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;And the protest at the US embassy that you were involved in? &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;Well, you know, this was after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, where the Vietnamese had taken the US embassy in Saigon for a token period. They had all been killed. I guess you could call it a suicide attack, using today&amp;#8217;s language. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And so, we thought, what can we do to show solidarity with the Vietnamese? Can’t we just capture the embassy for a short time and run the Vietnamese flag up and then withdraw? And in October ’67, we got very close to doing that. And we were surprised, as well, and so were the people in the embassy. So we thought, in March ’68, we would do that. But this time, everyone was prepared, and the police, mounted police, charged us and prevented us from reaching the embassy, so there was a big clash. And then Mick Jagger said, “Well, you know, it’s obvious what we have now got to do. We’ve got to have our own cavalry. So why don&amp;#8217;t we train people to fight on horseback against the mounted police?” But we thought that we’d give this one a miss. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So that was the big clashes outside Grosvenor Square, which stunned the country, actually, because they weren’t prepared for that. But it showed the depth of feeling. And then, a few months later, France exploded in May-June, with ten million workers on strike, which just shifted the whole political locus or focus of the struggle to something completely different, that something which had begun as an antiwar movement was now becoming a deeper social movement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;And the French convulsion, of course, didn’t actually start in Paris, as you mention in an article you recently did at the &lt;i&gt;Guardian&lt;/i&gt;. It started at a smaller university outside of Paris, and it started in March, right? Could you tell&amp;#8212;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;It started on March the&amp;#8212;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;&amp;#8212;for a lot of our younger listeners and viewers, some of that history of that amazing movement, how a few students ended up leading a movement that paralyzed the nation? &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;It’s quite astonishing when you think back on it. On March the 22nd in a campus in Nanterre outside Paris, students came out to protest against the restrictions, against bad housing conditions, and the government overreacted, beat them up. They set up the March the 22nd Committee, which called demonstrations in the heart of the Latin Quarter, and that quarter exploded on the night of May the 10th. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two months later, the campaign erupted with massive clashes. And, you know, the French have this magical capacity to erect barricades. Historically, from the eighteenth century onwards, they’ve been very good at doing barricades. It’s almost genetic now. And so, they put up the barricades in May, and the country was on the&amp;#8212;completely divided. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The students were then joined by workers. There were factory strikes. And soon, by the beginning of June, you had ten million workers on strike, many of them occupying their factories and wanting to run society. And you had Jean-Paul Sartre, the great French philosopher, congratulating the students and workers and saying, “You have put imagination on the seat of power.” So that French upheaval transformed the mode all over Europe, without any doubt, and people were scared. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;And how did the students build that kind of alliance with the labor movement? And how did it spread beyond just the students to the labor movement? &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;I think when workers saw students fighting on the barricades, the effect of that was exemplary. It’s just like the students had seen the Vietnamese fighting in Saigon; that had got them going. So the Latin Quarter in the heart of Paris was, when it was under student control, was renamed the Heroic Vietnam Quarter. And when workers saw students fighting on the barricades, they said, “Hey, hang on a minute. You know, these namby-pamby kids are taking on the state. We suffer much more than they do.” And slowly, delegations of young workers started coming from the car factories, from other factors, and joining students. Very funny story, when building workers suddenly came and said, “Hang on. We can show you how to build better barricades,” and immediately barricades went up. So this exemplary effect then went into the factories, and the trade union leaders, which were communist, all of them, were completely thrown by this and couldn’t control the workers at all, and the workers occupied. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;And the impact of that movement on the social conditions of the people in France, because obviously Charles de Gaulle, the World War II hero, was the president at the time, and the impact on the government and what kinds of reforms emerged from there? &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;Well, the government panicked. Charles de Gaulle, in a very rare outburst of anger, because normally he was very lofty, but when he found out what was going on in his country, he said, “&lt;i&gt;Chie-en-lit&lt;/i&gt;”&amp;#8212;it’s “[expletive] in the bed.” And the students then put up a poster with de Gaulle, saying, “No, you are the &lt;i&gt;chienlit&lt;/i&gt;,” which went all over the streets of Paris. But de Gaulle panicked. During the general strike in France, he panicked. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;He went secretly to address French troops stationed in Baden-Baden in Germany and said to them, “If Paris falls, will you help me to retake it?” And the army&amp;#8212;the general said, “We will, provided you release the generals who were involved in the Algerian coup,” total sort of right-wing generals. And de Gaulle made the deal. Never came to that, thank God, because there would have been massive bloodshed. So it didn’t come to that, but that’s how scared they were. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And you had French journalists traveling Europe and being asked, “Do you think the disease will spread? How serious is it?” because the entire rulers of Western Europe became very nervous. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;And again, what kind of impact was there on French society, in terms of the conditions of workers and students following that? &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;Well, I mean, the impact was that they won massive reforms. You know, the government which came after de Gaulle, Pompidou, actually made a lot of concessions in levels of wages, working conditions, the conditions inside universities. So, in order to prevent revolution, they acceded to a great deal of the workers&amp;#8217; demands. In some factories, trade union bureaucrats would go to the factory and say to the workers, “Guys, we’ve won a 25 percent wage increase,” and they’d say, “Screw it.” “And what do you want?” “We want the factory.” &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;And what most people don’t realize, I think, is that, the past forty years, the ruling classes of France have been trying to take back all of the reforms that were achieved in that short period of time back then, and the French working class has always been considered the most pampered by capitalists of Europe, in terms of their general conditions. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;They are. And the current president, Nicolas Sarkozy, came to power saying, “My victory shows the death of May ’68 and that legacy in France, and I will destroy it forever.” Well, exactly the opposite is happening. His ratings, a year after he was elected, are now rock-bottom. He’s a disliked president, even more unpopular than Chirac. Even as we speak, there are public-sector strikes taking place in France. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;I’d like to move on to Czechoslovakia, also 1968. Certainly, what was happening in France had an impact as well on what happened in Czechoslovakia and in the confrontations with the Soviet Union. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;You know, Juan, I always felt that in some ways what happened in Czechoslovakia offered a great deal of hope, because here you had a reformist faction inside the Czech Communist Party trying to make Czechoslovakia a socialist democracy. Dubcek, the leader of the reform communists, said, “We want socialism with a human face.” &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And that socialism with a human face had already led to the most amazing discussions in the Czech press and Czech television, which became the freest in Europe, even though it was state-owned. Journalists took control, and the newspapers and television were transformed. Political prisoners could confront their jailers on prime-time television and say, “Why did you torture us? Why did you say this?” So the whole country was politicized. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And then, fearful that this particular disease might spread to Russia and Eastern Europe&amp;#8212;and there was every chance it might have&amp;#8212;the Russians sent in the tanks. And the response of &lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;NATO&lt;/span&gt; was not so critical, if you look at what&amp;#8212;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;And they sent in the tanks around&amp;#8212;in what month again? &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;August.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;August. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/b&gt;It was the 21st of August, 1968. The Russians and the Warsaw Pact powers sent in the tanks to crush the Czech experiment. And by doing so, they didn’t know it, but they signed their own death warrant, because, interestingly enough, people like Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel Prize Russian novelist who wrote the famous books on the gulag, he was asked, “When did you lose faith totally in your own country and its capacity to reform from within?” and Solzhenitsyn said, “21st of August, 1968. When they stopped the Czechs from doing what they wanted and transforming the system, then I knew it was the end, and I lost all faith in this regime.” Interesting. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the response of the West was very mild, because they were not happy with the socialism with a human face either. But if the Czechs had won, who knows? The history of Europe might have been very different, because you never had a socialist government which was also democratic. And here, there was a possibility that the two could come together, and that would have given a very different shape to the world in Europe and elsewhere. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/b&gt;We&amp;#8217;re talking to Tariq Ali, the political activist, novelist and historian. His memoir is called &lt;i&gt;Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties&lt;/i&gt;. We’ll be back with him in a minute. Stay with us.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[break]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;We’re talking to Tariq Ali, the political activist, novelist and historian. His memoir is called &lt;i&gt;Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties&lt;/i&gt;. He has a big article in the &lt;i&gt;Guardian&lt;/i&gt; of London called &amp;#8220;&lt;a href=http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/mar/22/vietnamwar&gt;Where Has All the Rage Gone?&lt;/a&gt;&amp;#8221; about 1968. We’ve been talking about England, France, Czechoslovakia, where the fermenting in Europe in 1968, but it wasn’t just in Europe or in North America. There were widespread movements, amazing movements, in other parts of the third world at the same time. And those have gotten far less attention in many of the retrospectives about what’s been going on.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;I know. It’s really awful, that, actually. It shows the sort of nostalgia side of it. People only want to remember what they remembered at the time. But I think the two big events in the third world, one was the Mexican students’ uprising at the&amp;#8212;it was Olympics year, don’t forget. And the Mexican students fought for democracy in their own country against an oppressive semi-one-party state regime. And the Mexican authorities decided to massacre them. There was a gigantic massacre by the Mexican regime. You know, hundreds of students were killed, thousands were wounded. And at the same time, the Olympics were about to take place. No one at that time in the West said, “Let’s boycott the Olympics,” by the way.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;Yes. And in terms of some of the issues that they were raising at the time in Mexico?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;The issues they were raising were social justice, democracy, democratic rights, an end to an authoritarian, corrupt one-party state government. That is what the Mexican students were demanding, and they were mown down. And the most striking image that came out of the Olympics was the two black US athletes who had won the gold&amp;#8212;the runners who had won the gold and silver medals, when they went to the podium. I mean, it was a moment of real pride and internationalism that, in solidarity with the students, they had their medals, and they stood with their heads hanging down and raised their fists to give the clenched fist salute, a very moving event which was seen all over the third world as a sign of solidarity with that world by Afro-American athletes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;And, of course, in Mexico itself, the achieving justice or rectifying what happened back then is still a political battle that’s ongoing in a series of Mexican governments since then.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;It has been ongoing, and it’s still ongoing, because in the last Mexican elections, as anyone who followed them closely knows, Juan, they tricked&amp;#8212;they tricked the electorate once again. They rigged the elections, not as massively as they used to do in the past, but sufficiently to deny López Obrador the presidency. The Obrador campaign, election campaign, in Mexico mobilized more people than any other campaign they’d done, literally a million people in the Zócolo, in the heart of Mexico City. And then they say he didn’t&amp;#8212;and this was the case in most parts of the country. Everyone thought he was going to win. But suddenly, at the last moment, they rigged the elections, and all the people who accuse Chavez in Venezuela of all sorts of crimes and send hundreds of observers to watch every move were not present when the pro-Western government in Mexico was rigging the elections against López Obrador.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;Then, of course, the events in your own homeland, which are perhaps the least covered or remembered of all the major upheavals of 1968.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;You know, people sometimes get surprised when they ask me, “Well, we know about ’68, but we lost everywhere. We fought, and we lost.” And I say, hang on a minute. There&amp;#8217;s one country where they fought for three months, the students in Pakistan, against a military dictatorship. And the struggle began on November the 7th, 1968, went on ’til March the 10th, 1969. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And if you look at the chronology of that struggle, Juan, it gets bigger and bigger and bigger. Workers join, white-collar workers join, lawyers join, women join, judges come out on the streets, prostitutes get organized and come out. It became a massive social struggle. And every day, the number of people getting killed gets bigger and bigger and bigger. We still don’t have accurate figures of how many people the police and army shot dead in Pakistan. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But finally, when railway workers began to disrupt the railways, taking out the railway lines from the track, and the demand was very simple: end of dictatorship, and democratic free elections in the country. These were the two central demands. But the military dictator of the time, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, backed by Washington and London, was standing firm, ’til he realized he couldn’t carry on. And in March, he was toppled. And I remember&amp;#8212;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;Why was he so backed by Washington and London?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;Well, because Washington, in Pakistan, have always preferred to rule via the military than through civilian politicians. They don’t trust the civilian politicians too much. So all the three key dictators Pakistan have had had been backed by Washington. And in fact, Ayub was put into power by Washington in October ’58. So after ten years, the students&amp;#8212;he was removed. It was an insurrection, and he had to go. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And I was in the country at the time, and the mood was just exhilarating, euphoria, you know, people celebrating on the streets, hugging each other, distributing sweets. And religion played no part in the struggle at all. It was a totally secular struggle. And the three big demands of the movement, social demands of the movement, were food, clothes and shelter for all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;You also talk about the enormous development of a feminist movement at that time, which most people, when you&amp;#8217;re dealing with the Muslim world, would not even envision that. But as far back as ’68, there was a strong feminist movement there.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;There was a strong women&amp;#8217;s organizations in both parts of Pakistan, as it was then. And one of the most moving things was when a student was killed in the western part of the country, in the eastern part of the country, which later became Bangladesh, women would just pour out onto the streets, very few with their heads covered, but barefooted in mourning and in solidarity with what was happening to students in West Pakistan. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the feminist movement, you know, it’s often forgotten: why was it called the women&amp;#8217;s “liberation” movement? The word &amp;#8220;liberation&amp;#8221; came from Vietnam. The National Liberation Front of Vietnam was fighting for its freedom; we should fight for our freedom. Gay liberation movement, women&amp;#8217;s liberation movement, black liberation movement were inspired by all those struggles. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And I guess, of what survives from that, in terms of the legacy, the biggest gains were probably made on that front, social and sexual front. Women’s rights were won, the right of women to have abortions, the ending of illegalizing abortions, homosexuality, which was totally crushed. People now forget, because so much has changed on that front, that in countries like Britain, in the late ’50s and ’60s, early ‘60s, it was illegal to be gay. Illegal. You were arrested if you were found out. I have many friends who were locked up. Now, young people can hardly believe that. So the ’68 movement was a political, social, and movement for sexual liberation, which shouldn’t be forgotten. A lot of the rights being enjoyed by women and gay people today come from that movement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;And yet, as you say, religion played no part in that movement, and yet now religion plays such a huge part in the daily life and the political life of Pakistan today. What was the transformation that has occurred?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;You know, I challenge that, actually. I think what&amp;#8212;the last general elections in Pakistan, the religious parties were virtually wiped out electorally. It is true that there is much more religiosity on Pakistan, but there is in virtually all parts of the world, including this country. But in terms of the religious parties actually dominating Pakistan, this is not true, or the notion that Pakistan is on the eve of a Jihadi takeover and the Jihadi finger on the nuclear trigger. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I’ve just written a long a book on Pakistan, which will be published in September, in which I actually challenge all these mythologies and ask why are they being created and what is the function of it. The bulk of the country isn’t attracted to either Jihadi or religious politics. These are a tiny, tiny minority in Pakistan. The real problems of people in that country are food, clothing, shelter, education. And no political party or the military are interested in solving them. The surprise is, for me, that more people don’t move towards religion. But they don’t.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;So where has the rage gone, as you’ve asked in your article? And why there is so little of that kind of rage that erupted in a short period in the late ’60s and early ’70s?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;Well, I think it was a different period. That was an epoch of wars, of revolutions. Don’t forget, a lot of revolutions had taken place. I mean, the Cuban revolution had happened in 1959. So the mood was very different, whereas what we are witnessing now is essentially the attempts to revive a movement after massive defeats. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So the demonstrations against the war in Iraq in 2003 were gigantic, much larger than anything that happened in the ’60s, both the United States and in Europe. Gigantic. But it was a spasm. It happened, and then it disappeared. And it was as if millions of ordinary citizens were coming out to tell their politicians, “You’re lying. We know you’re lying. Don’t force us into this war.” But once the war happened and Iraq was occupied, through demoralization, depression, a sense of powerlessness, they retreated. Whereas in ’68 the movement grew slowly and built up to a peak, here the movement peaked to try and stop a war, and then it disappeared.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;Well, you mention the massive protest in 2002, 2003. We also had, in this country, massive protests just a year or two ago of unprecedented protest of immigrants in the country&amp;#8212;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;Yeah.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;&amp;#8212;over attempts to recruit much more draconian laws against immigrants. Yet, again, that movement too rose and then dissipated, and there hasn’t been any significant continuity. Could it be that part of the problem is that there&amp;#8217;s been much less emphasis on the need for strong radical and revolutionary organizations to move from one massive uprising to another to be able to provide some kind of accumulated strength to the progressive movement?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;Well. I think that is a part of the problem, is that there is no political organization, radical or otherwise, which can actually take these movements forward, except in Latin America, Juan, where country after country, you have giant social movements in Latin America. And then the result in Venezuela, in Bolivia, in Ecuador and now in Paraguay, of all places, is victories for people attached to these movements. So, Latin America, I argue, is one of the few places where there is hope. But in the rest of the world, movements rise and fall. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I mean, we could say, in a way, that an unusual development in Western politics is the size of audiences which Barack Obama is getting. He has energized youth in a way that they weren’t energized before. And it’s foolish and sectarian to say, but it’s the Democrats. Yeah, it is, but that’s not the interesting thing. The interesting thing is that a young generation has become attracted to politics again. The question is, will it remain so if the Democrats win? But it’s an interesting phenomenon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;Or&amp;#8212;but then the issue is, are they attached to normal Democratic party politics, or are they attached to some kind of a real&amp;#8212;a potential social movement? That’s the big issue is, in terms of the presidential race.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;Well, it’s&amp;#8212;you know, the strength of this campaign for Obama has been that people think he is offering something different, that this will mark a break. And, of course, on one level, his race, it will mark a phenomenal break if he’s elected. But whether it will on other things, of course, remains to be seen. If he wins, my advice to everyone here is to be at the celebrations in Washington with banners saying &amp;quot;Pull out of Iraq now,” is to make it a big antiwar moment, because since he’s used his opposition to the war in Iraq in this campaign, one shouldn’t stay aloof from this movement, but find ways of intervening in it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;And in Europe today and in Britain, what are the expectations of these presidential elections?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;In Europe, well, it varies from place to place. I mean, I think, for instance, in Italy, which has just had a big victory of the right, they will find it awkward, because it’s a very racist government now in Italy. Juan, I don’t know whether people here follow it, but 68 percent of Italians want all the gypsies, the traveling people, expelled from the country, forgetting that they too were victims of the Third Reich and were wiped out in the Second World War. So if America elects a black president, I think a lot of Italian right-wingers will be slightly disconcerted, saying “Oh, but these are the sort of people we are trying to get rid of from our country.” &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Britain, they are prepared to go along with anyone Washington elects, both political parties, New Labour and Conservative. So they are not bothered. Their position will be support the White House, whoever’s there. If Obama changes some things, they’ll go along with that. They are not going to fight. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But Europe, of course, is watching this quite keenly, because in Germany, for instance, and other places, you have politicians who have been incredibly upset by the Iraq business and now Afghanistan, where they see no hope at all. So they are hoping that there will be a change of regime, which will pull out and allow the Western world to breathe again without occupying countries. But, you know, that may be a hope which might not be fulfilled, but we’ll see.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;Well, I want to thank you very much for being with us, Tariq Ali. You’re going to be speaking tomorrow night, May 30th, at 7:30 at the Baruch Performing Arts Center in a public forum on “The New Imperialism: Old Problems and New Challenges.” Thanks again for being with us.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;TARIQ&lt;/span&gt; ALI: &lt;/B&gt;Thank you very much.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;caps&quot;&gt;JUAN&lt;/span&gt; GONZALEZ: &lt;/B&gt;Tariq Ali, political activist, novelist and historian. &lt;i&gt;An Autobiography of the Sixties&lt;/i&gt; is his book. He’s speaking tomorrow at the Baruch Performing Arts Center here in New York.&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/1968_tariq_ali_looks_back#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/activism">Activism</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/1968">1968</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/protest">protest</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/vietnam">Vietnam</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/taxonomy/term/2787">Democracy Now</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/tariq_ali">Tariq Ali</category>
 <pubDate>Sat, 31 May 2008 20:23:22 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Ellie Keen</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">5908 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Labour&#039;s time is up</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/labour039s_time_is_up</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Power can shape &amp;#8220;truth&amp;#8221;, but not for ever. That is one lesson that could be learned from the series of electoral defeats that mark the end of New Labour&amp;#8217;s weightless hegemony. There is something grotesque about the daily denunciations of Brown by hardcore Blairites in parliament and their media acolytes, who barely uttered a word of criticism as the country was dragged into two wars and New Labour prettified the Thatcherite social and economic agenda, now calling for the removal of Brown. As if his removal and replacement by a robotic Blairite (&lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Miliband&quot;&gt;Miliband&lt;/a&gt; senior, &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Purnell&quot;&gt;Purnell&lt;/a&gt; and, amusingly enough, even &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alan_Milburn&quot;&gt;Milburn&lt;/a&gt; is mentioned in this regard) would do the trick.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The litany of own goals scored by Gordon Brown is endless and has been well-documented. That one of these could lead, sooner rather than later, to the independence of Scotland, is ironic, but all this is beside the point. Brown was fully implicated in the New Labour project and funded its hyper-militarism. He is too weak to even mimic Zapatero in Spain and Rudd in Australia by withdrawing British troops from Iraq. Instead, one of his zombies devised the pathetic idea of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/may/19/education.military&quot;&gt;Armed Forces Day&lt;/a&gt; to celebrate militarism and encourage school-leavers to take up killing foreigners as their main subject and graduate or die in the university of the world.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fact is that New Labour&amp;#8217;s time is up. When it came to power waving the Union Jack in 1997, the social landscape had already been wrecked by Thatcherism. The phallic architecture of the deregulated financial companies dominated the city, the old gents and their cozy networks were consigned to clubland. Silicon and pharmaceutical firms, funded by Japanese and American capital and immunised against a trade-union movement, neutered by the state, sprouted along the M4 corridor southwest from London and Reading.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The old textile towns were reduced to the status of cemetries; iron and steelworks had been ploughed to rubble. The old working class was dead. In the transference of class wealth and power, Thatcherism and its neocon New Labour worshippers were eminently successful. Wealth disparities had increased during the Blair/Brown years. The &amp;#8220;modernisation&amp;#8221; had fallen manifestly short as a solution to long-term problems of productivity and investment, leaving aside the archaic political structures of the British state. Many of the cash-starved utilities had foundered in private hands. Schools and hospitals continued to deteriorate. As railway privatisation proved a disaster, New Labour &amp;#8220;radicals&amp;#8221; were thinking of how the &amp;#8220;revolution of choice&amp;#8221; could privatise health and education.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From the start New Labour was pledged to consolidate the Thatcherite paradigm rather than offer anything different. Blair&amp;#8217;s model was to depoliticise Labour (and the electorate) by preaching against the sin of &amp;#8220;ideology&amp;#8221; (ie social democracy) in the name of a new, beyond left-and-right, trendy Starbucks-style capitalism. And so it was decreed that Labour should become little more than a British version of the US Democratic Party with cheerleaders and all, though it is more remiscent of the Republicans. Domestically, Brown would aim for fiscal-surplus levels usually only demanded of the Third World, to be ameliorated by a few low-cost anti-poverty measures. Globally, New Labour would, in its own words, station itself &amp;#8220;up the arse of the White House and stay there&amp;#8221;. This was 10 Downing Street&amp;#8217;s instruction in 1997 to Her Majesty&amp;#8217;s new representative in the United States.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While all this was going on there was little opposition within the Labour Party or the major trades unions. As long as they were in power with over-sized, if unrepresentative majorities, the brothers and sisters might grumble a bit in private, but power was what really mattered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Look at them now as they squeal in anguish at the thought that they might lose their jobs. Members of the cabinet who have helped deregulate the country will find something or the other if the economy doesn&amp;#8217;t collapse, but for New Labour cannon-fodder the world outside the bubble offers little hope. It&amp;#8217;s too late now. They should accept that the party&amp;#8217;s over. Desperate squabbling to retain power at all costs without any political principle involves will not endear them to the electorate and is unrealistic in any case.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As for Gordon Brown, he may be a lame-duck prime minister, but he could still do something decent. After all, he has nothing to lose now except his job. He could withdraw British troops from Iraq and Afghanistan and, like the Irish Republic, permit a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. Worth remembering that Blair&amp;#8217;s massive majorities were the product not of voter enthusiasm but of a winner-takes-all electoral system, which helped to mask the collapse of the Conservatives, the country&amp;#8217;s historic party of government. The Tory recovery is a sign of how low New Labour has fallen and marks its end.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Brown could push through two constitutional measures badly needed at home: a fully elected second chamber and proportional representation. It might help reverse a growing alienation of the young from the political process. Were he to realise that he owes the country something, he might still make the history books and as more than an accessory to war crimes.&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/labour039s_time_is_up#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/politics">Politics</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/gordon_brown">gordon brown</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/neoliberalism">neoliberalism</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/new_labour">new labour</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/tariq_ali">Tariq Ali</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2008 16:04:24 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>JamieSW</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">5890 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>New Labour is Dead</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/new_labour_is_dead</link>
 <description>&lt;h3&gt;Power Can&amp;#8217;t Shape Truth Forever&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;New Labour has suffered a crushing defeat. The Blair project of promoting and implementing right-wing policies in the knowledge that traditional working class voters would remain solid died on 1 May 2008. Labour’s vote in the local elections in dropped to 24 percent, a point below the Liberal Democrats and twenty points less than the Conservatives (44 percent). Given the scale of the catastrophe, It seems unlikely that Gordon Brown can win the next general election.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Awestruck by Margaret Thatcher, Blair and Brown aped her achievements within their own party, squeezing old social-democratic ideas out of themselves, drop by drop. They were all market fundamentalists now. Deregulation and privatisation became a mantra and over the last ten years the social divide in the country between rich and poor increased more than even under Thatcher. Redistribution of wealth was no longer on Labour’s agenda.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As the market suffered a series of shocks&amp;#8212;-the collapse of a debt-ridden British bank, Northern Rock, led to state intervention in the form of nationalisation. No lessons were learnt. Helping the rich by further tax-cuts, abandoning (under pressure from the Financial Times) plans to tax non-domiciled billionaires symbolised the regime. The neo-liberal model atomised social and political life, weakened democratic accountability and drastically reduced the margins of reformist possibilities within the system. After 9/11 civil liberties were seriously eroded. A fdew weeks ago Brown and his ministers were arguing for increasing the detention of suspects to 42-days without trial. The Conservatives and police chiefs opposed this as draconian.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The British electoral system helped to conceal the relentless ebbing of popular support for the Blairite agenda. No longer. The New Labour Emperor is now revealed without any clothes. Power can shape ‘truth’, but not forever. That is the lesson of the New Labour defeat.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In London the choice was clear. . A Conservative celebrity who carefully cultivates an ultra-reactionary image, Boris Johnson, is a star of TV comedy shows. Given the way that politics has gone to the dogs in so many parts of the democratic world, its hardly surprising that celebrity status and wealth have taken centre stage. A somewhat pathetic and ineffectual ex-policeman stood for the Liberal Democrats or Ken Livingstone, the Labour candidate. Even though Livingstone first won as an independent against New Labour, he subsequently made his peace with Blair and rejoined the party, while preserving an independent stance on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and developing his own foreign policy by inviting Hugo Chavez to visit London.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The elections for the Mayor of London reflected the national mood. That Livingstone made mistakes is obvious. The biggest error was not in receiving an eccentric Muslim cleric and annjoying the right-wing press, but re-entering the Labour fold. The basis of his popularity had rested on the fact that he was not a confected New Labour politician. The fact that margin of his defeat appears to be less than the national average reflected this fact, but was not enough to save him. The official result has yet to be declared, but New Labour commentators on TV have accepted defeat. He suffered because he was associated with an unpopular New Labour government. Had he remained an independent and lacerated the Blair and Brown regimes, instead of being photographed with them he would have been home and dry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A city in which 70% of the citizens oppose the British presence in Iraq will now be represented by a pro-war mayor. Who cares if a million Iraqis have died since the occupation of their country, three million have become refugees and millions in that suffering country face the most horrendous conditions in their everyday lives. Anything associated with New Labour was punished.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Tariq Ali’s memoir&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1844670295/counterpunchmaga&quot;&gt;Streetfighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt; is published by Verso.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


</description>
 <comments>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/new_labour_is_dead#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/watch_area/politics">Politics</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/blair">Blair</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/elections">elections</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/neoliberalism">neoliberalism</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/tags/new_labour">new labour</category>
 <category domain="http://www.ukwatch.net/author/tariq_ali">Tariq Ali</category>
 <pubDate>Sun, 04 May 2008 11:38:38 +0000</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Ellie Keen</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">5792 at http://www.ukwatch.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Afghanistan: Mirage of the Good War</title>
 <link>http://www.ukwatch.net/article/afghanistan_mirage_of_the_good_war</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Rarely has there been such an enthusiastic display of international unity as that which greeted the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Support for the war was universal in the chanceries of the West, even before its aims and parameters had been declared. &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; governments rushed to assert themselves ‘all for one’. Blair jetted round the world, proselytizing the ‘doctrine of the international community’ and the opportunities for peace-keeping and nation-building in the Hindu Kush. Putin welcomed the extension of American bases along Russia’s southern borders. Every mainstream Western party endorsed the war; every media network—with &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;bbc&lt;/span&gt; World and &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;cnn&lt;/span&gt; in the lead—became its megaphone. For the German Greens, as for Laura Bush and Cherie Blair, it was a war for the liberation of the women of Afghanistan.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn1&quot; name=&quot;_ednref1&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; In fact, the only period in Afghan history where women were granted equal rights and educated was from 1979–89, the decade it was ruled by the  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;pdpa&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, backed by Soviet troops. Repressive in many ways, on the health and education fronts real progress was achieved, as in Iraq under Saddam. Hence the nostalgia for the past amongst poorer sections of society in both countries.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [1]&lt;/a&gt; For the White House, a fight for civilization. For Iran, the impending defeat of the Wahhabi enemy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Three years later, as the chaos in Iraq deepened, Afghanistan became the ‘good war’ by comparison. It had been legitimized by the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;un&lt;/span&gt;—even if the resolution was not passed until after the bombs had finished falling—and backed by &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt;. If tactical differences had sharpened over Iraq, they could be resolved in Afghanistan. First Zapatero, then Prodi, then Rudd, compensated for pulling troops out of Iraq by dispatching them to Kabul.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn2&quot; name=&quot;_ednref2&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Visiting Madrid after Zapatero’s election triumph of March 2008, I was informed by a senior government official that they had considered a total withdrawal from Afghanistan a few months before the polls but had been outmanoeuvred by the  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; promising Spain that the head of its military would be proposed for commander of the  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nato&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forces, and a withdrawal from Kabul would disrupt this possibility. Spain drew back, only to discover it had been tricked. &#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [2]&lt;/a&gt; France and Germany could extol their peace-keeping or civilizing roles there. As suicide bombings increased in Baghdad, Afghanistan was now—for American Democrats keen to prove their ‘security’ credentials—the ‘real front’ of the war on terror, supported by every &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; presidential candidate in the run-up to the 2008 elections, with Senator Obama pressuring the White House to violate Pakistani sovereignty whenever necessary. With varying degrees of firmness, the occupation of Afghanistan was also supported by China, Iran and Russia; though in the case of the latter, there was always a strong element of &lt;i&gt;Schadenfreude. &lt;/i&gt;Soviet veterans of the Afghan war were amazed to see their mistakes now being repeated by the United States in a war even more inhumane than its predecessor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Meanwhile, the number of Afghan civilians killed has exceeded many tens of times over the 2,746 who died in Manhattan. Unemployment is around 60 per cent and maternal, infant and child mortality levels are now among the highest in the world. Opium harvests have soared, and the ‘Neo-Taliban’ is growing stronger year by year. By common consent, Karzai’s government does not even control its own capital, let alone provide an example of ‘good governance’. Reconstruction funds vanish into cronies’ pockets or go to pay short-contract Western consultants. Police are predators rather than protectors. The social crisis is deepening. Increasingly, Western commentators have evoked the spectre of failure—usually in order to spur &lt;i&gt;encore un effort&lt;/i&gt;. A &lt;i&gt;Guardian &lt;/i&gt;leader summarizes: ‘Defeat looks possible, with all the terrible consequences that will bring.’&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn3&quot; name=&quot;_ednref3&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; ‘Failing State’, Guardian, 1 February 2008; see also ‘The Good War, Still to Be Won’ and ‘Gates, Truth and Afghanistan’, New York Times, 20 August 2007 and 12 February 2008; ‘Must they be wars without end?’, Economist, 13 December 2007; International Crisis Group, ‘Combating Afghanistan’s Insurgency’, 2 November 2006.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [3]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Two principal arguments, often overlapping, are put forward as to ‘what went wrong’ in Afghanistan. For liberal imperialists, the answer can be summarized in two words: ‘not enough’. The invasion organized by Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld was done on the cheap. The ‘light footprint’ demanded by the Pentagon meant that there were too few troops on the ground in 2001–02. Financial commitment to ‘state-building’ was insufficient. Though it may now be too late, the answer is to pour in more troops, more money—‘multiple billions’ over ‘multiple years’, according to the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; Ambassador in Kabul.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn4&quot; name=&quot;_ednref4&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039;New York Times, 5 November 2006.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [4]&lt;/a&gt; The second answer—advanced by Karzai and the White House, but propagated by the Western media generally—can be summed up in one word: Pakistan. Neither of these arguments holds water.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Political failures&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;True, there was a sense of relief in Kabul when the Taliban’s Wahhabite Emirate was overthrown. Though rape and heroin production had been curtailed under their rule, warlords kept at bay and order largely restored in a country that had been racked by foreign and civil wars since 1979, the end result had been a ruthless social dictatorship with a level of control over the everyday lives of ordinary people that made the clerical regime in Iran appear an island of enlightenment. The Taliban government fell without a serious struggle. Islamabad, officially committed to the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; cause, forbade any frontal confrontation.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn5&quot; name=&quot;_ednref5&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Pakistan’s key role in securing this ‘victory’ was underplayed in the Western media at the time. The public was told that it was elite Special Forces units and  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;cia&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ‘specialists’ that had liberated Afghanistan; having triumphed here they could now be sent on to Iraq.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [5]&lt;/a&gt; Some Taliban zealots crossed the border into Pakistan, while a more independent faction loyal to Mullah Omar decamped to the mountains to fight another day. Kabul was undefended; the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;bbc&lt;/span&gt; war correspondent entered the capital before the Northern Alliance. What many Afghans now expected from a successor government was a similar level of order, minus the repression and social restrictions, and a freeing of the country’s spirit. What they were instead presented with was a melancholy spectacle that blasted all their hopes. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The problem was not lack of funds but the Western state-building project itself, by its nature an exogenous process—aiming to construct an army able to suppress its own population but incapable of defending the nation from outside powers; a civil administration with no control over planning or social infrastructure, which are in the hands of Western &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;ngo&lt;/span&gt;s; and a government whose foreign policy marches in step with Washington’s. It bore no relation to the realities on the ground. After the fall of the Taliban government, four major armed groups re-emerged as strong regional players. In the gas-rich and more industrialized north, bordering the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum was in charge with his capital in Mazar-i-Sharif. Allied first to the Communists, later the Taliban and most recently &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt;, General Dostum had demonstrated his latest loyalty by massacring 2–3,000 Taliban and Arab prisoners under the approving gaze of &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; intelligence personnel in December 2001.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Not too far from Dostum, in the mountainous north-east of the country, a region rich in emeralds, lapis lazuli and opium, the late Ahmed Shah Masoud had built a fighting organization of Tajiks, who regularly ambushed troops on the Salang Highway that linked Kabul to Tashkent during the Soviet occupation. Masoud had been the leader of the armed wing of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamaat-i-Islami, which operated in tandem with an allied Islamist leader, Abd al-Rabb Sayyaf (both men were lecturers in &lt;i&gt;sharia&lt;/i&gt; at the law faculty of Kabul University in 1973, where these movements were incubated). Until 1993 they were funded by Saudi Arabia, after which the latter gradually shifted its support to the Taliban. Masoud maintained a semi-independence during the Taliban period, up to his death on 9 September 2001.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn6&quot; name=&quot;_ednref6&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Masoud had been a favourite pin-up in Paris during the Soviet–Afghan war, usually portrayed as a ruggedly romantic, anti-Communist Che Guevara. His membership of Rabbani’s Islamist group and reactionary views on most social issues were barely mentioned. But if he had presented an image of incorruptible masculinity to his supporters in the West, it was not the same at home. Rape and the heroin trade were not uncommon in areas under his control.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [6]&lt;/a&gt; Masoud’s supporters are currently in the government, but are not considered one hundred per cent reliable as far as &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; is concerned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To the west, sheltered by neighbouring Iran, lies the ancient city of Herat, once a centre of learning and culture where poets, artists and scholars flourished. Among the important works illustrated here over the course of three centuries was a 15th-century version of the classic &lt;i&gt;Miraj-nameh&lt;/i&gt;, an early medieval account of the Prophet’s ascent to heaven from the Dome of the Rock and the punishments he observed as he passed through hell.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn7&quot; name=&quot;_ednref7&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; The stunning illustrations were exquisitely calligraphed by Malik Bakshi in the Uighur script. There are 61 paintings in all, created with great love for the Prophet of Islam. He is depicted with Central Asian features and seen flying to heaven on a magical steed with a woman’s head. There are also illustrations of a meeting with Gabriel and Adam, a sighting of houris at the gates of Paradise, and of winebibbers being punished in hell. European scholars have suggested that an early Latin translation of the poem may have been a source of inspiration for Dante.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [7]&lt;/a&gt; In modern Herat, the Shia warlord Ismail Khan holds sway. A former army captain inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ismail achieved instant fame by leading a garrison revolt against the pro-Moscow regime in 1979. Backed by Teheran he built up a strong force that united all the Shia groups and were to trouble the Russians throughout their stay. Tens of thousands of refugees from this region (where a Persian dialect is the spoken language) were given work, shelter and training in Iran. From 1992–95, the province was run on authoritarian lines. It was a harsh regime: Ismail Khan’s half-witted effrontery soon began to alienate his allies, while his high-tax and forced conscription policies angered peasant families. By the time the Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996, support had already drained away from the warlord. Herat fell without a struggle, and Ismail was imprisoned by the Taliban, only escaping in March 2000. His supporters meanwhile crossed the border to Iran where they bided their time, to return in October 2001 under &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; cover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The south was another story again. The Pashtun villages bore the brunt of the fighting during the 1980s and 90s.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn8&quot; name=&quot;_ednref8&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Afghanistan’s ethnography has generated a highly politicized statistical debate. The 6-year survey carried out by a Norwegian foundation is probably the most accurate. This suggests that Pashtuns make up an estimated 63 per cent of the population, along with the mainly Persian-speaking Tajiks (12 per cent), Uzbeks (9 per cent) and the mainly Shia Hazaras (6 per cent):  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;wak&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Foundation, Norway 1999. The  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;cia&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Factbook, by contrast, gives 42, 27, 9 and 9 per cent respectively. The tiny non-Muslim minority of Hindus and Sikhs, mainly shopkeepers and traders in Kabul, were displaced by the Taliban; some were killed, and thousands fled to India.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [8]&lt;/a&gt; Rapid population growth, coupled with the disruptions of war and the resulting loss of livestock, hastened the collapse of the subsistence economy. In many districts this was replaced by poppy cultivation and the rule of local bandits and strongmen. By the early 1990s, three militant Sunni groups had acquired dominance in the region: the Taliban, the group led by Ahmed Shah Masoud from the Panjsher province, and the followers of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, once Pakistan’s favourite, who had been groomed by the Saudis as the new leader. The jihad was long over, and now the jihadis were at each other’s throats, with control of the drug trade the major stake in a brutal power struggle. Under Benazir Bhutto’s second premiership, Pakistan’s military backing for the Taliban proved decisive. But the overthrow of the Mullah Omar government in the winter of 2001 saw the re-emergence of many of the local gangsters whose predations it had partly checked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Anointment of Karzai&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Washington assigned the task of assembling a new government to Zalmay Khalilzad, its Afghan-American pro-consul in Kabul. The capital was occupied by competing militias, united only by opposition to the toppled Taliban, and their representatives had to be accommodated on every level. The Northern Alliance candidate for president, Abdul Haq of Jalalabad, had conveniently been captured and executed in October 2001 by the Taliban when he entered the country with a small group from Pakistan. (His supporters alleged betrayal by the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;cia&lt;/span&gt; and the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;isi&lt;/span&gt;, who were unhappy about his links to Russia and Iran, and tipped off Mullah Omar.) Another obvious anti-Taliban candidate was Ahmed Shah Masoud; but he had also been killed—by a suicide bomber of unknown provenance—two days before 9.11. Masoud would no doubt have been the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;eu&lt;/span&gt; choice for Afghan president, had he lived; the French government issued a postage stamp with his portrait, and Kabul airport bears his name. Whether he would have proved as reliable a client as Khalilzad’s transplanted protégé, Hamid Karzai, must now remain an open question. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Aware that the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; could not run the country without the Northern Alliance and its backers in Teheran and Moscow, Khalilzad toned down the emancipatory rhetoric and concentrated on the serious business of occupation. The coalition he constructed resembled a blind octopus, with mainly Tajik limbs and Karzai as its unseeing eye. The Afghan president comes from the Durrani tribe of Pashtuns from Kandahar. His father had served in a junior capacity in Zahir Shah’s government. Young Karzai backed the mujaheddin against Russia and later supported the Taliban, though he turned down their offer to become Afghanistan’s Ambassador to the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;un&lt;/span&gt;, preferring to relocate and work for &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;unocal&lt;/span&gt;. Here he backed up Khalilzad, who was then representing CentGas in their bid to construct a pipeline that would take gas from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan and India.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn9&quot; name=&quot;_ednref9&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; The CentGas consortium, incorporated in 1997, included  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;unocal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Gazprom, Hyundai and oil companies from Saudi Arabia, Japan and Pakistan. In late 1997 a Taliban delegation received full honours when they visited  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;unocal hq&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, hoping to sign the £2bn pipeline contract. According to the Sunday Telegraph (‘Oil Barons Court Taliban in Texas’, 14 December 1997): ‘the Islamic warriors appear to have been persuaded to close the deal, not through delicate negotiation but by old-fashioned Texan hospitality. Dressed in traditional shalwar kameez, Afghan waistcoats and loose, black turbans, the high-ranking delegation was given  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;vip&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; treatment during the four-day stay.’ The project was suspended in 1998, as the Taliban were split on whom to award the pipeline project to: Mullah Rabbani preferred the offer from the Argentine company Bridas, while Mullah Omar was strongly in favour of the American-led deal. But  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;–Taliban contacts continued till mid-2001 both in Islamabad and New York, where the Taliban maintained a ‘diplomatic office’ headed by Abdul Hakim Mojahed.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [9]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;After his appointment as interim president, the Saudi daily &lt;i&gt;Al-Watan&lt;/i&gt; published a revealing profile of Karzai, stating that he had been a &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;cia&lt;/span&gt; pawn since the 80s, with his status on the Afghan chessboard enhanced every few years:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since then, Karzai’s ties with the Americans have not been interrupted. At the same time, he established ties with the British and other European and international sides, especially after he became deputy foreign minister in 1992 in the wake of the Afghan mujaheddin’s assumption of power and the overthrow of the pro-Moscow Najibullah regime. Karzai found no contradiction between his ties with the Americans and his support for the Taliban movement as of 1994, when the Americans had—secretly and through the Pakistanis—supported the Taliban’s assumption of power to put an end to the civil war and the actual partition of Afghanistan due to the failure of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s experience in ruling the country.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn10&quot; name=&quot;_ednref10&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;bbc&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Monitoring Service, 15 December 2001. &#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [10]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Karzai was duly installed in December 2001, but intimacy with &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; intelligence networks failed to translate into authority or legitimacy at home. Karzai harboured no illusions about his popularity in the country. He knew his biological and political life was heavily dependent on the occupation and demanded a bodyguard of &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; Marines or American mercenaries, rather than a security detail from his own ethnic Pashtun base.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn11&quot; name=&quot;_ednref11&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; The late Benazir Bhutto made the same request for American protection on her return to Pakistan, but in her case it was vetoed by Islamabad.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [11]&lt;/a&gt; There were at least three coup attempts against him in 2002–03 by his Northern Alliance allies; these were fought off by the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;isaf&lt;/span&gt;, which was largely tied down in assuring Karzai’s security—while also providing a vivid illustration of where his support lay.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn12&quot; name=&quot;_ednref12&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Barry McCaffrey, ‘Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan’,  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Military Academy Memorandum, West Point,  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ny&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2006, p. 8.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [12]&lt;/a&gt; A quick-fix presidential contest organized at great expense by Western &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;pr&lt;/span&gt; firms in October 2004—just in time for the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; elections—failed to bolster support for the puppet president inside the country. Karzai’s habit of parachuting his relatives and protégés into provincial governor or police chief jobs has driven many local communities into alliance with the Taliban, as the main anti-government force. In Zabul, Helmand and elsewhere, all the insurgents had to do was ‘approach the victims of the pro-Karzai strongmen and promise them protection and support. Attempts by local elders to seek protection in Kabul routinely ended nowhere, as the wrongdoers enjoyed either direct &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; support or Karzai’s sympathy.’&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn13&quot; name=&quot;_ednref13&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, London 2007, p. 60. The corruption and brutality of the newly established Afghan National Police is also widely credited with turning the population against the Karzai government.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [13]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Nor is it any secret that Karzai’s younger brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, has now become one of the richest drug barons in the country. At a meeting with Pakistan’s president in 2005, when Karzai was bleating about Pakistan’s inability to stop cross-border smuggling, Musharraf suggested that perhaps Karzai should set an example by bringing his sibling under control. (The hatred for each other of these two close allies of Washington is well known in the region.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;New inequalities&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Also feeding the resentment is the behaviour of a new elite clustered around Karzai and the occupying forces, which has specialized in creaming off foreign aid to create its own criminal networks of graft and patronage. The corruptions of this layer grow each month like an untreated tumour. Western funds are siphoned off to build fancy homes for the native enforcers. Housing scandals erupted as early as 2002, when cabinet ministers awarded themselves and favoured cronies prime real estate in Kabul where land prices were rocketing, since the occupiers and their camp followers had to live in the style to which they were accustomed. Karzai’s colleagues, protected by &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;isaf&lt;/span&gt; troops, built their large villas in full view of the mud-brick hovels of the poor. The burgeoning slum settlements of Kabul, where the population has now swollen to an estimated 3 million, are a measure of the social crisis that has engulfed the country.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The ancient city has suffered cruelly over the past thirty years. Jade Maiwand, the modernized ‘Oxford Street’ cut through the centre in the 1970s, was reduced to rubble during the warfare of 1992–96. An American-Afghan architect describes how Kabul has been relentlessly transformed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;from a modern capital, to the military and political headquarters of an invading army, to the besieged seat of power of a puppet regime, to the front lines of factional conflict resulting in the destruction of two-thirds of its urban mass, to the testing fields of religious fanaticism which erased from the city the final layers of urban life, to the target of an international war on terrorism.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn14&quot; name=&quot;_ednref14&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Ajmal Maiwandi, ‘Re-Doing Kabul’, presented at  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;lse&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, 11 July 2002.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [14]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Yet never have such gaping inequalities featured on this scale before. Little of the supposed $19 billion ‘aid and reconstruction’ money has reached the majority of Afghans. The mains electricity supply is worse now than five years ago, and while the rich can use private generators to power their air conditioners, hot-water heaters, computers and satellite &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;tv&lt;/span&gt;s, average Kabulis ‘suffered a summer without fans and face a winter without heaters.’&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn15&quot; name=&quot;_ednref15&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Barnett Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January–February 2007.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [15]&lt;/a&gt; As a result, hundreds of shelterless Afghans are literally freezing to death each winter. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Then there are the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;ngo&lt;/span&gt;s who descended on the country like locusts after the occupation. As one observer reports:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A reputed 10,000 &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;ngo &lt;/span&gt;staff have turned Kabul into the Klondike during the gold rush, building office blocks, driving up rents, cruising about in armoured jeeps and spending stupefying sums of other people’s money, essentially on themselves. They take orders only from some distant agency, but then the same goes for the American army, &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt;, the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;un&lt;/span&gt;, the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;eu&lt;/span&gt; and the supposedly sovereign Afghan government.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn16&quot; name=&quot;_ednref16&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Simon Jenkins, ‘It takes inane optimism to see victory in Afghanistan’, Guardian, 8 August 2007.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [16]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Even supporters of the occupation have lost patience with these bodies, and some of the most successful candidates in the 2005 National Assembly elections made an attack on them a centre-piece of their campaigns. Worse, according to one &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; specialist, ‘their well-funded activities highlighted the poverty and ineffectiveness of the civil administration and discredited its local representatives in the eyes of the local populace.’&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn17&quot; name=&quot;_ednref17&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; S. Frederick Starr, ‘Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building’, in Fukuyama, ed., Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Baltimore 2006, p. 117.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [17]&lt;/a&gt; Unsurprisingly, &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;ngo&lt;/span&gt; employees began to be targeted by the insurgents, including in the north, and had to hire mercenary protection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;In sum: even in the estimate of the West’s own specialists and institutions, ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan has been flawed in its very conception. It has so far produced a puppet president dependent for his survival on foreign mercenaries, a corrupt and abusive police force, a ‘non-functioning’ judiciary, a thriving criminal layer and a deepening social and economic crisis. It beggars belief to argue that ‘more of this’ will be the answer to Afghanistan’s problems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;An Afghan surge?&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The argument that more &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; troops are the solution is equally unsustainable. All the evidence suggests that the brutality of the occupying forces has been one of the main sources of recruits for the Taliban. American air power, lovingly referred to as ‘Big Daddy’ by frightened &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; soldiers on unwelcome terrain, is far from paternal when it comes to targeting Pashtun villages. There is widespread fury among Afghans at the number of civilian casualties, many of them children. There have been numerous incidents of rape and rough treatment of women by &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;isaf&lt;/span&gt; soldiers, as well as indiscriminate bombing of villages and house-to-house search-and-arrest missions. The behaviour of the foreign mercenaries backing up the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; forces is just as bad. Even sympathetic observers admit that ‘their alcohol consumption and patronage of a growing number of brothels in Kabul . . . is arousing public anger and resentment.’&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn18&quot; name=&quot;_ednref18&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Barnett Rubin, ‘Proposals for Improved Stability in Afghanistan’, in Ivo Daalder et al, eds, Crescent of Crisis:  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;–European Strategy for the Greater Middle East, Washington,  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dc&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2006, p. 149.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [18]&lt;/a&gt; To this could be added the deaths by torture at the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt;-run Bagram prison and the resuscitation of a Soviet-era security law under which detainees are being sentenced to 20-year jail terms on the basis of summary allegations by &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; military authorities. All this creates a thirst for dignity that can only be assuaged by genuine independence. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Talk of ‘victory’ sounds increasingly hollow to Afghan ears. Many who detest the Taliban are so angered by the failures of &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; and the behaviour of its troops that they are pleased there is some opposition. What was initially viewed by some locals as a necessary police action against al-Qaeda following the 9.11 attacks is now perceived by a growing majority in the region as a fully fledged imperial occupation. Successive recent reports have suggested that the unpopularity of the government and the ‘disrespectful’ behaviour of the occupying troops have had the effect of creating nostalgia for the time when the Taliban were in power. The repression leaves people with no option but to back those trying to resist, especially in a part of the world where the culture of revenge is strong. When a whole community feels threatened it reinforces solidarity, regardless of the character or weakness of those who fight back. This does not just apply to the countryside. The mass protests in Kabul, when civilians were killed by an American military vehicle, signalled the obvious targets:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rioters chanted slogans against the United States and President Karzai and attacked the Parliament building, the offices of media outlets and nongovernmental organizations, diplomatic residences, brothels, and hotels and restaurants that purportedly served alcohol. The police, many of whom disappeared, proved incompetent, and the vulnerability of the government to mass violence became clear.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn19&quot; name=&quot;_ednref19&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [19]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;As the British and Russians discovered to their cost in the preceding two centuries, Afghans do not like being occupied. If a second-generation Taliban is now growing and creating new alliances it is not because its sectarian religious practices have become popular, but because it is the only available umbrella for national liberation. Initially, the middle-cadre Taliban who fled across the border in November 2001 and started low-level guerrilla activity the following year attracted only a trickle of new recruits from madrasas and refugee camps. From 2004 onwards, increasing numbers of young Waziris were radicalized by Pakistani military and police incursions in the tribal areas, as well as devastating attacks on villages by unmanned &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; ‘drones’. At the same time, the movement was starting to win active support from village mullahs in Zabul, Helmand, Ghazni, Paktika and Kandahar provinces, and then in the towns. By 2006 there were reports of Kabul mullahs who had previously supported Karzai’s allies but were now railing against the foreigners and the government; calls for jihad against the occupiers were heard in the north-east border provinces of Takhar and Badakhshan. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The largest pool for new Taliban recruits, according to a well-informed recent estimate, has been ‘communities antagonized by the local authorities and security forces’. In Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan, Karzai’s cronies—district and provincial governors, security bosses, police chiefs—are quite prepared to tip off &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; troops against their local rivals, as well as subjecting the latter to harassment and extortion. In these circumstances, the Taliban are the only available defence. (According to the same report, the Taliban themselves have claimed that families driven into refugee camps by indiscriminate &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; airpower attacks on their villages have been their major source of recruits.) By 2006 the movement was winning the support of traders and businessmen in Kandahar, and led a mini ‘Tet offensive’ there that year. One reason suggested for their increasing support in towns is that the new-model Taliban have relaxed their religious strictures, for males at least—no longer demanding beards or banning music—and improved their propaganda: producing cassette tapes and &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;cd&lt;/span&gt;s of popular singers, and &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;dvd&lt;/span&gt;s of &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; and Israeli atrocities in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn20&quot; name=&quot;_ednref20&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, pp. 42, 69.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [20]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The re-emergence of the Taliban cannot therefore simply be blamed on Islamabad’s failure to police the border, or cut ‘command and control’ links, as the Americans claim. While the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;isi&lt;/span&gt; played a crucial role in bringing the Taliban to power in 1996 and in the retreat of 2001, they no longer have the same degree of control over a more diffuse and widespread movement, for which the occupation itself has been the main recruiting sergeant. It is a traditional colonial ploy to blame ‘outsiders’ for internal problems: Karzai specializes in this approach. If anything, the destabilization functions in the other direction: the war in Afghanistan has created a critical situation in two Pakistani frontier provinces, and the use of the Pakistan army by Centcom has resulted in suicide terrorism in Lahore, where the Federal Investigation Agency and the Naval War College have been targeted by supporters of the Afghan insurgents. The Pashtun majority in Afghanistan has always had close links to its fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan. The present border was an imposition by the British Empire, but it has always remained porous. It is virtually impossible to build a Texan fence or an Israeli wall across the mountainous and largely unmarked 1,500-mile frontier that separates the two countries. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Older models&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The current occupation of Afghanistan naturally recalls colonial operations in the region, not just to Afghans but to some Western myth-makers—usually British, but with a few Subcontinental mimics—who try to draw lessons from the older model; the implication being that the British were ‘good imperialists’ who have a great deal to teach the brutish, impatient Americans. The British administrators were, for the most part, racist to the core, and their self-proclaimed ‘competence’ involved the efficient imposition of social apartheid in every colony they controlled. They could be equally brutal in Africa, the Middle East and India. Though a promise of civilizational uplift was required as ideological justification, then as now, the facts of the colonial legacy speak for themselves. In 1947, the year the British left India, the overwhelming majority of midnight’s children were illiterate, and 85 per cent of the economy was rural.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn21&quot; name=&quot;_ednref21&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; ‘Per capita income was about one-twentieth of the level then attained in developed countries . . . Illiteracy was a high 84 per cent and the majority (60 per cent) of children in the 6 to 11 age-group did not attend school; mass communicable diseases (malaria, smallpox and cholera) were widespread and, in the absence of a good public health service and sanitation, mortality rates (27 per 1,000) were very high.’ Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai, eds, Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. II: c.1757–c.1970, Cambridge 1983, p. 23.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [21]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Not bad intentions or botched initiatives, but the imperial presence itself was the problem. Kipling is much quoted today by editorialists urging a bigger Western ‘footprint’ in Afghanistan, but even he was fully aware of the hatred felt by the Pashtuns for the British, and wrote as much in one of his last despatches from Peshawar in April 1885 to the &lt;i&gt;Civil and Military Gazette&lt;/i&gt; in Lahore:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pathans, Afridis, Logas, Kohistanis, Turcomans and a hundred other varieties of the turbulent Afghan race, are gathered in the vast human menagerie between the Edwardes Gate and the Ghor Khutri. As an Englishman passes, they will turn to scowl on him, and in many cases to spit fluently on the ground after he has passed. One burly, big-paunched ruffian, with shaven head and a neck creased and dimpled with rolls of fat, is specially zealous in this religious rite—contenting himself with no perfunctory performance, but with a whole-souled expectoration, that must be as refreshing to his comrades as it is disgusting to the European.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;One reason among many for the Pashtuns’ historic resentment was the torching of the famous bazaar in Kabul, a triumph of Mughal architecture. Ali Mardan Khan, a renowned governor, architect and engineer, had built the &lt;i&gt;chahr-chatta&lt;/i&gt; (four-sided) roofed and arcaded central market in the 17th century on the model of those in old Euro-Arabian Muslim cities—Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Palermo or Córdoba. It was regarded as unique in the region; nothing on the same scale was built in Lahore or Delhi. The bazaar was deliberately destroyed in 1842 by General Pollock’s ‘Army of Retribution’, remembered as amongst the worst killers, looters and marauders ever to arrive in Afghanistan, a contest in which competition remains strong. Defeated in a number of cities and forced to evacuate Kabul, the British punished its citizens by removing the market from the map. What will remain of Kabul when the current occupiers finally withdraw is yet to be seen, but its spreading mass of deeply impoverished squatter settlements suggest that it is set to be one of the major new capitals of the ‘planet of slums’.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn22&quot; name=&quot;_ednref22&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Mike Davis, ‘Planet of Slums’,  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nlr&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 26, March–April 2004, p. 13.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [22]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The Western occupation of Afghanistan is now confronted with five seemingly intractable, interrelated problems. The systemic failures of its nation-building strategy, the corruption of its local agents, the growing alienation of large sectors of the population and the strengthening of armed resistance are all compounded by the distortions wrought by the opium-heroin industry on the country’s economy. According to &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;un&lt;/span&gt; estimates, narcotics account for 53 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product, and the poppy fields continue to spread. Some 90 per cent of the world opium supply emanates from Afghanistan. Since 2003 the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; mission has made no serious attempt to bring about a reduction in this lucrative trade. Karzai’s own supporters would rapidly desert if their activities in this sphere were disrupted, and the amount of state help needed over many years to boost agriculture and cottage industries and reduce dependence on poppy farming would require an entirely different set of priorities. Only a surreal utopian could expect &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; countries, busy privatizing and deregulating their own economies, to embark upon full-scale national-development projects abroad. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;NATO’s goals&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;It need hardly be added that the bombardment and occupation of Afghanistan has been a disastrous—and predictable—failure in capturing the perpetrators of 9.11. This could only have been the result of effective police work; not of international war and military occupation. Everything that has happened in Afghanistan since 2001—not to mention Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon—has had the opposite effect, as the West’s own intelligence reports have repeatedly confirmed. According to the official 9.11 Commission report, Mullah Omar’s initial response to Washington’s demands that Osama Bin Laden be handed over and al-Qaeda deprived of a safe haven was ‘not negative’; he himself had opposed any al-Qaeda attack on &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; targets.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn23&quot; name=&quot;_ednref23&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039;The 9.11 Commission Report, New York 2004, pp. 333–4; 251–2. &#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [23]&lt;/a&gt; But while the Mullah was playing for time, the White House closed down negotiations. It required a swift war of revenge. Afghanistan had been denominated the first port of call in the ‘global war on terror’, with Iraq already the Administration’s main target. The shock-and-awe six-week aerial onslaught that followed was merely a drumroll for the forthcoming intervention in Iraq, with no military rationale in Afghanistan. Predictably, it only gave al-Qaeda leaders the chance to vanish into the hills. To portray the invasion as a ‘war of self-defence’ for &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; makes a mockery of international law, which was perverted to twist a flukishly successful attack by a tiny, terrorist Arab groupuscule into an excuse for an open-ended American military thrust into the Middle East and Central Eurasia.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;Herein lie the reasons for the near-unanimity among Western opinion-makers that the occupation must not only continue but expand—‘many billions over many years’. They are to be sought not in the mountain fastnesses of Afghanistan, but in Washington and Brussels. As the &lt;i&gt;Economist&lt;/i&gt; summarizes, ‘Defeat would be a body blow not only to the Afghans, but’—and more importantly, of course—‘to the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; alliance’.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn24&quot; name=&quot;_ednref24&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; ‘Must they be wars without end?’. &#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [24]&lt;/a&gt; As ever, geopolitics prevails over Afghan interests in the calculus of the big powers. The basing agreement signed by the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; with its appointee in Kabul in May 2005 gives the Pentagon the right to maintain a massive military presence in Afghanistan in perpetuity, potentially including nuclear missiles. That Washington is not seeking permanent bases in this fraught and inhospitable terrain simply for the sake of ‘democratization and good governance’ was made clear by &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt;’s Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Brookings Institution in February this year: a permanent &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato &lt;/span&gt;presence in a country that borders the ex-Soviet republics, China, Iran and Pakistan was too good to miss.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn25&quot; name=&quot;_ednref25&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; ‘Afghanistan and  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nato&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: Forging the 21st Century Alliance’, 29 February 2008; available on Brookings website.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [25]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;More strategically, Afghanistan has become a central theatre for reconstituting, and extending, the West’s power-political grip on the world order. It provides, first, an opportunity for the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; to shrug off problems in persuading its allies to play a broader role in Iraq. As Obama and Clinton have stressed, America and its allies ‘have greater unity of purpose in Afghanistan. The ultimate outcome of &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt;’s effort to stabilize Afghanistan and &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; leadership of that effort may well affect the cohesiveness of the alliance and Washington’s ability to shape &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt;’s future.’&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn26&quot; name=&quot;_ednref26&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Paul Gallis, ‘ &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nato&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in Afghanistan’,  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;crs&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Report for Congress, 23 October 2007.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [26]&lt;/a&gt; Beyond this, it is the rise of China that has prompted &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; strategists to propose a vastly expanded role for the Western military alliance. Once focused on the Euro-Atlantic area, a recent essay in &lt;i&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;i&gt; Review &lt;/i&gt;suggests, ‘in the 21st century &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; must become an alliance &lt;i&gt;founded&lt;/i&gt; on the Euro-Atlantic area, designed to project systemic stability beyond its borders’:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The centre of gravity of power on this planet is moving inexorably eastward . . . The Asia-Pacific region brings much that is dynamic and positive to this world, but as yet the rapid change therein is neither stable nor embedded in stable institutions. Until this is achieved, it is the strategic responsibility of Europeans and North Americans, and the institutions they have built, to lead the way . . . security effectiveness in such a world is impossible without both legitimacy and capability.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn27&quot; name=&quot;_ednref27&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Julian Lindley-French, ‘Big World, Big Future, Big  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nato’&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;,  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;smallcaps&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nato&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Review, Winter 2005.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [27]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The only way to protect the international system the West has built, the author continues, is to ‘re-energize’ the transatlantic relationship: ‘There can be no systemic security without Asian security, and there will be no Asian security without a strong role for the West therein.’&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;These ambitions have yet to be realized. In Afghanistan there were angry street demonstrations against Karzai’s signing of the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; bases agreement—a clear indication, if one was still needed, that &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; will have to take Karzai with them if they withdraw. Uzbekistan responded by asking the United States to withdraw its base and personnel from their country. The Russians and Chinese are reported to have protested strongly in private, and subsequently conducted joint military operations on each other’s territory for the first time: ‘concern over apparent &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; plans for permanent bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia’ was an important cause of their rapprochement.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn28&quot; name=&quot;_ednref28&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; Rubin, ‘Proposals for Improved Stability in Afghanistan’.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [28]&lt;/a&gt; More limply, Iran responded by increasing export duties, bringing construction in Herat to a halt.&lt;a href=&quot;#_edn29&quot; name=&quot;_ednref29&quot; title=&quot;&quot; onMouseOver=&quot;return overlib(&#039; In response to Karzai’s pleas, Teheran proposed a treaty that would prohibit foreign intelligence operations in each country against the other; hard to see how Karzai could have signed this with a straight face.&#039;, FGCOLOR, &#039;#E3E3E3&#039;, BGCOLOR, &#039;#000000&#039;)&quot; onMouseOut=&quot;nd();&quot;&gt; [29]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;There are at least two routes out of the Khyber impasse. The first and worst would be to Balkanize the country. This appears to be the dominant pattern of imperial hegemony at the moment, but whereas the Kurds in Iraq and the Kosovars and others in the former Yugoslavia were willing client-nationalists, the likelihood of Tajiks or Hazaras playing this role effectively is more remote in Afghanistan. Some &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; intelligence officers have been informally discussing the creation of a Pashtun state that unites the tribes and dissolves the Durand Line, but this would destabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan to such a degree that the consequences would be unpredictable. In any event there appear to be no takers in either country at the moment. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The alternative would require a withdrawal of all &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; forces, either preceded or followed by a regional pact to guarantee Afghan stability for the next ten years. Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia and, possibly, China could guarantee and support a functioning national government, pledged to preserve the ethnic and religious diversity of Afghanistan and create a space in which all its citizens can breathe, think and eat every day. It would need a serious social and economic plan to rebuild the country and provide the basic necessities for its people. This would not only be in the interests of Afghanistan, it would be seen as such by its people—physically, politically and morally exhausted by decades of war and two occupations. Violence, arbitrary or deliberate, has been their fate for too long. They want the nightmare to end and not be replaced with horrors of a different kind. Religious extremists would get short shrift from the people if they disrupted an agreed peace and began a jihad to recreate the Taliban Emirate of Mullah Omar.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;artbody&quot;&gt;The &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; occupation has not made this task easy. Its predictable failures have revived the Taliban, and increasingly the Pashtuns are uniting behind them. But though the Taliban have been entirely conflated with al-Qaeda in the Western media, most of their supporters are driven by local concerns; their political evolution would be more likely to parallel that of Pakistan’s domesticated Islamists if the invaders were to leave. A &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; withdrawal could facilitate a serious peace process. It might also benefit Pakistan, provided its military leaders abandoned foolish notions of ‘strategic depth’ and viewed India not as an enemy but as a possible partner in creating a cohesive regional framework within which many contentious issues could be resolved. Are Pakistan’s military leaders and politicians capable of grasping the nettle and moving their country forward? Will Washington let them? The solution is political, not military. And it lies in the region, not in Washington or Brussels.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;hr/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref1&quot; name=&quot;_edn1&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;           					 [1]&lt;/a&gt;  In fact, the only period in Afghan history where women were granted equal rights and educated was from 1979–89, the decade it was ruled by the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;pdpa&lt;/span&gt;, backed by Soviet troops. Repressive in many ways, on the health and education fronts real progress was achieved, as in Iraq under Saddam. Hence the nostalgia for the past amongst poorer sections of society in both countries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref2&quot; name=&quot;_edn2&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [2]&lt;/a&gt;  Visiting Madrid after Zapatero’s election triumph of March 2008, I was informed by a senior government official that they had considered a total withdrawal from Afghanistan a few months before the polls but had been outmanoeuvred by the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; promising Spain that the head of its military would be proposed for commander of the &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;nato&lt;/span&gt; forces, and a withdrawal from Kabul would disrupt this possibility. Spain drew back, only to discover it had been tricked. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref3&quot; name=&quot;_edn3&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;           					 [3]&lt;/a&gt;  ‘Failing State’, &lt;i&gt;Guardian&lt;/i&gt;, 1 February 2008; see also ‘The Good War, Still to Be Won’ and ‘Gates, Truth and Afghanistan’, &lt;i&gt;New York Times&lt;/i&gt;, 20 August 2007 and 12 February 2008; ‘Must they be wars without end?’, &lt;i&gt;Economist&lt;/i&gt;, 13 December 2007; International Crisis Group, ‘Combating Afghanistan’s Insurgency’, 2 November 2006.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref4&quot; name=&quot;_edn4&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [4]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;i&gt;New York Times&lt;/i&gt;, 5 November 2006.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref5&quot; name=&quot;_edn5&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;           					 [5]&lt;/a&gt;  Pakistan’s key role in securing this ‘victory’ was underplayed in the Western media at the time. The public was told that it was elite Special Forces units and &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;cia&lt;/span&gt; ‘specialists’ that had liberated Afghanistan; having triumphed here they could now be sent on to Iraq.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref6&quot; name=&quot;_edn6&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [6]&lt;/a&gt;  Masoud had been a favourite pin-up in Paris during the Soviet–Afghan war, usually portrayed as a ruggedly romantic, anti-Communist Che Guevara. His membership of Rabbani’s Islamist group and reactionary views on most social issues were barely mentioned. But if he had presented an image of incorruptible masculinity to his supporters in the West, it was not the same at home. Rape and the heroin trade were not uncommon in areas under his control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref7&quot; name=&quot;_edn7&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [7]&lt;/a&gt;  The stunning illustrations were exquisitely calligraphed by Malik Bakshi in the Uighur script. There are 61 paintings in all, created with great love for the Prophet of Islam. He is depicted with Central Asian features and seen flying to heaven on a magical steed with a woman’s head. There are also illustrations of a meeting with Gabriel and Adam, a sighting of houris at the gates of Paradise, and of winebibbers being punished in hell. European scholars have suggested that an early Latin translation of the poem may have been a source of inspiration for Dante.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref8&quot; name=&quot;_edn8&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;           					 [8]&lt;/a&gt;  Afghanistan’s ethnography has generated a highly politicized statistical debate. The 6-year survey carried out by a Norwegian foundation is probably the most accurate. This suggests that Pashtuns make up an estimated 63 per cent of the population, along with the mainly Persian-speaking Tajiks (12 per cent), Uzbeks (9 per cent) and the mainly Shia Hazaras (6 per cent): &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;wak&lt;/span&gt; Foundation, Norway 1999. The &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;cia&lt;/span&gt; Factbook, by contrast, gives 42, 27, 9 and 9 per cent respectively. The tiny non-Muslim minority of Hindus and Sikhs, mainly shopkeepers and traders in Kabul, were displaced by the Taliban; some were killed, and thousands fled to India.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref9&quot; name=&quot;_edn9&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [9]&lt;/a&gt;  The CentGas consortium, incorporated in 1997, included &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;unocal&lt;/span&gt;, Gazprom, Hyundai and oil companies from Saudi Arabia, Japan and Pakistan. In late 1997 a Taliban delegation received full honours when they visited &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;unocal hq&lt;/span&gt;, hoping to sign the £2bn pipeline contract. According to the &lt;i&gt;Sunday Telegraph &lt;/i&gt;(‘Oil Barons Court Taliban in Texas’, 14 December 1997): ‘the Islamic warriors appear to have been persuaded to close the deal, not through delicate negotiation but by old-fashioned Texan hospitality. Dressed in traditional &lt;i&gt;shalwar kameez&lt;/i&gt;, Afghan waistcoats and loose, black turbans, the high-ranking delegation was given &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;vip&lt;/span&gt; treatment during the four-day stay.’ The project was suspended in 1998, as the Taliban were split on whom to award the pipeline project to: Mullah Rabbani preferred the offer from the Argentine company Bridas, while Mullah Omar was strongly in favour of the American-led deal. But &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt;–Taliban contacts continued till mid-2001 both in Islamabad and New York, where the Taliban maintained a ‘diplomatic office’ headed by Abdul Hakim Mojahed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref10&quot; name=&quot;_edn10&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;           					 [10]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;bbc&lt;/span&gt; Monitoring Service, 15 December 2001. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref11&quot; name=&quot;_edn11&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [11]&lt;/a&gt;  The late Benazir Bhutto made the same request for American protection on her return to Pakistan, but in her case it was vetoed by Islamabad.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref12&quot; name=&quot;_edn12&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [12]&lt;/a&gt;  Barry McCaffrey, ‘Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan’, &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt; Military Academy Memorandum, West Point, &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;ny&lt;/span&gt; 2006, p. 8.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref13&quot; name=&quot;_edn13&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;           					 [13]&lt;/a&gt;  Antonio Giustozzi, &lt;i&gt;Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan&lt;/i&gt;, London 2007, p. 60. The corruption and brutality of the newly established Afghan National Police is also widely credited with turning the population against the Karzai government.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref14&quot; name=&quot;_edn14&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [14]&lt;/a&gt;  Ajmal Maiwandi, ‘Re-Doing Kabul’, presented at &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;lse&lt;/span&gt;, 11 July 2002.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref15&quot; name=&quot;_edn15&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [15]&lt;/a&gt;  Barnett Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, &lt;i&gt;Foreign Affairs&lt;/i&gt;, January–February 2007.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref16&quot; name=&quot;_edn16&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;           					 [16]&lt;/a&gt;  Simon Jenkins, ‘It takes inane optimism to see victory in Afghanistan’, &lt;i&gt;Guardian&lt;/i&gt;, 8 August 2007.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref17&quot; name=&quot;_edn17&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [17]&lt;/a&gt;  S. Frederick Starr, ‘Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building’, in Fukuyama, ed., &lt;i&gt;Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq&lt;/i&gt;, Baltimore 2006, p. 117.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class=&quot;footnote&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#_ednref18&quot; name=&quot;_edn18&quot; title=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
           					 [18]&lt;/a&gt;  Barnett Rubin, ‘Proposals for Improved Stability in Afghanistan’, in Ivo Daalder et al, eds, &lt;i&gt;Crescent of Crisis: &lt;/i&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;us&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;–European Strategy for the Greater Middle East&lt;/i&gt;, Washington, &lt;span class=&quot;smallcaps&quot;&gt;dc&lt;/span&gt; 2006, p. 149.&lt;/p&gt;